Last year's Victorian Legislative Council Inquiry into Extremism in Victoria report states
1 Introduction
F 1: The language used to describe any form of extremism is important and should be considered carefully.
F 2: The present threat of violence from far-left extremism is not equivalent to the present threat of violence from far-right extremism, but the domestic violent extremism threat landscape is continually evolving and changing.
F 3: Extremist movements have been identified as a significant issue in Australia. Findings from any future Commonwealth inquiry into these matters would be beneficial in increasing understanding of the issue at a national level.
2 Extremism is a global issue
F 4: The relationship between global, national and state economic policies can contribute to an environment where anti-immigration and anti-government sentiments grow, increasing the appeal of far-right extremist groups which claim to address these issues.
F 5: Global and domestic populist movements, particularly the mainstreaming of anti-immigration and anti-democratic ideas, are risk factors for legitimising the rhetoric of extremist movements.
F 6: The disruption from ongoing environmental deterioration and climate change should be considered a risk factor for increasing the threat of both far-left and far-right extremist groups.
F 7: The transnational elements of extremist movements must be considered alongside their domestic manifestations because of the borderless and leaderless nature of some violent extremist movements.
F 8: The impacts of and responses to violent extremism can be experienced globally, not just locally, with information about both extremist events, and government and community approaches in response to them, being accessible by a global audience.
3 Risk factors for far‑right extremism in Victoria
F 9: Far-right extremism is not new in Australia or Victoria, but there has been a re-emergence of far-right extremism, most notably from 2015 and 2016 onwards.
F 10: Social isolation, economic insecurity and inequality are risk factors that may play a part in increasing susceptibility to extremist narratives. Addressing these issues is important for wellbeing and social cohesion and may reduce the appeal of extremist narratives.
F 11: Evidence from stakeholders to the Inquiry and recent investigations suggest that trust in government and politicians has declined in Victoria, and in other jurisdictions globally, and this has been further exacerbated by the global COVID-19 pandemic.
R 1: That the Victorian Government and Members of Parliament seek ways to build public trust in the Parliament, including developing measures to improve transparency. This should include investigating the potential benefits of introducing an integrity charter.
F 12: Mainstream media has a critical role to play in the dissemination of accurate information during crises, as well as in reporting responsibly on the activities of far-right extremist groups and individuals, and not creating negative stereotypes of specific communities.
F 13: Reporting of extremist activities, groups and individuals should be subject to strong media guidelines to minimise amplification of extremist propaganda that benefits or platforms extremist movements.
F 14: An increasing focus on young people as a target of radicalisation and recruitment by the extreme far-right is of significant concern.
F 15: The Committee is concerned that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reported that in 2021 minors made up 15% of new counter-terrorism investigations (up from 2–3% in recent years) and, on average, comprised more than half of ASIO’s highest priority investigations per week. Young people who experience feelings of social isolation, disengagement and alienation may be more vulnerable to radicalisation, and are among key targets of extremist propaganda and recruitment.
F 16: In formulating intervention and prevention measures aimed at countering youth radicalisation to extremism, it is imperative that alienating, criminalising or discriminating against young people is avoided as far as possible.
4 The threat of far‑right extremism in Victoria
F 17: Both groups and individuals are capable of carrying out ideologically motivated terrorism, however, the risk from an individual acting alone is currently considered by authorities to be the more likely scenario.
F 18: Far-right extremism poses a threat to democracy. Strengthening democratic processes and increasing transparency by providing information to the public about political processes and practices is an important part of mitigating this threat.
F 19: Responses to extremism need to avoid measures that curtail civil liberties in a disproportionate manner.
F 20: Violent extremism poses a risk to politicians and public figures in Victoria, who may be targeted by groups or individuals motivated by ideological, religious or single-issue grievances.
F 21: Left-wing aligned (or perceived to be left-wing aligned) politicians and public figures have been targeted by far-right extremist groups and individuals.
F 22: Racism and racist scapegoating, Islamophobia and antisemitism are common elements of far-right extremist ideologies, messaging and activities.
F 23: When public and elected figures accept racist rhetoric and action this blurs the lines between what is acceptable and what is not in the community and leads to risks that multicultural communities will be targeted.
F 24: Evidence from stakeholders suggests that far-right extremism can be gendered, and that misogyny and anti-feminist sentiment are common but not necessarily well understood features of far-right extremist movements.
R 2: That the Government consider funding research investigating the links between extremism and family violence, anti-women or anti-feminist sentiment, and masculinity to identify further opportunities for counter-extremism measures.
F 25: Both real and perceived threats from far-right extremist groups cause harm to the LGBTQIA+ community in Victoria. Government measures to support these communities are important.
F 26: Improved collection and analysis of hate incident data is needed to inform prevention of hate crimes, and responses to hate, as well as to better understand the extent of far-right and other forms of extremism in Victoria.
R 3: That the Victorian Government continue to implement the recommendations from the Legislative Assembly Legal and Social Issues Committee’s report on the Inquiry into anti-vilification protections, in particular recommendations 33 and 34.
5 Extremist recruitment and communication
F 27: Public trust in mainstream media has declined, while social media as a primary source of information has increased.
F 28: The increasing use of social media and other online platforms by the wider public has enabled the increased ability of extremists to disseminate their ideology and attract people to their cause.
F 29: Regulatory frameworks that govern the use of encrypted online communication platforms should be formulated to be able to effectively respond to and keep pace with developments in technology and behaviour.
6 The impact of COVID‑19 on extremism in Victoria
F 30: The factors that increase susceptibility and engagement with far-right extremism were heightened by the social and economic disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. This included the public health restrictions enacted by the Victorian Government in response to the pandemic alongside those of other states and the Commonwealth Government. The Committee notes that these restrictions were enacted to protect public health.
F 31: Conspiracy theories and disinformation were attractive to some who felt disenfranchised by public health measures enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Far-right extremist groups and individuals capitalised on this by promoting conspiracy theories and disinformation to generate support for their ideologies.
R 4: That in future public health emergencies, the Victorian Government build on its outreach and communication efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure that there is an emphasis on public information that is in plain language, timely, accessible and easy to interpret.
F 32: Vile threats and abuse were made during the pandemic against public office holders, government officials and minorities. This kind of discourse has no place in an open, plural and multicultural democracy such as Victoria and should be condemned in the strongest terms.
F 33: A small number of far-right extremist groups and individuals attended protests against the Victorian Government’s COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates in 2021, however, extremist ideology was not the primary motivating factor for the majority of those attending. Rather, a range of personal grievances relating to the impacts of the Victorian Government’s COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates were the primary motivators, despite the restrictions being implemented to protect public health.
F 34: There has been a growth in exposure to far-right extremist ideology in Victoria since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the extent to which this exposure has translated to significant long-term growth in the far-right extremist movement remains unknown. The Committee found that personal grievances relating to COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates were the primary motivation for protests seen in Melbourne in late 2021. Nevertheless, it is important for the Victorian Government to remain vigilant against the threat of far-right radicalisation in this context.
7 Countering extremism
F 35: Countering extremism is a whole-of-society issue. Governments and law enforcement can and should play a proactive role in the process of countering extremism, however, communities need to be supported with resources to ensure they have the capacity to effectively participate.
F 36: Individual, needs-based interventions that look at a person holistically and work with them over a long period of time to build their strengths will be more effective for countering extremism in people already engaged in extremist behaviours.
R 5: That the Victorian Government ensure all of Victoria’s countering violent extremism programs, including but not limited to the community integration support program (CISP), continue to be reviewed externally on a regular basis to ensure that they are effective and adapting to the evolving extremism landscape.
F 37: Community-led and grassroots initiatives to promote social cohesion and community building are an important measure for countering extremism and have been demonstrated as effective in Victoria.
R 6: That the Victorian Government develop a strategy to support community-driven social cohesion initiatives aimed at building connections and trust amongst community members and between community members and civic institutions.
F 38: Anti-racism public education campaigns and education programs that teach respect and appreciation for multiculturalism are important for improving social cohesion in Victoria.
F 39: Education about the Holocaust is particularly important for understanding some of the consequences of racism and vilification throughout history and should have ongoing inclusion in the Victorian school curriculum.
R 7: That the Victorian Government support the ongoing provision of existing anti-racism education programs and actively seek to improve and increase the provision of such programs in the community.
FINDING 40: Digital and critical literacy are essential skills for young people to navigate the internet safely, to develop resistance to the influence of extremist messaging and to analyse the quality of information they are exposed to.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The Victorian Government should review the digital and critical literacy skills taught via the primary and secondary school curriculum to identify opportunities for improvement and expansion.
F 41: Youth workers play a critical role in the delivery of effective support measures that work to both increase social cohesion and mitigate the risks of radicalisation to extremism.
R 9: That the Victorian Government ensure youth workers are adequately and appropriately resourced to provide effective service delivery of youth supports and programs aimed at strengthening trust and social connectedness and mitigating the risks of radicalisation. Further, that youth workers are proactively engaged and consulted in the development and implementation of the Government’s youth policies and strategies.
F 42: While online content regulation sits beyond the purview of state governments, the Committee reiterates the value of the Christchurch Call and the measures it outlines with regard to violent extremist and terrorist content.
F 43: Multidisciplinary and cross-jurisdictional research into extremism offers valuable insights into emerging problems and prevention strategies. Norway’s Center for Research on Extremism would be a good model on which to base an Australian body working on developing empirical and theoretical knowledge on extremism in Australia and collaborating with domestic and international stakeholders to further information and understanding in this area.
F 44: Access to firearms obtained legally or illegally by members of far-right extremist groups poses potential risks to the community and is of significant concern.
F 45: Acquisition and use of firearms by far-right extremists, not all of whom may be easily identifiable, leads to a critical gap in counter-terrorism strategy that could be assisted by a coherent, national framework on firearm regulation.
