In Ponzio v Ashley Services Group Limited [2025] FedCFamC2G 289 the Court addressed claims by Ponzio, stating
In relation to Magna Carta the Court observes (adapting slightly what it said in Ledger Acquisitions Australia MB Pty Ltd v Kiefer [2014] FCCA 2216 at [59]- [66] per Judge Lucev) that:
(a) the Charter of Magna Carta was signed by King John of England “in the meadow that is called Runnymede between Windsor and Staines” on 15 June 1215. Only three of the original clauses remain in effect in the United Kingdom, one of those clauses being cl 39 which became cl 29 in 1225. The current enactment dates from 1297;
(b) the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) (“Restriction Act”) was challenged in Chia Gee & Ors v Martin [1905] HCA 70; (1905) 3 CLR 649; (1905) 12 ALR 425 (“Chia Gee”) as “unconstitutional, on the basis that its provisions were contrary to the provisions of Magna Charta and the Statutes which had since confirmed it”: Chia Gee, CLR at 652-653 per Griffith CJ. Sir Samuel Griffith, the first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, and arguably the principal drafter of what became the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (“Constitution”), brooked no argument on this contention, dismissing it in a single sentence: “The contention that a law of the Commonwealth is invalid because it is not in conformity with Magna Charta is not one for serious refutation”: Chia Gee, CLR at 653 per Griffith CJ The other two initial Justices of the High Court of Australia, Barton and O’Connor JJ, contented themselves with concurring with the Chief Justice: Chia Gee, CLR at 654 per Griffith CJ. Barton J, who was the first Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, and O’Connor J, were both involved in the Constitutional conventions which led to the drafting of the Constitution, Barton extensively so. Such was the authority of the first three Justices of the High Court of Australia that no more needed to be said;
(c) in Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; in re Yates [1925] HCA 53; (1925) 37 CLR 36 (“Walsh and Johnson”), also a case concerning the Restriction Act, Isaacs J discussed the Constitutional significance of Magna Carta in an Australian context. Referring to cl 29 of Magna Carta Isaacs J said, Walsh and Johnson, CLR at 79, that:
The chapter, ... recognises three basic principles, namely, (1) primarily every free man has an inherent individual right to his life, liberty, property and citizenship; (2) his individual rights must always yield to the necessities of the general welfare at the will of the State; (3) the law of the land is the only mode by which the State can so declare its will.
(d) Isaacs J recognised that personal liberty and property give way to a declaration by the State (in this case the Commonwealth) of the law of the land, observing, Walsh and Johnson, CLR at 79, that: These principles taken together form one united conception for the necessary adjustment of the individual and social rights and duties of the members of the State.
(e) in Skyring v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 23 ATR 84; (1991) ATC 4028 (“Skyring”) the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, faced with a contention that Commonwealth tax legislation violated property rights secured by Magna Carta, held that the power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by the taxation power in s 51(ii) of the Constitution, to legislate with respect to taxation, extends to the imposition of taxation and its collection, even though it has the effect of requiring the person on which taxation is levied to pay the tax out of property which he owns: Skyring, ATR at 87 per Gummow, Einfeld and Heerey JJ;
(f) in Arnold & Anor v State Bank of South Australia & Ors (1992) 38 FCR 484 (“Arnold”) the appellants sought to attack a mortgage on the basis that the debt secured by the mortgage involved the creation by the respondent bank of a book entry credit at no cost to itself. Magna Carta was invoked as guaranteeing the rights of the appellants to their matrimonial home and livelihood. Challenges were also made on the basis of passages from the Bible, and in particular those striking at usury. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, in dismissing the appellants’ appeal, did not specifically refer to Magna Carta in its reasoning, but approved what had been said in two recent cases before single Judges of the Federal Court: Arnold at 485-486 per Burchett, Hill and Drummond JJ, including in Fisher & Anor v Westpac Banking Corporation & Ors (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, No 64/92, 18 August 1992) (“Fisher”)
(g) in Fisher the plaintiffs sought to set aside a claim made by a bank under a mortgage to their matrimonial home on the basis that the matrimonial home was guaranteed not to be abrogated from or interfered with by anyone by reason of authority derived ultimately from Magna Carta. Similar pleas were also made by reference to biblical authority. In the Federal Court of Australia French J, like the first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia in Chia Gee, dismissed the plea by reference to Magna Carta in a single sentence, Fisher at p 15 per French J, as follows:
In relation to the remaining pleas based on the Magna Carta and the Bible, it is sufficient to say they disclose no legally tenable cause of action. It follows that Magna Carta has no apparent operation in the circumstances of this case, the law of the land in relation to the unlawful termination action being that set out in the FW Act, and to the extent that this issue concerns the process and procedure of this Court, then as set in the FCFCA Act and the GFL Rules.
