In Yap -v- Matic [No 7] [2023] WASC 55 the Court has dealt with contempt by a sovereign citizen, stating
[18] Contempt of court is a matter that lies both within the court's inherent jurisdiction and is provided for by the statutory regime relating to the court's powers. It is a tool that the court may employ to protect the due administration of justice. A finding of contempt may be dealt with summarily and may, if appropriate, result in the imprisonment of a contemnor without trial.
[19] The ability of the court to charge a party with contempt, to determine the matter of guilt and to impose a penalty of its own volition is an immense power and must be exercised sparingly It is therefore important to distinguish between that conduct of which the court disapproves, and that which attracts the court's condemnation and punishment.
[20] In John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae, their Honours Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ quote from Cotton LJ in Hunt v Clarke as follows:
A penalty will not be imposed in its exercise 'unless the thing done is of such a nature as to require the arbitrary and summary interference of the court in order to enable justice to be duly and properly administered without any interruption or interference'.
[21] Conduct which the court considers unusual, irritating, rude or even belligerent does not necessarily invoke the summary powers of the court. A party may express beliefs about the legitimacy of a court order, or the quality of a judgment, or may resist particular principles of law. It is not enough that the court is insulted, or that the beliefs expressed do not align with those of the judicial officer. The threshold requirement is that the court must find that the conduct interferes with the administration of justice or in some way demonstrates a contumelious disrespect for the authority of the court.
[22] In matters such as this it is particularly important to emphasise that the court does not impose punitive measures in relation to people's beliefs. Mr Matic is quite entitled to his beliefs even if they are irrational, irritating or even offensive to others. In a tolerant and humane society people must be entitled to hold such beliefs without fear of sanction or punishment from the State. History is littered with the tragic consequences of intolerance and injustice perpetrated by state authorities for beliefs that do not meet with the approval of the governing or ruling elite. However, at the same time the court must be concerned with, and must remain vigilant to protect, the administration of justice from conduct, including on occasion the expression of views, that corrodes public confidence in and respect for the courts and the justice system. A just and tolerant society must zealously guard the instruments and institutions that preserve justice and tolerance. ...
[26] ... In Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam [No 2] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309, 313 - 314, Kirby P observed:
Contempt law has been fashioned by the courts to protect the administration of justice. This is an activity, self-evidently of the greatest importance to society. It represents a vital part of the peaceful government of a community such as ours. In Ditfort v Calcraft (1989) 98 FLR 158 at 160, I said: '... These well known features of our legal system make the faithful compliance with subpoenas issued by the courts essential to the proper administration of justice.' A conviction of contempt of court is a conviction of an offence, criminal in nature. Punishment of the convicted contemnor must therefore take into account the considerations normally applicable to the punishment of crime and apt to uphold the purpose of this jurisdiction, viz, the undisturbed and orderly administration of justice in the courts according to law. Thus, in determining the punishment which is apt to the circumstances which have led to a conviction of contempt, it is appropriate to bear in mind the purposes of punishing the contemnor; deterring the contemnor and others in the future from committing like contempts; and denouncing the conduct concerned in an approximately [sic appropriately] emphatic way: see Director of Public Prosecutions v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732 at 741. ...
[27] Recently, the Western Australian Court of Appeal considered the purpose of punishing contemnors in R v T. In that decision, Mazza, Mitchell and Vaughan JJA said:
Sentencing for a contempt of court constituted by a breach of the court's orders may serve two distinct purposes. These purposes may be described as coercive and punitive. A sentence for contempt may provide a coercive means by which the court orders can be enforced and future compliance with the order secured for the benefit of a party to the proceedings can be ensured. However, a sentence for contempt may also punish wilful disobedience of a court's order so as to vindicate judicial authority and maintain the integrity of the court's process in the public interest.
[28] Their Honours went on to observe that:
It is also clear that punishment of past intentional disobedience of court orders is a significant consideration in sentencing for contempt of court. As the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia recognised in Tate:
Normally, the purpose of contempt proceedings against a person for breach of such an order is to coerce them to comply with it. However, it is quite clear that another purpose of bringing proceedings for contempt against a person who has breached a non-monetary order of the court may be that of punishment. The purposes of imposing punishment would appear to reflect the need for individual and general deterrence and retribution for the party's failure to comply with the order. Retribution is called for because it is essential to the proper working of the court system that court orders are obeyed. If they are defied or ignored, the whole system of dispute resolution by litigation breaks down. While there are other means of dispute resolution available, in the final analysis a citizen has the right to approach a court to determine a dispute and the court has a duty to do so.
...
[30] In relation to those factors, I make the following observations. (a) Sandi Matic's contempt was serious in the sense that it was a deliberate and defiant disregard of an order of this court. However, other than continuing to delay the proceedings, and the distraction and diversion of public resources caused thereby, the consequences of the contempt were limited. (b) The context of the contempt is unfavourable to Sandi Matic. At the time of the conduct that gave rise to the charge of contempt, that is 30 November 2022, Sandi Matic had already been convicted of contempt once before, on 27 October 2022. (c) The reason for the contempt, at least insofar as Mr Matic has submitted, was a lack of understanding of the significance of, or doubt in relation to the authenticity of, the relevant orders. In part for the reasons set out in Yap v Matic [No 4], and in part in relation to the oral submissions proffered by Mr Matic on 13 December 2022, I do not accept those reasons. (d) There is no evidence that Mr Matic gained any benefit from his contempt, other than to delay the proceedings by a week. (e) Mr Matic has expressed no remorse, nor contrition, for his contempt in any real sense. In fact, since being convicted for contempt in December 2022, Mr Matic has continued to fail to appear at hearings, including the hearing of 30 January 2023. (f) Other than matters I have canvassed in previous decisions in these proceedings, Sandi Matic has not put before the court any evidence of his character, personal circumstances, or antecedents. There is no evidence of any criminal record. However, I note again that at the time of the relevant contempt, Sandi Matic had already been convicted of contempt, and since that conviction, has been separately convicted of criminal contempt by her Honour Archer J. (g) General and personal deterrence, and denunciation of the contempt, are important factors in this case. I shall return to these issues. ...
[39] The case of Sandi Matic raises important questions about the nature of contempt, and the metes and bounds of the court's authority. I shall emphasise again, that the function of this charge and penalty is not to punish Sandi Matic for his beliefs, or to necessarily seek to correct the beliefs that Sandi Matic holds in his private life.
[40] However, Sandi Matic's behaviour has not been without a cost. That cost involves the court resources that are wasted in hosting repeated hearings when parties fail to appear. There is importantly, a social and reputational cost to the court when litigants are given wide berth to disregard or ignore court orders. There is a cost to other parties, who have the right to expect that court orders will be complied with.
[41] Additionally, there is a clear need for personal and general deterrence. While Sandi Matic has previously been afforded by me the benefit of doubt in relation to his contemning, the circumstances of this contempt are different. That is most plainly illustrated by the origin of each of the charges. The first conviction for contempt was made out following an application from the plaintiffs in this matter. The second conviction, with which I am now dealing, arose of the court's own initiative.
[42] In my view, it is tolerably clear that Mr Matic has chosen to knowingly defy court orders. All of the surrounding circumstances, including Sandi Matic's communications with the court and his conduct at hearings relating to this conviction, lead in my view to an irresistible inference that Mr Matic's conduct is born from a lack of genuine acceptance of the authority of the court.
[43] Mr Matic has at various points, been at pains to express that his failure to appear in accordance with court orders was not a rejection of the court's authority. Rather, he has asserted that his lack of compliance rests on his confusion about the proceedings and set of misguided beliefs about the justice system. ...
[44] I have previously outlined that Mr Matic's beliefs appear to align with those of the self‑proclaimed ' sovereign citizen ' movement. This is a movement that has been gaining popularity and traction in Australia over the last few years but has also been prolific in other jurisdictions for longer. The growing prevalence of this class of beliefs and associated conduct is a matter of concern for the preservation of the authority of the court and the administration of justice. It reinforces the importance of general deterrence in the community. I reiterate again that Mr Matic is at liberty to hold his beliefs but that does not absolve him of the responsibility to adhere to the rule of law which includes acceptance of, and compliance with, court orders.
[45] While Mr Matic has stressed in oral submissions and written communications that he is attempting to be 'honourable' and that he does 'respect the court authority', that is not a sentiment frankly, that can be taken seriously against the background of his actual conduct. By the time of the original hearing in relation to this penalty decision, that is the hearing on 30 January 2023, Mr Matic had twice been convicted of contempt by me. He had once been arrested and made to appear before the court. He had been instructed in no uncertain terms that 'if the court orders you to attend, it's not an invitation; it's an order'. On 13 December 2022, when listing the penalty hearing on 30 January 2023, Sandi Matic's family commitments were accommodated and his preferences were taken into account. Sandi Matic told the court that if the penalty was listed 'towards the later part of January...I can attend.' Sandi Matic also expressly confirmed that the date and time set by the court were convenient to him. I therefore did not consider it necessary to order that he appear at the penalty hearing. Nevertheless, Sandi Matic once again failed, without notice or explanation, to attend court on 30 January 2023.
[46] Additionally, as part of Mr Matic's previous conviction for contempt of court, on 8 December 2022 I ordered that Mr Matic pay the plaintiffs' costs of their contempt application, fixed in the amount of $16,057 and payable forthwith. As at the time of this judgment, Sandi Matic remains in default of that order. This may be a further demonstration of Mr Matic's lack of respect for the authority of a court order. That ongoing default also casts doubt over the utility of making a costs order or imposing a fine on Sandi Matic.
