In Yap v Matic [No 4] [2022] WASC 422 Solomon J in dealing with contempt refers to sovereign citizenship -
On 27 October 2022, I found the defendant Sandi Matic guilty of contempt by reason of his breach of the court's orders dated 11 February 2022. My reasons were set out in Yap v Matic [No 3] [2022] WASC 370, which in turn are to be read with reasons I published in Yap v Matic [2022] WASC 181.
The circumstances of Mr Matic's contempt are explained in those reasons and need not be repeated.
Procedural background
As Sandi Matic did not appear at the hearing of 27 October 2022, and also to give him further time to consider his position, I deferred the issue of the appropriate penalty to a hearing on 25 November 2022. Sandi Matic was given ample notice of that hearing. Sandi Matic did not attend on 25 November 2022. On that day I made an order that: The defendant, Sandi Matic, shall appear in person at the Supreme Court of Western Australia at 2.00pm on Wednesday, 30 November 2022, for delivery of the reserved decision.
Those orders were sent to Mr Matic from the court via email on 25 November 2022. Additionally, the plaintiffs have filed an affidavit of service by Cheryl Lorraine Harrison sworn 28 November 2022 that deposes to the fact that Mr Matic was personally served with those orders, as well as a letter from the plaintiffs' solicitors and a copy of the plaintiffs' submissions in respect of the penalty to be imposed.
I explained at the hearing on 30 November 2022 that there could be no doubt that Mr Matic had received and was aware of the order that he appear at that hearing, in person. That awareness was illustrated by Mr Matic's correspondence with the court, and with the plaintiffs' solicitors, up until and indeed during the hearing of 30 November 2022. In particular, less than an hour before Mr Matic was due to appear, he sent via email to my chambers a letter addressed to me. Relevantly, that letter included the following passage:
With no evidence to show that we are a named party to these proceedings we kindly decline your invitation to attend this meeting but we offer the Honourable Court to attend future appointments as a friend of the court, Amicus Curiae.
As I explained on 30 November 2022, Mr Matic's repeated failure to appear before the court has delayed these proceedings and interfered with the ability of the court to dispense with this matter.
I was therefore satisfied that Mr Matic's failure to appear when he had been ordered to do so was, on its face, grounds for the court to charge Mr Matic with contempt of court pursuant to O 55 r 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC). ...
Mr Matic emailed my chambers this morning, 7 December 2022, in the following terms:
i; private living and peaceful man, 'Sandi' accept your invitation to attend as special appointment to the Honourable Court today at 16:30 at Perth with intention to clarify the mistakes that we believe have been made.
That email is important for two reasons. The first is that it once again highlights Mr Matic's difficulty accepting the authority of the court. That is illustrated by his characterisation of a court order, and indeed of an arrest warrant, as an 'invitation to attend'. Secondly, this email confirms that Mr Matic did receive the court's orders dated 30 November 2022 and was given notice of the court's allegation of contempt and the circumstances giving rise to that charge.
At 12.45 pm today, Mr Matic was arrested and remanded in custody. Those are the circumstances that have led to Mr Matic's appearance today.
Penalty for contempt of court
I now return to the issue of the appropriate penalty to impose upon Mr Matic in relation to the conviction for contempt handed down on 27 October 2022.
In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic), the High Court adopted the description of the cardinal feature of the power to punish for contempt as being that it is 'an exercise of judicial power by the courts to protect the due administration of justice'.
Like that case, here the contempt proceedings arose in the course of a civil proceeding. The comments of the High Court reflect and embody a principle that is both fundamental and ubiquitous; that is that the rule of law and the administration of justice require that all persons in society accept that court orders manifest the application of the law by which all people are governed and that for civil society to be maintained, such orders must be obeyed. People are entitled to adopt and with limited qualifications to express, whatever beliefs they choose no matter how others may regard them. But compliance with court orders is a foundational feature of the rule of law. Many cases throughout the common law world have expressed that sentiment in one way or another. Relevantly, in a number of the cases in Australia, the offending conduct was undertaken brazenly in opposition to the court's authority for financial gain. In other cases, the conduct was part of an orchestrated campaign designed to achieve a purpose, such as a political or industrial outcome in which a deliberate decision was made to flout the court's authority in pursuit of the desired objective.
In at least some of those cases, public disregard for the authority of the court appeared to be part of the strategy in the achievement of the offender's objective. An important feature was the conscious disregard of the court's authority for personal gain or in furtherance of some cause.
An example is the High Court case of CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) itself. In that case, it was alleged that an industrial union had disobeyed orders made by the court by establishing a blockade of a construction site. As I have noted, in other cases, parties have disobeyed a court's order to make a financial gain or to agitate some political or social cause.
Here, it is less clear that the defendant was quite as strategic in his disobedience of the court's orders. He appears to have been motivated by a deep sense of grievance arising from his complaints in relation to a commercial transaction, and the proceedings that have been brought against him. The conduct which I have found amounted to a contempt appears to have been undertaken out of a sense of self-righteous anger, in which disregard of the court order was a collateral consequence
Put simply, it does not appear to me that disobedience of the court's orders or rejection of the court's authority was of itself the defendant's objective when he breached the injunction granted on 11 February 2022.
At the same time, the defendant has expressed views that could be characterised as inconsistent with an unqualified acceptance of the court's authority. These views have been expressed in comments made by Mr Matic before the court, and in correspondence to my chambers, and correspondence to the plaintiffs' solicitors. Those comments include what appear to be challenges to the court's authority to control the defendant, including the apparent preconditions of his submission to the court's authority, such as whether the court or a judicial officer has entered into a 'contract' with him. Other comments reflect somewhat incoherent or at least unorthodox views about establishing the identity of certain people. The defendant has, for example, demanded that the court identify the defendant himself. These communications have included misguided and distracting debate about the meaning of words such as 'you', and whether the defendant's name when expressed in capitals, refers to him or to some other entity. Some of the views expressed by the defendant might be regarded as irrational, bizarre, or even offensive.
The communications received by the court on 30 November 2022 referred to at [5], demonstrate the flavour of these comments. I have annexed a selection of that correspondence to this judgment at Annexure A and Annexure B.
For present purposes, the mischief in the comments with which I am concerned relates not to whether these views are correct or sensible, but rather to the acceptance or rejection of the court's authority.
It appears that to one extent or another, the views expressed by the defendant are shared by a growing group within society that has loosely been referred to as the sovereign citizen movement and perhaps by other names or descriptions. There are aspects of the views of that movement that have come before this and other courts, including some of the views expressed by this defendant, which reflect a rejection to one degree or another of the court's authority. Those views, and their apparent increasing popularity, or acceptance, cannot be dismissed as harmless or bemusing nonsense. The promulgation of such views and beliefs represents a dangerous corrosion of some of our society's most fundamental values in the maintenance of the rule of law and the administration of justice. The events in the United States of America over recent years reinforce the vigilance required to protect those values and the danger inherent in taking them for granted.
But at the same time, I am not persuaded, and certainly not beyond reasonable doubt, that it is the holding of such views which inspired Mr Matic to engage in the particular conduct that I have found amounted to the contempt of which he was convicted on 27 October 2022.
I am therefore not persuaded that for the purposes of this judgment, I should proceed on the basis that views expressed by this defendant regarding the authority of the court, were the motivating force for the particular behaviour that amounted to the contempt.
In the circumstances, it seems to me that the most important consideration is personal deterrence; that is, imposing a penalty that makes clear to the defendant that he should be conscious of the requirement to obey the court's orders. In Wood v Staunton (No 5), Dunford J summarised the relevant matters to consider in respect of the proper punishment to be imposed for contempt in refusing to answer a series of questions at a Royal Commission. That summary has been adopted in the context of disobedience of a court's order at a civil proceeding by this court; see for example State of Western Australia v Galati [No 4]. The relevant matters are as follows:
(i) the nature and seriousness of the contempt proved; (ii) the consequences of the contempt; (iii) the context in which the contempt was committed; (iv) the reason for the contempt including whether the contemnor intended subjectively to commit the contempt; (v) any benefit received by the contemnor; (vi) whether there has been any apology or public expression of contrition; (vii) the circumstances, character and antecedents of the contemnor; (viii) general and personal deterrence; and (ix) denunciation of the contempt.
