'The puzzle of the sovereign’s smile and the inner complexity of Hobbes’s theory of authorisation' by Eva Helene Odzuck in (2024) History of European Ideas comments
Hobbes’s theory of authorisation poses numerous puzzles to scholars. The weightiest of these conundrums is a supposed contradiction between chapter 17 of Leviathan, that calls for unconditional submission to the sovereign, and chapter 21, that defends the liberties of the subject. This article offers a fresh perspective on the theory’s consistency, function and addressees. While existing research doubts the theory’s consistency, focuses on its immunisation function and on the subjects as the theory’s main addresses, the paper argues that Hobbes’s theory of authorisation is consistent with the doctrine of the liberty of subjects, and that it serves the dual purpose of immunising the sovereign against criticism and disciplining the sovereign via a counsel of memento mori: A hitherto underexplored element of authorisation theory is a reminder of the mortality of sovereignty directed at the sovereign to convince him to make restricted use of his absolute right to rule. Hobbes’s theory of authorisation can thus be read as part of a complex argumentative strategy for peace, rooted in a ‘liberal absolutism’ which is not as paradoxical as it sounds, and which is reflected in the frontispiece by the friendly smile of the sovereign.
Odzuck argues
... there is considerable disagreement in Hobbes scholarship around what might have led Hobbes to develop and set out the theory of authorisation. Concerning the content and principal function of the authorisation theory there is less disagreement. The main content of the theory seems to be unconditional submission to the emerging sovereign: the subjects give up all their rights and authorise all actions of the emerging sovereign. This claim on the content seems to imply the claim on the theory’s main function: it is plausible to assume that the theory’s central purpose is to justify the absolute state and to immunise the sovereign from criticism; as authors of all the sovereign’s actions, the subjects cannot complain about them and – of course – have no right of resistance. Specific problems arise, however, from a reading of authorisation as unconditional; most notably, an unconditional authorisation of the sovereign’s actions appears to contradict the doctrine of the liberty of subjects set out in chapter 21 of Leviathan, which implies conditional authorisation.
This article will propose a complex interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of authorisation that resolves this apparent contradiction and complements prevailing hypotheses around the theory’s function and principal addressee. My account and defence of this interpretation will proceed as follows: First, I will introduce readers to the theory of authorisation by analysing central passages of Leviathan (especially chapter 17) and argue that textual evidence seems to support the claim of unconditional authorisation of the sovereign’s actions.
I will subsequently proceed to highlight problems of this reading of unconditional authorisation of the emerging sovereign that arise from the theory of the liberty of subjects (particularly as set out in chapter 21).
I will then present my interpretation as a non-paradox theory of conditional and unconditional authorisation, on the basis of my analysis of chapters 14, 16, 17 and 21 of Leviathan, and defend my claims relating to the theory’s consistency and complexity.
Concluding, I will summarise my findings, characterising Hobbes’s theory of authorisation as a complex argumentative strategy for peace that combines absolutist and liberal elements in a non-paradoxical way and that fulfils different functions for different addresses – one underexplored function being a memento mori for the sovereign.
