In Woodley v. Cipolla, 2022 ONSC 7096 McDermott J considers OPCA arguments and a 'pretension' claim.
The judgment states
... [5] However, this is not the only reason the litigation is challenging. John Cipolla is displeased by the direction of these proceedings and has brought collateral attacks on this application on at least three occasions. Firstly, on February 8, 2021, he brought six civil lawsuits against various defendants, including the Applicant, the Applicant’s partner, the Applicant’s lawyer, executives and counsel for Legal Aid Ontario as well as several members of the Applicant’s family. He claimed damages of $2,250,000 in each of these lawsuits (other than the lawsuit against the Applicant, against whom he claimed $3,250,000) for trespass against his property. The property in issue was stated to be his daughter, Vela.
[6] John Cipolla decided as well to have recourse to an “alternative court”, namely the “Common Law Court, Great Britain and International.” In a “Lawful Notice” dated February 17, 2021 and filed by John Cipolla, he states that “the Common Law Court, Great Britain and International was created on the 11th June 2017, to address the failings in the statutory judicial system and to provide a lawful remedy for living men and living women, this would address all harm, loss and injury suffered.” The notice states that “the ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT of JUSTICE had no authority over a living man or woman. This stance confirms that they are failing to comply with the Declarations of Arbroath 1320 and the Common Law Court 2018, they are therefore guilty of binding the people into slavery”. He accuses the Ontario Superior Court of Justice of “abuse of position, Theft of Property, Criminal Coercion, Uttering, the Failure to accept the positions of a living man or woman, Refusal to Comply with common law, Tyranny and Treason.” He demands that “the use of my property (VELA SUMMER CIPOLLA) must cease immediately.”
[7] By endorsement dated March 8, 2021, Boswell J. of this court dismissed the six lawsuits under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as being frivolous and vexatious. He called the lawsuits “nonsensical”. He also issued a second endorsement on March 24, 2021 addressing the “lawful notice”, calling it “rubbish” and warned Mr. Cipolla to “clean up his act” failing which he would be found to be a vexatious litigant.
[8] As this trial date approached, John Cipolla decided to have recourse to another “alternative court”, being the ASKIT Judicial Tribunal of the Anishinabek Solutrean Metis Indigenous Nation (ASMIN). On May 22, 2022, that “Tribunal” purported to issue a “perspicacity” granting John Cipolla decision making concerning Vela. It is confusing as to where Vela was to live as it says that care would be shared equally but also stated that Vela’s primary residence would be with the Respondent Father in New York State.
[9] Since that “decision” was issued, John Cipolla has only participated marginally in these proceedings. He says that the decision of the ASMIN tribunal usurps the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. He refused to participate in the Trial Scheduling Conference before Justice Douglas on October 19, 2022, and Justice Douglas stated that the respondent “does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court and did not meaningfully participate” that day. He reiterated his position on jurisdiction before Justice Wildman at the Trial Management Conference on November 30, 2022 and asked her “to note in this endorsement that ‘this matter has been dealt with in full by the ASMIN tribunal and is now closed.’”
[10] Before and after the “decision” of the ASMIN tribunal, John Cipolla engaged in litigation conduct that would be grounds for disciplinary action had a solicitor committed these offences. His conduct can only be described as outrageous and disrespectful. In his March 24, 2021 affidavit, he referred to Mr. Herron, solicitor for the Applicant as “Jeremy unscrupulous Herron.” On October 31, 2022 after the Trial Scheduling Conference, he communicated by email directly to Justice Douglas, stating as follows: The attached UCC1, UCC1 amendments, PPSA Registration and International Apostille filings prove that I hold both legal and Equitable title to my estate and Legal Title to the VELA SUMMER CIPOLLA estate in my capacity as Secured Party Creditor (SPC), Holder-in-Due-Course (HDC), and Real Party In Interest (RPII). The Crown does, however, hold legal title to opposition, THE JESSICA WOODLEY ESTATE, since she (Jessica Woodley) is presumed to be a "minor" in the nature of Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations 363.6 or the equivalent, applicable Canadian law as a British subject held in trust.
[11] John Cipolla suggests to Justice Douglas that he could file a security interest in Vela under the Personal Property Security Act and states that Since VELA SUMMER CIPOLLA (in commerce) is my property, I require an order, from you, that JESSICA WOODLEY (Jessica Woodley), and her Crown Trustee, be ordered to pay child support, for Vela Summer Cipolla (Vela), to John Cipolla in the amount of $10,000. monthly for the next 15 years (Vela's 22nd birthday/last year of college).
[12] John Cipolla threatened court staff who were just doing their job. When the trial coordinator sent him the Zoom link for the trial, he accused her of harassment, stating that: This is the 3rd time that I’ve advised you, SCJ, Family Branch and Family Registrar team (and J Wildman today) that this matter was adjudicated in the ASMIN Tribunal last May and a final order issued- see my 11/22/2022 email with attachments A-G. In addition, I stated that if if I received anymore correspondence with respect to this matter from SCJ, Family Branch Registrars, TC, Judges or opposing counsel that it would be deemed by me to be a threat, harassment and intimidation and that I would file criminal charges. Do I need to seek a restraining order? Cease and desist immediately.
[13] But most of his vitriol has been reserved to the judges who were involved in this matter. In 2021, John Cipolla accused Healey J. of this court of corruption and incompetence. He recorded a case conference before Graham J. on February 19, 2021 contrary to s. 136 of Courts of Justice Act. John Cipolla had a Trial Management Conference with Justice Wildman on November 30, 2022 and again breached s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and prepared a transcript of the hearing. He emailed Justice Wildman, accusing her of conspiracy, intimidating a court participant, and terrorism. He purported to send an invoice for $25,000 per day to Justices Douglas and McCarthy for “carrying out Endorsements” that they had issued in this matter and accused Justice McCarthy of fraud.
[14] When John Cipolla found out that I would be doing the trial, he began to email me directly as well. He emailed me an affidavit that stated that the ASMIN Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction n because of his aboriginal status. He said in his email that, as a result, “This concludes the matter in your court.”
[15] The night before the trial, John Cipolla decided that he would have other members of ASMIN email me, other judges of the Superior Court in Barrie who have presided over this matter as well as the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice, the Senior Family Judge and the Regional Senior Justice. Members of the Ontario judiciary suffered through 10 to 15 unsolicited emails throughout the night. The emails attached the decision of the ASMIN tribunal and typically stated as follows: The long standing abuses to indigenous are continuing despite UNDRIP One People's Federation. Attached pls find ASMIN Tribunal Notice including final order and Envoy appointment from G.C. Mukwa to colonial Superior Court Justice J. McDermot Notifying him that he needs to heed Indigenous Tribunals, laws, customs and traditions.
[16] John Cipolla denied having anything to do with this when he spoke to the matter at the commencement of the trial on December 7, 2022, but this was untrue: his email of December 6, 2022 to other members of ASMIN was mistakenly included with one of the emails to the court and stated, “Aloha. Can all of you pls send an email blast like the one below to all the same emails, attach the ASMIN tribunal letter and bc me before 9:15 am this morning? If it’s after 9:30 am send it any way regardless.” The email contained the script noted above. It was clear that he was responsible for numerous emails being sent to various judges of this court demanding that the court decline jurisdiction in this case.
[17] John Cipolla appeared at this trial but only to argue that this court had no jurisdiction over him or his daughter due to their aboriginal heritage. That issue was argued and I determined that the trial would proceed and the court had jurisdiction. John Cipolla then asked me if he was being compelled attend the trial and I told him he was not. He then said that he would not participate in the trial and left the zoom meeting before the trial was completed. The trial was based on the Applicant Mother’s evidence by affidavit sworn December 2, 2022. John Cipolla did not file an affidavit, call any evidence, cross- examine the Applicant, as he was entitled to do, or file any material other than the affidavit disputing jurisdiction, and by the time the Applicant Mother had completed her case, he had left the trial.
Jurisdiction
[18] John Cipolla says that this court does not have jurisdiction for several reasons: a. He says that he is indigenous and that the decision of the ASMIN tribunal has usurped jurisdiction from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. b. He also, in his submissions, stated that his discharge of a bond has also removed jurisdiction from the Superior Court of Justice.
[19] This application for a parenting order was brought by the Applicant under the provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act. Under s. 22(1)(a) of the CLRA, jurisdiction in a proceeding is dictated by the residence of the child: if the child is “habitually resident” in Ontario at the commencement of proceedings, the Ontario court, in this case the Family Division of the Superior Court of Justice, has jurisdiction to address parenting issues. There is no doubt that this was the case with respect to Vela, who was then (as of the date the Application was issued) living with her mother in Port McNicoll, Ontario. Mr. Cipolla was also living in Port McNicoll on that date and confirmed as much when he filed his Answer and Claim by Respondent on September 11, 2020. There is no question that this court had jurisdiction to address this matter under the provisions of the CLRA when Ms. Woodley commenced these proceedings.
[20] John Cipolla not only requested in his Answer that the application be dismissed; he also requested a parenting order to be made by this court. In doing so, he attorned to the jurisdiction of this court. However, he suffered a number of setbacks in this proceeding, including dismissal of two motions for shared care and then “100% access”, the granting of two orders returning the child to the Applicant Mother after he overheld the child, the dismissal of his lawsuits against the Applicant, her parents and Legal Aid and finally an order quashing his witness summonses to legal aid officials. Because of this, John Cipolla decided that it would be best for him to proceed to obtain a default “order” made by the ASMIN Tribunal. He believed that this forum would be more favourable to him and he was right.
[21] It is important to note that John Cipolla did not properly take steps to have this court decline jurisdiction which he should have done prior to proceeding in another forum. The proper course of action would be to move that this court decline jurisdiction under s. 25 of the CLRA and then bring new proceedings. It was not good practice for John Cipolla to bring default proceedings elsewhere in the face of a properly constituted court and then present the order as a fait accompli.
[22] The decision of the ASMIN Tribunal proceeded by way of default hearing. In that decision John Cipolla was given legal “decision-making” over Vela with equal shared care. The decision was confusing and conflicting: although the “perspicacity” says that care would be shared, it also says that the primary residence of Vela was with John Cipolla in New York State. It further provided that Ms. Woodley would pay $300 per month in child support as well as more than $36,000 in costs. The document states that, “This Decision amends and supersedes any previous or subsequent orders, endorsements or agreements of any family court in which these parties are litigating on Turtle Island, unless a Treaty among ASMIN - Canada - USA directs otherwise.”
[23] John Cipolla’s argument was summed up in his affidavit sworn on November 22, 2022, referred to in argument and emailed to me (but not properly filed with the court) which stated as follows:
The ASMIN Tribunal is the only venue with jurisdiction since Vela and i are Indigenous and this action occurred on our unceded land- see attached Daniels v. Canada 2016 [17] where the sec recognized the Metis of eastern Canada, Art Ill of UNDRIP(2021) & OAS(1990) recognized the right of self determination, Tsilhoq'in (2014) [69] sec held that Terra Nullius never applied in Canada, in Desaultel (2021) [72] the sec held the Crown had a duty to consult when they have notice of a aboriginal right or title and Canada's Truth & Reconcilliation Report part 5 that protects Indigenous posterity. In 2021 i was appointed Envoy of ASMIN.
[24] There has been controversy in the news recently concerning individuals who have falsely claimed First Nations ancestry to gain an academic or occupational advantage. Similarly, an individual or a group of individuals do not become First Nations based only on their say so or membership in an illegitimate organization. ASMIN appears to be such a group and there was no evidence of recognition of ASMIN as being a First Nations in Canada or the United States. Indeed, the group remains unrecognized by any aboriginal or governmental authority as a first nation in this province and it appears that anyone, regardless of indigenous status, can join ASMIN by payment of a fee of $225: see Mukwa v. Farm Credit of Canada, 2021 ONSC 1632 as aff’d by 2022 ONCA 320.
[25] This is not the first time that a member of ASMIN has utilized the arguments noted above concerning aboriginal right or title. For example, arguments concerning unceded land and the Tsilhoq'in case were relied upon by Mr. Mukwa in an attempt to stop foreclosure proceedings in the Farm Credit case noted above. Both this court and the Ontario Court of Appeal made short shrift of those claims, and quickly dismissed them. Indeed, the Plaintiff in that case, Grand Chief Wabiska Mukwa, appears to be the decision maker in the “perspicacity” of the ASMIN Tribunal noted above.
[26] Mr. Herron, in his submissions, stated that John Cipolla had engaged in tactics known as OPCA [Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument]. Those tactics were described by Rooke C.J.A. in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 as comparable to “medieval alchemy”; a vain attempt to turn base metals into gold but held out as legitimate. Rooke C.J.A. described the arguments made by OPCA litigants as mostly nonsensical and a purposeful abuse of the court system in order to achieve a result without addressing the merits of the litigation. This is because, as discovered by John Cipolla, OPCA litigants almost invariably have no reasonable expectation of litigation success based on the merits. Rooke C.J.A., in a detailed decision, notes a number of OPCA tactics, including:
• unique nomenclature and name motifs;
• a concept that “everything is a contract”;
• a denial that the court has jurisdiction over an OPCA litigant;
• use of “obsolete, foreign, or typically otherwise irrelevant legislation”; and
• egregious litigation conduct.
[27] In argument, John Cipolla took great exception to the statement by Mr. Herron that he engaged in OPCA tactics. However, I believe that his strong reaction to this suggestion shows that he is well aware that he meets the standard criterion of an OPCA litigant. In fact, the individual who gave John Cipolla his “default” hearing, “Grand Chief” Wabiska Mukwa, was denounced in several cases as having used OPCA tactics: See Mukwa v. Farm Credit Canada, supra, Sarac v. Wilstar Management Inc., 2021 ONSC 7776 and National Bank of Canada v. Guibord, 2021 ONSC 6549. Mr. Mukwa was unsuccessful in all of those cases, mostly involving mortgage remedies or landlord and tenant issues.
[28] John Cipolla used similar tactics in this litigation as were described by Justice Rooke in Meads, which was, as with the present case, a matrimonial cause where the Respondent sought to avoid disclosure obligations. Cipolla goes by the name of “i; a man; have no legal name only a christian name. John Cipolla: a man. SPC/HDC/RPII/Trustee/Bailee.” He has used unique documentation, including identification by thumbprint. He relies upon a selective reference to Supreme Court of Canada decisions, including a statement that there is a “right to consult” under Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 even though that was a land claims case, not one involving parenting of a child. He filed an article concerning the applicability of United States jurisprudence in Canada and questioned the promulgation of the British North America Act. He engaged in odious litigation conduct noted above.
[29] However, John Cipolla focused his arguments on jurisdictional issues. In Meads, Rooke C.J.A. said [at para. 267]: A very common OPCA scheme category is that the OPCA litigant is in some manner outside the jurisdiction of the court or state, or is somehow rendered immune from legal obligations. This category has three general forms:
1. the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to certain specific domains, and the OPCA litigant falls outside those categories;
2. the jurisdiction of the court is eliminated due to some defect; and
3. the OPCA litigant is in some manner immunized from the court's actions.
[30] John Cipolla cloaks his argument in the guise of indigenous rights. He says that he, along with Vela, is indigenous and that the only valid authority is the ASMIN tribunal. He issued a trespass notice concerning these proceedings. He argues a number of Supreme Court of Canada precedents saying that the Canadian or Ontario Courts have no jurisdiction because of the “right to consult” contained in the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision.
[31] As noted, these arguments have been previously used by the “Chief Justice” of the ASMIN tribunal, Wabiska Mukwa, in his own litigation. In Sarac, Myers J. determined that the ASMIN tribunal was “not a domestic tribunal exercising a jurisdiction on behalf of a First Nation that has been recognized by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.” The order of the ASMIN tribunal in this case was certainly not recognized by the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribal Court and the John Cipolla has not demonstrated any valid reason why this court should recognize the order.
[32] Finally, in Guibord, Mew J. found Tsilhqot’in inapplicable to the commercial dispute before the court in that case [at para. 13]: No duty to consult arises in this case because, as will be further discussed below, the pleaded dispute between the parties does not raise justiciable issues of aboriginal title, nor is the Crown a party.
[33] That is the case here. This is a matrimonial cause involving the parenting of a child. To suggest that the Respondent Father has a proprietary interest in his daughter (by, for example, filing a PPSA security interest) is, in the words of Boswell J., offensive. The case at bar involves the best interests of a child, not the disposition of property or a land claim. There is no “right to consult” in the present case.
McDermot engaged with the pretendian issue in stating
[34] In Sarac, Myers J. spoke of the suggestion that ASMIN is defending Aboriginal rights: This country recognizes that real injustices have been inflicted upon its Indigenous communities including the Metis People. Litigants who try to avoid their financial responsibilities by wrapping themselves in the garb of Indigenous Peoples' real victimhood and suffering to tie up the courts with illegitimate and abusive claims deserve not another moment of court time or attention.
[35] I cannot agree more. There is no question that Indigenous people in Canada, especially children, have suffered greatly and deserve redress and respect. To make arguments in an in personam case based on an Indigenous land claim supported by a made-up tribunal promulgated by an illegitimate organization posing as a First Nation does nothing more than a disservice to the efforts of Canada’s First Nations. It dilutes and cheapens legitimate claims by Indigenous peoples in Canada and deserves no consideration by this court, which must focus only on the best interests of the child who is the subject matter of this case. It is to be noted that John Cipolla could have addressed Vela’s Indigenous ancestry in the context of Vela’s best interests under s. 24(3)(f) of the CLRA. However, as far as I can see, he has never raised that issue in this court or in these proceedings.
[36] Moreover, John Cipolla cannot complain about this court having jurisdiction when he had filed an Answer and Claim by Respondent requesting a parenting order. That Answer was never withdrawn. By filing the Answer in this proceeding, John Cipolla attorned to the jurisdiction of this court and confirmed that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had the unquestioned authority to make parenting decisions concerning Vela.
[37] There is also no evidence that Ms. Woodley agreed that the ASMIN tribunal had jurisdiction in this matter, especially insofar as the proceedings were noted as having been default proceedings. Moreover, even were that tribunal legitimate and even had Ms. Woodley attorned to that court, the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts is not necessarily dictated by attornment to any jurisdiction but rather the habitual residence of the child and the factors under s. 22 of the CLRA: see Murray v. Ceruti, 2014 ONCA 649 where the court stated [at para. 40]: However, assuming without deciding that the respondent did attorn, it is important to have regard to the role of attornment in a jurisdictional analysis under the CLRA. Attornment is not referenced in the CLRA. At most, it is a factor to be considered in the analysis mandated by s. 22(1)(b), and in the analysis of whether to decline jurisdiction under s. 25. On the facts of this case, it is not dispositive of either issue.
[38] Finally, John Cipolla filed a document entitled “Discharge Document No. 3” which purports to be a discharge of a bond. There are a number of different documents contained in this filing, including a purported lien against the pleadings in this case, a “UCC Financing Statement” supposedly issued in Colorado, a “Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement” in favour of the “John Edward Cipolla Trust”, a “Common Law Copyright Notice” in favour of the said trust advising that this court was in breach of copyright law, a “Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship” and an “Affidavit of Truth” attaching discharged bonds. All of these documents appear to have been issued in the United States and many appear to be irrelevant to these proceedings. Many are confirmed by “digital fingerprint” and are largely incomprehensible and irrelevant.
[39] During argument, John Cipolla asked me to confirm that this document deprived the Ontario Superior Court of Justice of jurisdiction. When I asked him how that could possibly be the case, John Cipolla told me to go and do my research. He was unwilling to explain to me how the document had anything to do with the case or the jurisdiction of the court, probably because the document was complete nonsense and incomprehensible. However, I suspect that these documents are related to the concept often relied upon by OPCA litigants that “everything is a contract” noted by Rooke C.J.A. in Meads, supra. The court’s review of the document confirms that it has nothing to do with this case or the best interests of Vela.
