Chapter Seven of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee report Right Wing Extremist Movements In Australia states
7.1 Australia is a healthy and vibrant democracy. Freedom of speech is fundamental to Australia’s values. Political views become unacceptable when individuals or groups use fear, terror, or violence to further or achieve ideological aims. Ashift from peaceful political engagement to the promotion, or use, of violence is incompatible with liberal democracy. The threat or use of violence against specific groups of people is an attack against our shared values. Violent extremism must not be tolerated in Australia.
Defining extremism
7.2 It is challenging to precisely define right wing extremism. A wide range of defining characteristics were provided to the committee. This included hostility towards minority groups, liberal democracy, a pluralistic society, and equality.
7.3 Some right wing extremists condone the threat or use of violence to further their goals or defend their position in what they see as a decaying social order. They justify violence to advance their extreme ideology.
7.4Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies explained that it is not helpful to categorise extremism according to a binary left-right conceptualisation of political ideologies. Those agencies reported that extremists increasingly adopt hybrid ideologies that do not fit neatly on the political spectrum.
7.5 Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies have developed two broad categories of politically motivated violence that are further divided into more specific sub-categories. Those broad categories are: religiously motivated violent extremism; and ideologically motivated violent extremism.
7.6 Ideologically motivated violent extremism is further divided into a range of sub-categories including: nationalist and racist violent extremism; anarchist and revolutionary violent extremism; and specific issue violent extremism.
7.7 For the purposes of this inquiry, much of the evidence received by the committee related to individuals and groups who fall within the category of nationalist and racist violent extremism, including neo-Nazis and white supremacist groups.
Nature and extent of extremism in Australia
7.8 There is a long history of extremism in Australia. The views of Australian extremist movements reflect the sociopolitical context of the time and evolve according to that context.
7.9 Ideologically motivated violent extremism is rising globally, and Australia is not immune to that trend. Disturbing evidence was received by the committee of communication between extremists based elsewhere in the world and those based in Australia, often in the online environment.
7.10 Australian extremists have built links with international movements that reflect their ideological position. They have developed these links to create a shared community that can provide ideological, discursive, financial, and organisational support.
7.11 Extremists opportunistically co-opt elements of mainstream culture to give their movements and ideological views greater credibility, to appeal to a wider audience, and to lure people into their extreme world view. Radicalised individuals can be encouraged to consider, or even commit, violent acts.
7.12 The internet facilitates the rapid sharing of this culture and the creation of a globalised extremist movement. For some individuals, joining a large and active community can satisfy an unmet need for social connection.
7.13 For example, the committee learned of the transnational so called active club network, which is used by extremists to build a community on shared principles. Those communities are designed to appear innocuous to outside observers as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
7.14 Active clubs are usually decentralised and are only loosely connected to each other. To outside observers they appear to focus on brotherhood and physical fitness. However, they may provide participants with an introduction to extremist ideologies and promote an extreme ideology.
7.15It is noted that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reported that it is aware of the active club model and, at the time of giving evidence to the committee, it had assessed that it presents a low risk of politically motivated violence.
7.16Concerningly, in August 2024, during this inquiry, ASIO raised the terrorism threat level to PROBABLE. There is a greater threat of people radicalising and using violence to further their ideological cause.
7.17 As at November 2024, there have been nine attacks, disruptions or suspected terrorist incidents in Australia. In ASIO's assessment, most of those incidents were motivated by nationalist and racist ideologies or a hybrid of ideologies. All those incidents involved lone actors or small groups and low-capability weapons.
7.18 It is deeply concerning that law enforcement and intelligence agencies reported that many radicalised individuals the subject of their investigations are young people. TheAustralian Federal Police informed the committee that it has commenced investigations and conducted operational activity against a number of people under the age of 16, with the youngest person being 11 years old.
Mainstreaming of extremist ideas
7.19 The committee received evidence to suggest that extremists aim to make their ideas and ideologies more politically and culturally accessible and acceptable. They do that through the spread of propaganda both in physical spaces and on widely used online platforms.
7.20 Mainstream online platforms can act as gateways to more radical or extremist content hosted elsewhere online.
7.21 Some extremists overtly pursue radical social change using violence or through the distribution of vile propaganda material intended to vilify and instil fear in minority groups. Others adopt more nuanced tactical approaches, distorting and manipulating mainstream political issues to lure people, including young Australians, into their extreme ideological domain.
The threat posed by extremism
7.22 Extremist movements pose a threat to Australian society and Australian values. Certain communities and groups of Australians are at particular risk. Thecommittee received evidence that highlighted how these Australians are subjected to dehumanising propaganda and targeted by extremists.
7.23 A range of communities were identified as being at particular risk from extremist actors. Those communities include: First Nations peoples; culturally diverse communities; religious communities; women; migrants; LGBTQIA+ people; and young people.
7.24 Australians who belong to minority groups reported the feeling of alienation and exclusion associated with being targeted by extremists. Their evidence demonstrated that even non-violent actions can have severe consequences for their sense of belonging and participation in society.
7.25 Nationalist and racist violent extremism is incompatible with Australian democracy. It is anathema to Australian values.
Radicalisation
7.26 The radicalisation process can be complex and idiosyncratic. There are a range of factors that could contribute to someone becoming susceptible to radicalisation.
7.27 Those factors include: social isolation; a real or perceived loss of status or privilege; economic insecurity; a sense of marginalisation;
7.28 Several inquiry participants cautioned against a simplistic approach to addressing radicalisation and violence. They warned that there is no straightforward 'conveyor belt' that carries individuals from exposure to extremist ideas, to radicalisation, to committing violent acts.
7.29 The Australian Institute of Criminology identified three broad risk factors that contribute to radicalisation: sociodemographic characteristics, such as being male, young, unemployed or underemployed; psychological characteristics, such as low self-control, personal grievance, certain mental health conditions; and contextual characteristics, such as criminal history or associations with other radicalised persons.
Measures to address extremism
7.30 Throughout the inquiry, the committee heard that the criminalisation of extremist behaviour is unlikely to fully address the threat of violence and reduce the risk posed to the wider community.
7.31 Some inquiry participants recommended that the response to extremism should primarily focus on addressing the potential for extremists to resort to violence and not on the ideology itself. People should be free to hold extreme ideas. However, they should be strongly deterred from using violence in furtherance of those ideas.
7.32 Other inquiry participants suggested that a holistic approach is more appropriate. That approach would include providing resources that support civic engagement, strengthen civic institutions, and provide tools that weaken the appeal of extremist ideologies.
7.33 Inquiry participants recommended that governments focus on: community outreach and engagement programs; deradicalisation initiatives; education programs that foster critical thinking skills, improve knowledge of civics, and instil a greater sense of empathy; and antiracism programs.
Community outreach and engagement programs
7.34 Civil society was recognised as an integral part of any response to extremism. Community organisations are often best placed to respond to extremism, asindividuals who belong to those communities often view those organisations as having greater credibility. The family also plays an important role. The committee received evidence regarding the effectiveness of involving parents in deradicalisation programmes.
7.35 While government can provide assistance to community organisations, this does not necessarily provide a solution to the issue. Some individuals may mistrust government and government-led initiatives.
7.36 Notwithstanding this, it was suggested that civil society organisations should be broadly supported so that they are able to continue to meet the social needs of individuals who may be drawn to radical ideologies. Civil society organisations provide individuals with meaning, connectedness, respect, and recognition. If they are not able to provide those outcomes, some individuals may turn to other sources and thereby become more susceptible to radicalisation.
Deradicalisation initiatives
7.37 The committee received evidence highlighting the importance of deradicalisation programs in countering violent extremism.
7.38 A distinction was drawn between disengagement and deradicalisation. Disengagement refers to the disavowal of violence in the pursuit of an extreme ideology, while deradicalisation is a complete abandonment of a radical ideology. Individuals who have disengaged may still hold extreme beliefs but do not condone violence in the pursuit of that ideology.
7.39 Violent extremists are often driven by emotion. Effective deradicalisation programmes may seek to engage people who have been radicalised on an emotional level to properly understand the factors in their lives that have motivated them to view violence as an appropriate means to further their ideological position.
7.40 As individuals adopt extremist ideologies for idiosyncratic reasons, deradicalisation programs should be tailored to the specific needs of the individual.
7.41 That support may require access to a multidisciplinary team of professionals depending on the unique needs of the individual. In some cases, it might also be appropriate to provide radicalised individuals with a mentor to help guide them on the path to rehabilitation.
7.42 Some organisations with experience in providing deradicalisation programs suggested that former extremists who have been deradicalized may assist through the process. Their personal insights into extremism and radicalisation may be of particular benefit in some cases.
7.43 The committee understands that deradicalisation and countering violent extremism initiatives require continuous evaluation and refinement to ensure that they are fit-for-purpose and responsive to the evolving threat environment.
Recommendation 1
7.44 The committee recommends that the Australian government undertakes periodic evaluation of Australian deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs. That evaluation should involve experts engaged in those programs, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and organisations that research countering violent extremism and deradicalisation. Any such periodic review should draw upon the experience both in Australia and overseas in other liberal democracies. Education and youth engagement programs 7.45Education was repeatedly highlighted as an effective tool in reducing the appeal of extremist ideology and weakening the propaganda disseminated by extremists.
7.46 Instilling empathy for others was identified as an important facet of education. Empathy helps individuals better understand the perspectives of others and avoid the adoption of hateful ideologies.
7.47 Several inquiry participants commented that the increased use of online platforms required a new approach to, and focus on media literacy, and critical thinking skills.
7.48 Young people are at particular risk of developing links with extremist movements, as extremists often tailor their messages to appeal to young people.
7.49 Young people are often at a stage of their life where they are testing their sense of self and developing their unique identity. They may be in positions of vulnerability and susceptible to insidious targeting from those purporting to provide social connection. Sometimes extremists position themselves to meet those psychological needs and to draw young people into the thrall of their extreme and hateful ideology.
Recommendation 2
7.50 The committee recommends that the Australian government develops a national framework for engaging with young people to deter them from radical extremism. That framework should provide best practice guidance to the states and territories and the broader civic community on how to engage with young people to: assist them in identifying harmful ideologies promoting violent extremism; deter them from adopting harmful ideologies promoting violent extremism; and provide them with the means to engage with the wider community in a socially positive way.
The online environment
7.51 The committee heard evidence in relation to the difference between ‘in real life’ and online extremism. The anonymity of the online environment is conducive to the sharing of violent rhetoric and harassment of individuals belonging to minority groups. Some people feel comfortable to say things online that they would never consider communicating in public.
7.52 Some individuals find social fulfilment in online communities. They can meet a strong psychological need to feel part of a bigger movement. In the vast majority of cases, many of those communities contribute positively to wider society and perform a valuable social role. However, violent extremists may prey upon the psychological need of vulnerable people to perpetuate hate and promote their destructive cause.
7.53 The online environment is where people are most likely to be exposed to fringe ideas and extreme ideologies. Individuals are likely to be exposed to that material even if they are not actively seeking it.
7.54 Extremists are drawn to the internet not only for the anonymity, but also for the low barriers to access and its global reach. The internet provides them with a vehicle to recruit, radicalise, and inspire new adherents or reinforce the beliefs of other extremists.
7.55 Efforts to remove offensive or objectionable content from the internet can be difficult. The committee received evidence that video footage of the despicable Christchurch terrorist attack and the perpetrator’s twisted manifesto continue to circulate online despite the New Zealand Chief Censor classifying it as objectionable content that is illegal to possess or distribute.
7.56 It is clear that offensive, objectionable, and harmful material is likely to continue to circulate online despite efforts to regulate the online environment and remove that material.
7.57 The Office of the eSafety Commissioner stated that it had not conducted research into the presence of ideologically motivated violent extremism online. It has conducted research into online hate, including in relation to children and young people’s experiences of hate on online gaming platforms.
Recommendation 3
7.58 The committee recommends that the Australian government conducts research into violent extremism in the online environment, including on: social media platforms; gaming platforms; and gaming-adjacent platforms. That research should examine how those platforms may be used by extremist actors to spread propaganda and recruit members, particularly in relation to young people.
Social media platforms
7.59 Social media platforms use algorithms to deliver content to their users. Those algorithms often prioritise similar material to the same user. Hence, there can be a compounding effect produced by the continual receipt by a user of emotive, shocking, and salient content, which can include extreme material.
7.60 Depending on how individual users of those platforms engage with that content, over time they can find themselves presented with a larger volume of similar content.
7.61 Extremists often use mainstream social media platforms as an initial point of contact with potential recruits, including vulnerable young people. If individuals engage with extremist content in a favourable way on mainstream platforms, they can be invited to closed sites where plans for violence can be discussed or promoted.
7.62 In relation to the use of algorithms for content filtering on social media platforms, the committee heard that social media companies have in many instances reduced the level of transparency around how their platforms operate.
7.63 The Christchurch Call, to which many social media companies are signatories, called for greater transparency around how those companies operate and the measures they have in place to regulate their platforms. The Office of the eSafety Commissioner told the committee that no social media company operating in Australia is adequately meeting its expectations under the Christchurch Call.
7.64 The committee was told that independent researchers are not able to access the social media monitoring tools that were once available to them. Social media companies have discontinued the use of those tools, which make it difficult, if not impossible, for their efforts to enforce terms of service to be assessed by outside observers. The eSafety Commissioner indicated that the discontinuation of those tools has decreased public transparency and limited her office’s ability to monitor the presence of hate speech, abuse, disinformation, and extremist content on social media platforms.
Recommendation 4
7.65 The committee recommends that the Office of the eSafety Commissioner engages with stakeholders in relation to the development of best practice guidelines in relation to transparent and independent assurance measures to verify that social media platforms are enforcing terms of service to exclude harmful extremist content. Encrypted communication applications
7.66 Online anonymity was raised as a major concern during the inquiry, particularly by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The widespread use of encrypted communication applications allows violent extremists to conceal their identities and hide their communication from law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
7.67 ASIO reported that virtually all of its priority counter-terrorism and counter-espionage investigations are frustrated by the use of encryption technology.
7.68 While encrypted communication platforms may be used for nefarious ends, it is acknowledged that they can also have a socially beneficial role. Those platforms have been used to uncover information that has been suppressed by authoritarian governments and in investigations into corrupt or criminal practices by individuals and companies.
7.69 Encrypted communications are integral to the proper functioning of the internet and play an important role in public transparency. Encryption protects privacy and assists in the investigation of wrongdoing. At the same time, encrypted communication technologies are used by violent extremist actors to conceal their activities from law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
7.70 Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should be permitted access to encrypted communications in very specific cases that involve well-founded concerns for national security and where such access is regulated by the judicial system through the issue of warrants. That access is integral to those agencies being able to conduct their very important work that keeps Australians safe. As the extremist threat is globalised, Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies are increasingly expected to be able to provide operational intelligence to their foreign counterparts. To ensure that violent extremism can be combatted wherever and whenever it emerges, it is vital that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are equipped with the tools they need to effectively monitor and respond to national security threats, including those posed by extremists.
Recommendation 5
7.71 The committee recommends the Australian government considers introducing legislation that would enable Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies to access encrypted communications if there is a well-founded threat to national security and a warrant has been issued by a judicial officer to access those communications.
National hate crimes database
7.72 Some participants in the inquiry advocated for the establishment of a national database to better track hate crimes. There are currently private organisations which are performing this invaluable civic function. It was also highlighted that there is no nationally consistent definition of what constitutes a hate crime in Australia, which can frustrate responses from law enforcement and human rights commissions.
7.73 The lack of a nationally consistent understanding of what constitutes a hate crime has resulted in a reluctance to report those crimes and incomplete data about the extent of the problem.
7.74 A nationally consistent approach to what constitutes a hate crime would facilitate a nationally consistent reporting and data collecting system. That system would: provide quantitative evidence of the efficacy of legislative measures that address hate and violence against targeted communities; assist law enforcement agencies in evaluating the effectiveness of their policing and education and training programs; and assist human rights commissions in developing advocacy programs and providing victim support programs.
Recommendation 6
7.75 The committee recommends the Australian government adopts a nationally consistent definition of what constitutes a hate crime and consider establishing a national hate crimes database.
7.76 The committee recommends its finding and conclusions to the Senate.
