The latest report from the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media comments
The committee is gravely concerned that the information Australians receive on these platforms is being influenced by directions from foreign authoritarian governments. That's why we have recommended a range of enforceable transparency standards, so that users can both evaluate the content they see on these platforms, and the conduct of the platforms themselves. For example, we believe state-affiliated media entities should be proactively labelled on all platforms. We recommend that any content censored at the direction of a government be disclosed to users. Platforms should be open to independent external researchers who can identify, investigate and attribute coordinated inauthentic behaviour. The access to user data facilitated by these platforms, especially to employees based in authoritarian countries, must be disclosed.
WeChat was found to have comprehensively failed the transparency test by refusing to participate in public hearings on the basis that, despite its significant digital presence, it does not have a physical presence in Australia. The committee therefore recommends that, as part of a suite of transparency requirements, social media companies that operate in Australia be required to establish a physical presence within Australia's legal jurisdiction so that they can be held accountable to our laws.
The committee found that TikTok engaged in a determined effort to obfuscate and avoid answering the most basic questions about the platform, its parent company ByteDance and its relationship to the Chinese Communist Party. That's one reason why the committee has also recommended that social media companies that repeatedly fail to meet the minimum transparency requirements should be subject to fines and, as a last resort, may be banned by the Minister for Home Affairs with appropriate oversight mechanisms in place.
Should the United States Government take action to force ByteDance to divest ownership of TikTok to another company that is not beholden to the Chinese Communist Party, the committee finds that Australia should consider similar requirements in Australia.
The serious espionage and data security risks posed by TikTok, which necessitated the April 2023 ban on government users downloading the app to their devices, must also be confronted by government contractors and critical infrastructure providers. Government must also put in place measures to anticipate, assess and mitigate the next TikTok before it is widely deployed on government devices.
Deterring this malign online behaviour must be a priority for government. Amended Magnitsky sanctions, bolstered enforcement of espionage and foreign interference offences and support for diaspora communities targeted by transnational repression all need to be part of a package of reforms to raise the costs of this activity.
Of course, social media companies do not need to wait for the government to introduce legislation to strengthen transparency on their platforms. They can proactively undertake this important task on their accord, as some of them are already doing.
Foreign interference through social media is a real, pervasive and growing threat. Despite Australia's world-leading efforts to counter foreign interference including through our Espionage and Foreign Interference statutory framework and the establishment of a Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, it is evident that there is more work to be done to make Australia an even harder target for the sophisticated disinformation campaigns of authoritarian regimes.
The Committee's Recommendations are
1 The committee recommends the Australian Government require all large social media platforms operating in Australia to meet a minimum set of transparency requirements, enforceable with fines. Any platform which repeatedly fails to meet the transparency requirements could, as a last resort, be banned by the Minister for Home Affairs via a disallowable instrument, which must be reviewed by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.
Requirements should include, at minimum, that all large social media platforms:
- must have an Australian presence;
- must proactively label state affiliated media;
- must be transparent about any content they censor or account takedowns on their platform;
- must disclose any government directions they receive about content on their platform, subject to national security considerations;
- must disclose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity, including transnational repression and surveillance originating from foreign authoritarian governments;
- must disclose any takedowns of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, and report how and when the platform identified those CIB networks;
- must disclose any instances where a platform removes or takes adverse action against an elected official's account;
- must disclose any changes to their platform's data collection practices or security protection policies as soon as reasonably practicable;
- must make their platform open to independent cyber analysts and researchers to examine cyber-enabled foreign interference activities;
- must disclose which countries they have employees operating in who could access Australian data and keeps auditable logs of any instance of Australian data being transmitted, stored or accessed offshore; and
- must maintain a public library of advertisements on their platform.
2 The committee recommends that, should the United States Government force ByteDance to divest its stake in TikTok, the Australian Government review this arrangement and consider the appropriateness of ensuring TikTok Australia is also separated from its ByteDance parent company.
3 The committee recommends the Australian Government extend, via policy or appropriate legislation, directives issued under the Protective Security Policy Framework regarding the banning of specific applications (e.g. TikTok) on all government contractors' devices who have access to Australian government data
The Minister for Home Affairs should review the application of the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, to allow applications banned under the Protective Security Policy Framework to be banned on work-issued devices of entities designated of Systems of National Significance.
4 The committee recommends the Australian Government consider extending the Protective Security Policy Framework directive banning TikTok on federal government devices to WeChat, given it poses similar data security and foreign interference risks.
5 The committee recommends the Australian Government continues to audit the security risks posed by the use of all other social media platforms on government-issued devices within the Australian Public Service, and issue general guidance regarding device security, and if necessary, further directions under the Protective Security Policy Framework.
6 The committee recommends the Australian Government establish a national security technology office within the Department of Home Affairs to map existing exposure to high-risk vendors such as TikTok, WeChat and any similar apps that might emerge in the future. It should recommend mitigations to address the risks of installing these applications, and where necessary, ban them from being installed on government devices.
7 The committee recommends the Australian Government designate an entity with lead responsibility for whole-of-government efforts to counter cyber-enabled foreign interference, with appropriate interdepartmental support and collaboration, resources, authorities and a strong public outreach mandate.
8 The committee recommends the Australian Government address countering cyber-enabled foreign interference as part of the 2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy.
9 The committee recommends the Australian Government clarify that Magnitsky-style cyber sanctions in the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 can be used to target cyber-enabled foreign interference actors, via legislative amendment if necessary, and ensure it has appropriate, trusted frameworks for public attribution.
10 The committee recommends the Australian Government refer the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for review, with particular reference to the Act's effectiveness in addressing cyber-enabled foreign interference.
11 The committee recommends the Australian Government investigate options to identify, prevent and disrupt artificial intelligence (AI)-generated disinformation and foreign interference campaigns, in addition to the Government's Safe and Responsible AI in Australia consultation process.
12 The committee recommends the Australian Government establish a program of vetting appropriate personnel in trusted social media platforms with relevant clearances to ensure there is a point of contact who can receive threat intelligence briefings.
13 The committee recommends the Australian Government build capacity to counter social media interference campaigns by supporting independent research.
14 The committee recommends the Australian Government ensure that law enforcement agencies, and other relevant bodies such as the eSafety Commissioner, work with social media platforms to increase public awareness of transnational repression.
15 The committee recommends the Australian Government empower citizens and organisations to make informed, risk-based decisions about their own social media use by publishing plain-language education and guidance material and regular reports and risk advisories on commonly used social media platforms, ensuring this material is accessible for non-English speaking citizens. Specific focus should be on protecting communities and local groups which are common targets of foreign interference and provide pre-emptive information and resources.
16 The committee recommends the Australian Government support independent and professional foreign-language journalism by supporting journalism training and similar programs, thereby expanding the sources of uncensored news for diaspora communities to learn about issues such as human rights abuses inside their country of origin.
17 The committee recommends the Australian Government promote the digital literacy and the infrastructure of developing countries in the Indo-Pacific region that are the targets of malicious information operations by foreign authoritarian states.
