15 May 2023

Pseudolegal

In Brown v Hannan (Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 482 yet another pseudolegal proceeding has been struck out as misconceived and as an abuse of process. 

 Brown lodged an application at VCAT under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic), claiming that Judge Lisa Hannan had discriminated against him in the provision of goods and services on the ground of his political belief or activity, inc the comment that 

 Lisa continued to deny my lawful process in obtaining court recordings asking stupid questions designed to incite me to anger, to frustrate me and to conceal, aid and abet members of police who have filed false charges against me and also falsely imprisoned me for charges subsequently withdrawn. Lisa is asking questions which I can prove she does not ask others and provided me hindrance based on my politrical [sic] belief that she and the organisation she works for are engaaged [sic] in acts of treason against people of the Commonwealth of Australia and that she has no lawful standing which is traceable to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution ACT 1900. 

 In response to ‘what kind of outcome do you think might resolve your dispute?’ Brown applied for 

(1) Justice 

(2) Cease and desist in hindering my lawful process 

(3) Compensation for false imprisonment and for the stress and harm I have been caused by her criminal misconduct and discrimination based on my indisputable knowledge that she is engaged in treason against the people of the Commonwealth of Australia 

(4) Lisa sent to prison for life. 

 Brown subsequently claimed 

 This order is in error and demonstrates that [VCAT Deputy President] now appears complicit in the discrimination, unless of course this is merely a demonstration of incompetence. Lisa Hannan is NOT a Judge in the County Court Lisa Hannah is an employee of a trading corporation (HCA 11) The complaint is due to Lisa Hannan discriminating against me based on my lawful beliefs the fact that this is also criminal misconduct is yes a matter for another forum however by no means negates VCATs responsibility to deal with the discrimination Lisa Hannan has discriminated against me in her private capacity and not in the capacity of a Judge or Magistrates as she did not do this in court It now appears that VCAT are likewise discriminating against me and as such it appears that I musty [sic] appeal this “decision” based on fraud and so-called Deputy President to the discrimination. ...

VCAT states 

 As I said to the applicant at the hearing, when a judicial officer is carrying out their duties as a judicial officer, they are not performing a service to any party before them. They are carrying out their duties, whether or not it benefits or serves any particular party. They are obliged to act in accord with the relevant law, and if they do not, their actions are reviewable in various ways, but the EO Act is not one of those ways. 

Further, in relation to a court proceeding, it is at least misconceived and perhaps an abuse of process to seek to review the decision of a judicial officer in carrying out their duties by complaining that the officer discriminated against a party in a proceeding. This Tribunal does not have power to examine the decisions of a judicial officer. It would not be a proper use of the Tribunal’s powers. There are other avenues for review of the decisions of a magistrate or judge. 

In addition, I note that section 14 of the Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) provides immunity as follows:

14 Protection of magistrates 

(5) A magistrate has, in the performance of his or her duties as a magistrate, the same protection and immunity as a Judge of the Supreme Court has in the performance of his or her duties as a Judge.

It is unnecessary to examine that immunity closely. There are other reasons why Mr Brown’s claim cannot proceed. However, it is relevant and uncontroversial to say that the immunity prevents the magistrate from being personally sued and personally held liable for their actions as a magistrate. 

In this case, the orders sought by the applicant are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. There is no power under the EO Act for the Tribunal to order that a judge ‘cease and desist hindering [the applicant]’s lawful process’ or to order compensation for false imprisonment or for ‘criminal misconduct’ or (self-evidently) to send a judge to prison. 

Neither the EO Act nor the VCAT Act give the Tribunal power to do what Mr Brown has asked.

The Tribunal went on to conclude 

On the information in the application and Mr Brown’s documents and based on what he said at the hearing, I consider his claim as there expressed should not proceed. 

In summary that is for the following reasons. First, this Tribunal has no power to make the orders he seeks. Secondly, his description of events and his remarks to me at the hearing indicated to me that the decisions he complains about were made in the course of the respondent’s exercise of duties as a magistrate and are outside the definition of ‘services’ in the EO Act, so that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider them. Thirdly, it is at best misconceived to seek to review any decision of a judicial nature under the EO Act. 

There may remain a power for the Tribunal to consider whether what happened was a refusal of service by someone not exercising judicial power. Accordingly, the claim is not dismissed, but only struck out. In leaving the claim thus, I do not suggest that Mr Brown should attempt to amend the application in this proceeding and have it reinstated. There is no fee for an application in this jurisdiction. Mr Brown would be better if he wishes to pursue the matter to file a new application setting out what happened, who was involved and why he says the events amount to discrimination against him. 

Finally, I note that the current application contains scant useful information, and is couched in such intemperate language about the respondent and seeks such unattainable outcomes regarding the respondent that it should be given no further airing.