In Taylor, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file [2023] HCATrans 63 Gageler ACJ states:
Pursuant to rules 6.07.3 and 13.03.1, I refuse the application for leave to issue or file the proposed application for a constitutional or other writ. I publish my reasons and I direct that those reasons be incorporated into the transcript. ...
On 4 April 2023, Ms Cindy Taylor filed an application for leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ under r 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”), supported by an affidavit affirmed by her on 28 March 2023. Leave is required because on 27 March 2023 pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the Rules Steward J directed the Registrar to refuse to issue or file the document without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained.
Ms Taylor’s proposed application for a constitutional or other writ names the Commonwealth Attorney-General as the defendant and seeks “an order of Mandamus on the Attorney General of the Commonwealth to: Immediately instruct the Crown to: Succeed the Plaintiff to the title and role of Sovereign Empress of Australia; And other orders as the Court sees it, in support of the above”. It appears that Ms Taylor also seeks damages for “the Crown’s ongoing use of Lawfare” against her and for having been “thrown from [her] natural path of evolvement”.
The legal claims sought to be agitated by the application are unintelligible and the primary relief sought is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The proposed application is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.
In Taylor, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file a document [2017] HCATrans 248 Keane J notes that the applicant sought to file an application for an order to show cause against the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth.
The application is difficult to understand but appears to be directed to vindicate aspects of the applicant’s claim as “Mother of ALL” to achieve “compliance with the Family Undertaking . . . for all Families by 21/7/18”.
On 21 September 2017, Nettle J, pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), directed the Registrar to refuse to issue or file the application without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained by the applicant.
On 26 September 2017, the applicant filed an ex parte application seeking leave to have the application issued and filed. An affidavit by the applicant was filed in support of the application.
To the extent that this material is intelligible, it only serves to confirm that the application to show cause is frivolous and vexatious. A letter from the applicant dated 4 December 2017, received by the Registry this morning, does not alter this conclusion.
In James v District Court at Whanganui [2023] NZCA 181 the Court states
[1] The appellant, who goes only by the name James, brought judicial review proceedings in the High Court in February 2022 in which he sought an injunction against the Whanganui District Court. The terms of the injunction were directed towards halting or challenging proceedings brought against James in District Court. It is not possible to discern the subject matter of the District Court proceedings with any certainty from the documents James has filed.
[2] Churchman J struck out the judicial review proceeding as an abuse of process.[1] James filed an appeal against Churchman J’s decision. ...
[4] In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd, this Court explained that: ... a “frivolous” pleading is one which trifles with the court’s processes, while a vexatious one contains an element of impropriety. ... [One that is] “otherwise an abuse of the process of the court” ... extends beyond the other grounds and captures all other instances of misuse of the court’s processes, such as a [proceeding] that has been brought with an improper motive or are an attempt to obtain a collateral benefit. ...
[6] In his pleading, James sought to distinguish between “the Man James” and “the Legal Fiction Person JAMES JONES” and asserted that District Court required the former’s written consent to “conduct any business” with the latter and that consent had been withdrawn.
[7] It appeared to Churchman J that the form and wording of James’ statement of claim was consistent with that typically advanced by the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Litigants” who adhere to the “ Sovereign Citizen movement”. Essentially, these arguments proceed on the premise that an individual has both a natural persona and a separate legal or “corporate” persona and that the natural person cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the state without their consent. The Court has previously held that this position is untenable. Almost always, it will be viewed as an abuse of process by a litigant. Churchman J concluded that there was no legal basis for James’ claim against the Whanganui District Court and that the proceeding was an abuse of process. ...
[10] The grounds of appeal, although expressed in a convoluted manner and although denying the concepts of “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” and “sovereign citizen ”, nevertheless rest on the argument regarding the “separation” between natural and legal persons and the rejection of Acts of Parliament unless consent has been given. They can be summarised as being that the District Court has no jurisdiction over James without him giving his consent, which he has not done, and that Churchman J erred in rejecting this argument.
[11] The arguments that James relies on are properly characterised as “sovereign citizen” type arguments. They cannot succeed. Apart from the sovereign citizen arguments, there is no genuinely identifiable legal or factual error asserted. We are satisfied that the appeal cannot succeed. We consider that it is properly viewed as both vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.
