19 December 2022

Straw Gods and Homo Sapiens

Another instance of the unpersuasive straw man often adopted by sovereign citizens. In Rambaldi and Anor v Rice Bar Restaurant and Anor [2018] VSC 218 the Court states 

 [27] On 4 January 2018 the defendant filed an affidavit sworn by him on 28 December 2017. The affidavit is rambling, nonsensical and, aside from the occasional assertion in respect of matters the subject of this claim, is unresponsive to Mr Rambaldi’s affidavit of 7 December 2017. By way of example in this regard, an extract of the defendant’s affidavit (paragraphs [1] to [15]) reads as follows: SC:CTM

1. Kim Huit is consciously aware, that He is “Living Spirit” living as “Servant to Al Might Creator” in the “Greater Universe Continuum”. We are integrally interlocked to the immutable1 laws of this “Natural Element” wherein our inalienable “Spirit” is constituted in interlocutory law without been holder or occupier of “PERSON” Office. 

2. Therefore the Man called Kim Huit of the House Tang, with the Grace of God as living breathing soul force of man, whereas one of the people of the land called Australia, and sincerely avow that in Kim Huit’s correct and proper public capacity exclusively as the beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction, being of majority age, competent to testify, a self-realised man upon the land, that My yes be yes, My no, no, My word be true, and that do avow the truths and facts contained herein, are of Kim Huit first hand, sincere belief and knowledge as being, true, correct, complete, certain and not misleading; and grateful to the Blessing of Almighty God to allow Kim Huit to write this affidavit: 

3. In the State of Victoria, the “Constitution Act 1975 – SECT 76, state that the Supreme Court of Victoria “to be a court of record and to have a seal. The Court shall be a court of record, and shall have and use as occasion may require a seal bearing an impression of the Royal Arms having inscribed thereon the words “The seal of the Supreme Court of the State of Victoria”; and such seal shall be kept in the custody of the Chief Justice of The Court”. 

4. THAT We make this “special appearance” before this honourable court, to assist the court in distinguishing between ourselves: Kim Huit living spirit of the House Tang and KIM HUIT TANG (and all the derivatives and variation in the spelling of the said name (CORPORATION SOLE), in DOG-LATIN of the grammatical fact stating that such NAME written in DOG-LATIN-GLOSSA style in any of your documents are Corrupt and Criminal, our appearance before the court must not be construed as volunteering or consenting to the Plaintiff or the court jurisdiction. 

5. That We have not engaged the services of licenced legal counsel and, thereby rebut any assumed “consent to contract” or “consent to jurisdiction”. 

6. That We are “Kim Huit” with the initial letter capitalized as required by the rules of English Grammar when writing the description of living Spirit man. With the blessing of Al Mighty Creator of All Things We become the son of a man and a woman that was born in our mother womb with rights of inheritance and issue from the house of Tang” with the initial capitalized.  

7. That We are not a life-less, dead-in-law-artificial-legal-entity-person- natural-person-human being. 

8. That We are who we are, not, who the imagination, devices or records of men, say that we are. 

9. That it is the responsibility of the plaintiff and court registrar to bring the correct party before the court, we are not that party. 

10. “. .And the LORD-GOD formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life: and man become a living soul” Genesis Chapter 2:7 

11. That consistent with the God’s scriptures laws unless we have wilfully harmed someone or damaged their property, we have not committed any wrongdoing; and therefore we are not liable to answer or enter to any contract without consent or be liable for any damage/penalty(s) but the court should consider a remedy to the benefit of the Living Man Kim Huit of the House Tang. 

12. We truly believe and say that we had fulfilled our obligation lawfully with the A.T.O, we had tendered 7 payments in total in our good faith and accordance with Bill of Exchange 1909, as amended in2011 and administered by the Treasury .... 

13. ATO as a Government entity are well verse in financial instruments and the laws and obligations that must be followed, the Commissioner or his/her deputies know that they had the right to protest at the time stipulated in the instruments; however they chose not to show up at the time of the meeting and they failed or refused to protest and the ATO had never returned the tendered instruments. 

14. Awe (sic) demand that PITCHER PARTNERS and GESS MICHAEL RAMBALDI verify in writing that the A.T.O had never received any payment in a way of Bill of Exchange, and what firsthand knowledge do they have regarding the tendered Bill of Exchange to the ATO, or did ATO mislead them by not disclosing the true facts of the payments they received by BOE, or are they both colluding to deceive us and the Honorable Court to benefit financially. 

15. Notwithstanding we attached A.T.O’s Department inchoate instruments including what have been begun but apparently not completed (missing several material particulars, including some or all of the Parties being expressed in a representative capacity as part of our presentments that having been all accepted for valuable consideration as per the tenor of such terms, provisions and endorsements so expressed (subsequently issued complete with any negativing or limiting one’s liability by such endorsements), as being an “unqualified offer to Contract between the Parties” so named thereon.

[28] The affidavit continues for another 15 paragraphs in the same vein. If one were attempting an analysis of its substance, the defendant appears to contend that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim and that by the proffering of bills of exchange the Commissioner’s claim (which constitutes the entirety of the plaintiffs’ claim in this proceeding) has been discharged. 

[29] On 23 February 2018, the defendant sought to file several additional documents, headed ‘Writ of Error’, ‘Facts-Finding’, and ‘Judicial-Notice’, which were in the same vein as the affidavit to which I have referred. On 27 February 2018 Ms Helena Konstanopoulos, an Assistant Registrar (Legal) and Deputy Prothonotary of the Court wrote to the defendant advising him that the documents had been rejected for filing as they had not been prepared in accordance with the rules of Court and were not in the correct form. The defendant responded on 14 March 2018 in argumentative terms.

In Roberts v Goodwin Street Developments Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 103 the Court states that the grounds of appeal by Mr Roberts were as follows: 

 1. A competent person would agree that the flesh of “daniel” or “daniel roberts” is not the same as the office of Trustee “Daniel” or “Daniel Roberts” or the Trust Corpus True Person “DANIEL” “ROBERTS” “DANIEL “ROBERTS” “BENEFICIARY”. 

2. The appellant is a living man with flesh and blood, a living man cannot defend himself in a civil jurisdiction. 

3. The appellant is a member of the Homo Sapien Species, owns Divine Trust Rights to a Good Soul, Body, Mind and Property. 

4. The appellant is not a Thing and cannot be Legally converted to a Thing via Civil Controversy. 

5. The appellant is a Property owner and is apologetic for any Mistake of Fact. 

6. The prospective respondent is a Protagonist of Drama and discharging this case is resolution of the Plot. 

7. The prospective respondent is a fictional Person and cannot make a claim against a living man Natural Person under the Law. 

8. The appellant is not surety for a corporate fiction, Inferior Trust(s) can’t stand, there is hidden accounting, we don’t accept punitive or cohesive benefits. 

9. The appellant is trustee of an express True Trust, appellant has a superior Trust position.

18 December 2022

Literature and Defamation

'Legal Fiction: Reading Lolita as a Sentencing Memorandum' by Christina Frohock in (2022) 86(1) Albany Law Review comments 

 The idea of a legal narrative often focuses on identifying a narrative within the law, for example, the persuasive power of storytelling in a trial court motion or an appellate brief. The story emerges from the law. This Article proposes inverting that focus so that we identify the law within a narrative. Using the example of Vladimir Nabokov’s classic novel Lolita, the Article explains how we can read the novel as a prolonged sentencing memorandum. That memorandum casts the infamous first-person narrator, recounting his crimes under the pseudonym of Humbert Humbert, as a defendant writing pro se. In Lolita, the law emerges from the story, showing that an entire legal document may be redrawn as a narrative. The legal document and the narrative are one, with a distinct point of view in favor of the criminal defendant. This unity between law and narrative illuminates a deep, essential goal shared by both genres: garnering sympathy. The notion of law without sympathy thus rings hollow. Finally, this essential link between law and sympathy shines a new light on the law’s role to promote justice. Justice must be measured at least partly as an expression of sympathy rather than solely as a cold calculation of costs and benefits.

SCAG earlier this month stated 

 On 9 December 2022, the Standing Council of Attorneys-General approved in principle final amendments for Part A of the Stage 2 Review of the Model Defamation Provisions. This is subject to final agreement in the first half of 2023. Participants noted the significant work that has been undertaken by the interjurisdictional Defamation Law Working Party, led by NSW, since the exposure draft Part A Model Defamation Amendment Provisions were released in August 2022 for public consultation. A large stakeholder roundtable was held in September and 36 written submissions were received. Careful consideration has been given to the feedback received from a wide range of stakeholders and this has informed further refinements to the Part A amendments. The Part A reforms that have been agreed in principle for commencement from 1 January 2024 are a pragmatic approach that is intended to strike a better balance between protecting reputations and not unreasonably limiting freedom of expression in the various circumstances where third parties publish defamatory matter via internet intermediaries. 

The amendments include:

  • Two conditional, statutory exemptions from defamation liability for a narrow group of internet intermediaries, including search engines in relation to organic search results 

  • A new innocent dissemination defence for internet intermediaries, subject to a simple complaints process (Model B) 

  • A new court power to make orders against non-party internet intermediaries to prevent access to defamatory matter online 

  • A requirement that courts consider balancing factors when making preliminary discovery orders

  • Updates to the mandatory requirements for an offer to make amends for online publications

Participants agreed that Commonwealth officials will consider the desirability of an exemption from section 235(1) of the Online Safety Act 2021 for defamation law and report back to the Defamation Law Working Party in the first half of 2023. 

Participants noted an update on Part B of the Stage 2 Review, led by Victoria, which considers whether absolute privilege should be extended to cover reports of alleged unlawful conduct to police and other entities including statutory investigative bodies and professional disciplinary bodies. 

Participants noted that consultation on the Part B reforms was finalised in October 2022 and that stakeholder feedback is informing final policy recommendations and amendments to the Model Defamation Provisions. This will enable consideration and agreement of the final Part B amendments in 2023. 

Participants agreed in principle that there should be a review of the Stage 1 and Stage 2 amendments to the Model Defamation Provisions beginning no later than 3 years after the commencement of the Stage 2 amendments (for both Part A and B) in all states and territories.

Constitutions and Constructivism

'Constitutionalizing in the Anthropocene' (Tilburg Law School Research Paper) by Floor M. Fleurke, Michael C. Leach, Hans Lindahl, Phillip Paiement, Marie-Catherine Petersmann and Han Somsen comments 

The Anthropocene thesis, in its rejection of both the modernist separation between ‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’ as well as its treatment of ‘humans’ as a singular global geophysical force, presents fundamental challenges to constitutional theory and practice. First, in terms of conceptual and foundational transformations, the Anthropocene provokes the reconceptualization of legal relations as never limited to human concerns, but always and already part of more-than-human collectives, in which both humans and nonhumans act with co-agency, in recognition of shared vulnerabilities and in relations premised on care. This reconceptualizing demands a new understanding of representational practices that could constitutionalize more-than-human relations as political and legal collectives. Second, emergent technologies such as genetic and climate engineering introduce fundamental questions about regulatory modalities available in the Anthropocene, and the role law plays in this regard. Such technologies have given rise to the possibility of ‘ruling by design’, by technologically mediating ‘natural’ forces or Earth system processes to achieve pre-established regulatory goals. This possibility raises critical concerns about the remaining role for law in legitimizing and enabling such developments. Finally, the temporal dimensions of the Anthropocene thesis cast a critical light on law’s potential for driving radical transformations in (un)governance. In imagining future legal institutions capable of manifesting more-than-human constitutionalism, it is necessary to excavate the historical role that foundational legal principles and institutions – such as sovereignty and personhood – have had in facilitating exploitative relations within and beyond humans.

'Just Versus Quick: Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in a Common Law System' by Stephen Gageler (2022) 45(2) Melbourne University Law Review 830 states 

Justice Gageler explores how lessons from behavioural economics are reflected in the institutional structure in which the judicial function is performed. The structure has what the economist Vernon Smith would call an ‘ecological rationality’, an internal logic that minimises errors in human judgement. Features of the structure which combine to have this effect include the appointment of judges from senior ranks of the legal profession, the security of judicial tenure and remuneration, the decisional independence of the judge, the personal discipline of the judge, the requirement to give reasons, and the appellate process. These structural features also carry risks to the quality of adjudication, calling for what Smith would call ‘constructivist’ intervention. Delay in the production of judgments is one of those risks. The challenge in designing a constructivist solution to the problem of delay in the production of judgments is that of striking an appropriate balance between speed and correctness without compromising decisional independence. 

 Gageler J comments 

 From time to time, we engage in Australia in spontaneous national conversations on matters pertaining to the judicial function. The conversations tend to be sparked by some public utterance of a senior practising lawyer or former member of the judiciary, to gain immediate but fleeting attention in the mainstream media, and then to fester at length amongst members of the judiciary. The conversations are not conducted by the participants speaking to each other, or even in the presence of each other, but by them separately delivering learned speeches to learned audiences. We have for some time been engaged in a conversation about judicial productivity. This is my contribution. 

Over a decade ago, the High Court of Australia made a decision that marked a hardening of judicial attitude against delay in the conduct of litigation. On the third day of the four-week trial of a civil proceeding that had been pending in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for nearly two years, the plaintiff had applied for an adjournment and for leave to amend its statement of claim to add a substantial new claim against the defendant. The primary judge had granted the adjournment and the amendment. The Court of Appeal of the Australian Capital Territory had upheld that decision. The High Court unanimously reversed. The plurality in the High Court said that the primary judge and the Court of Appeal had given insufficient attention to the overriding procedural objective identified in the modernised rules of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory of facilitating the just resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings with minimum delay and expense. 

In a concurring judgment, another member of the High Court drew a parallel between the plaintiff’s delay of two years in attempting to amend its statement of claim and the Court of Appeal’s delay of some six months in delivering judgment after hearing the appeal to it from the decision of the primary judge. He concluded:

The proceedings reveal a strange alliance. A party which has a duty to assist the court in achieving certain objectives fails to do so. A court which has a duty to achieve those objectives does not achieve them. The torpid languor of one hand washes the drowsy procrastination of the other. Are these phenomena indications of something chronic in the modern state of litigation? Or are they merely acute and atypical breakdowns in an otherwise functional system? Are they signs of a trend, or do they reveal only an anomaly? One hopes for one set of answers. One fears that, in reality, there must be another.

The current conversation about judicial productivity is a belated attempt to grapple with the questions posed in those remarks. The conversation began three years ago when the author of the remarks delivered a post-judicial speech, the substance of which was reproduced in a national newspaper. The speech was based on a statistical analysis, undertaken by the author himself, which compared for sample periods the average time between the conclusion of a hearing and the delivery of judgment taken by judges at first instance in the Commercial Court and in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and in the Federal Court of Australia. The comparison, according to the author, suggested ‘that the two Australian courts are slower than the English courts and that the Federal Court is the slowest of all’. ‘The Australian performance, particularly the Federal Court performance’, the author went on to opine, ‘is a matter for shame’. Something needed to be done about the delay, the author said, and ‘[i]f all other solutions fail, the only remedy may be the persistence, intensity, even savagery, of judicial, professional and public criticism’. 

The particular subject of judicial productivity in the Federal Court of Australia was soon afterwards taken up in another national newspaper. There it was reduced to a table, the online version of which was interactive. The table ranked each of 69 then-current and recent Federal Court Justices not only by reference to the average number of days each of them took to deliver a written judgment, but also by reference to the average number of words and the average number of paragraphs each of them produced per day. 

Not unsurprisingly, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court and the Chief Justice of New South Wales weighed in on the conversation. Both accepted unreservedly the undesirability of delay in the delivery of judgments. Both nevertheless pointed out the crudeness of adopting a purely quantitative measure of judicial productivity, echoing the memorable and oft-repeated observation of a former Chief Justice of New South Wales that ‘not everything that counts can be counted’. Both pointed to the inevitability of a degree of trade-off between the quantity and quality of judicial output. Both also pointed to the need to take a system-wide perspective. A judge working quickly to produce a large number of low-quality judgments only to have many of them set aside on appeal, they pointed out, cannot thereby be said to be contributing more to the administration of justice than a judge working more slowly and more carefully to produce a lesser number of high-quality judgments, few of which are set aside on appeal. 

My own contribution to the conversation picks up on those themes and develops them at a level of abstraction unrelated to criticism of the productivity of any individual court and unrelated even to consideration of the productivity of courts within any individual national or sub-national system. What I want to do is to explore the subject of judicial productivity at a conceptual level by focusing on the essential nature of the judicial function and on the institutional setting in which that function falls to be performed.

VAD

'Who is Eligible for Voluntary Assisted Dying? Nine Medical Conditions Assessed Against Five Legal Frameworks' by Ben White, Lindy Willmott, Katrine Del Villar et al in (2022) 45(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal coments 

Eligibility criteria in voluntary assisted dying legislation determine access to assistance to die. This article undertakes the practical exercise of analysing whether each of the following nine medical conditions can provide an individual with access to voluntary assisted dying: cancer, motor neurone disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic kidney disease, Alzheimer’s disease, anorexia, frailty, spinal cord injury and Huntington’s disease. This analysis occurs across five legal frameworks: Victoria, Western Australia, a model Bill in Australia, Oregon and Canada. The article argues that it is critical to evaluate voluntary assisted dying legislation in relation to key medical conditions to determine the law’s boundaries and operation. A key finding is that some frameworks tended to grant the same access to voluntary assisted dying, despite having different eligibility criteria. The article concludes with broader regulatory insights for designing voluntary assisted dying frameworks both for jurisdictions considering reform and those reviewing existing legislation.

Fake News

'Fake News and the Tax Law' by Kathleen Delaney Thomas and Erin Scharff in Washington and Lee Law Review (Forthcoming) comments 

The public misunderstands many aspects of the tax system. For example, people frequently misunderstand how marginal tax rates work, misperceive their own average tax rates, and believe they benefit from tax deductions for which they are ineligible. Such confusion is understandable given the complexity of our tax laws. Unfortunately, research suggests these misconceptions shape voter preferences about tax policy which, in turn, impact the policies themselves. 

That people are easily confused by taxes is nothing new. However, with the rise of social media platforms, the speed at which misinformation campaigns can move to shape public opinion is far faster now. The past five years have seen a dramatic shift in the landscape of false information, and scholars in a variety of disciplines, from law to psychology to journalism, have explored the increasing influence of fake news. 

Building on this burgeoning literature, this Article is the first to examine the incidence and impact of fake news on the tax law. We analyze a unique dataset of tax stories flagged as “false” or “untrue” by reputable, third-party news sources. We use this dataset to explore common themes in fake tax news, as well as the ways tax laws’ complexity contributes to spreading false information. We then offer recommendations for how tax administrators and policymakers can combat these misinformation efforts. Specifically, we argue that insights from the literature on fake news can and should inform how administrators disseminate true tax information to the public. Further, understanding what types of tax laws are easily misunderstood or subject to manipulation should inform substantive tax policy design.

CRT and data

'Data, the New Cotton' by Chaz Arnett - CRT meets Big Data -   comments 

The early transformation of the United States into an industrial power is often attributed to our innovative capitalist system. “Capitalism” is a convenient abstraction that we often neglect to concretize because when we do, it becomes clear that the economic success of the nation was, in truth, extracted from, and built upon the enslavement and exploitation of black bodies in the cotton industry. This enslavement and exploitation was popularly justified through calculated feedback loops of racial subjugation, demonization, and dehumanization. Even after the end of non-carceral slavery, the capitalist economic system continued to actively incentivize the maintenance of these feedback loops. The products changed, but the system essentially remained the same. In the present day, the United States’ wealth is largely built and maintained by a “data economy” involving the extraction, processing, and sale of human data. The products and processes may seem benign as abstractions, but once concretized, we see the same patterns of racialized subjugation and exploitation in the data economy as we did in the cotton industry. This essay is intended to ground some of these abstract processes in reality, and demonstrate how plantation logics are currently alive and well in the modern data economy. The reader is encouraged to use this essay as an entry point into exploring and understanding how the interplay of race, capitalism, big data, and surveillance incentivizes and maintains the subjugation and exploitation of African Americans in the modern United States.

16 December 2022

Contempt

In Yap v Matic [No 4] [2022] WASC 422 Solomon J in dealing with contempt refers to sovereign citizenship -

 On 27 October 2022, I found the defendant Sandi Matic guilty of contempt by reason of his breach of the court's orders dated 11 February 2022. My reasons were set out in Yap v Matic [No 3] [2022] WASC 370, which in turn are to be read with reasons I published in Yap v Matic [2022] WASC 181. 

The circumstances of Mr Matic's contempt are explained in those reasons and need not be repeated. 

Procedural background 

As Sandi Matic did not appear at the hearing of 27 October 2022, and also to give him further time to consider his position, I deferred the issue of the appropriate penalty to a hearing on 25 November 2022. Sandi Matic was given ample notice of that hearing. Sandi Matic did not attend on 25 November 2022. On that day I made an order that: The defendant, Sandi Matic, shall appear in person at the Supreme Court of Western Australia at 2.00pm on Wednesday, 30 November 2022, for delivery of the reserved decision. 

Those orders were sent to Mr Matic from the court via email on 25 November 2022. Additionally, the plaintiffs have filed an affidavit of service by Cheryl Lorraine Harrison sworn 28 November 2022 that deposes to the fact that Mr Matic was personally served with those orders, as well as a letter from the plaintiffs' solicitors and a copy of the plaintiffs' submissions in respect of the penalty to be imposed. 

I explained at the hearing on 30 November 2022 that there could be no doubt that Mr Matic had received and was aware of the order that he appear at that hearing, in person. That awareness was illustrated by Mr Matic's correspondence with the court, and with the plaintiffs' solicitors, up until and indeed during the hearing of 30 November 2022. In particular, less than an hour before Mr Matic was due to appear, he sent via email to my chambers a letter addressed to me. Relevantly, that letter included the following passage:

With no evidence to show that we are a named party to these proceedings we kindly decline your invitation to attend this meeting but we offer the Honourable Court to attend future appointments as a friend of the court, Amicus Curiae.

As I explained on 30 November 2022, Mr Matic's repeated failure to appear before the court has delayed these proceedings and interfered with the ability of the court to dispense with this matter. 

I was therefore satisfied that Mr Matic's failure to appear when he had been ordered to do so was, on its face, grounds for the court to charge Mr Matic with contempt of court pursuant to O 55 r 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC). ...

Mr Matic emailed my chambers this morning, 7 December 2022, in the following terms:

i; private living and peaceful man, 'Sandi' accept your invitation to attend as special appointment to the Honourable Court today at 16:30 at Perth with intention to clarify the mistakes that we believe have been made. 

That email is important for two reasons. The first is that it once again highlights Mr Matic's difficulty accepting the authority of the court. That is illustrated by his characterisation of a court order, and indeed of an arrest warrant, as an 'invitation to attend'. Secondly, this email confirms that Mr Matic did receive the court's orders dated 30 November 2022 and was given notice of the court's allegation of contempt and the circumstances giving rise to that charge. 

At 12.45 pm today, Mr Matic was arrested and remanded in custody. Those are the circumstances that have led to Mr Matic's appearance today. 

Penalty for contempt of court 

I now return to the issue of the appropriate penalty to impose upon Mr Matic in relation to the conviction for contempt handed down on 27 October 2022. 

In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic), the High Court adopted the description of the cardinal feature of the power to punish for contempt as being that it is 'an exercise of judicial power by the courts to protect the due administration of justice'. 

Like that case, here the contempt proceedings arose in the course of a civil proceeding. The comments of the High Court reflect and embody a principle that is both fundamental and ubiquitous; that is that the rule of law and the administration of justice require that all persons in society accept that court orders manifest the application of the law by which all people are governed and that for civil society to be maintained, such orders must be obeyed. People are entitled to adopt and with limited qualifications to express, whatever beliefs they choose no matter how others may regard them. But compliance with court orders is a foundational feature of the rule of law. Many cases throughout the common law world have expressed that sentiment in one way or another. Relevantly, in a number of the cases in Australia, the offending conduct was undertaken brazenly in opposition to the court's authority for financial gain. In other cases, the conduct was part of an orchestrated campaign designed to achieve a purpose, such as a political or industrial outcome in which a deliberate decision was made to flout the court's authority in pursuit of the desired objective. 

In at least some of those cases, public disregard for the authority of the court appeared to be part of the strategy in the achievement of the offender's objective. An important feature was the conscious disregard of the court's authority for personal gain or in furtherance of some cause. 

An example is the High Court case of CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) itself. In that case, it was alleged that an industrial union had disobeyed orders made by the court by establishing a blockade of a construction site. As I have noted, in other cases, parties have disobeyed a court's order to make a financial gain or to agitate some political or social cause. 

Here, it is less clear that the defendant was quite as strategic in his disobedience of the court's orders. He appears to have been motivated by a deep sense of grievance arising from his complaints in relation to a commercial transaction, and the proceedings that have been brought against him. The conduct which I have found amounted to a contempt appears to have been undertaken out of a sense of self-righteous anger, in which disregard of the court order was a collateral consequence 

Put simply, it does not appear to me that disobedience of the court's orders or rejection of the court's authority was of itself the defendant's objective when he breached the injunction granted on 11 February 2022. 

At the same time, the defendant has expressed views that could be characterised as inconsistent with an unqualified acceptance of the court's authority. These views have been expressed in comments made by Mr Matic before the court, and in correspondence to my chambers, and correspondence to the plaintiffs' solicitors. Those comments include what appear to be challenges to the court's authority to control the defendant, including the apparent preconditions of his submission to the court's authority, such as whether the court or a judicial officer has entered into a 'contract' with him. Other comments reflect somewhat incoherent or at least unorthodox views about establishing the identity of certain people. The defendant has, for example, demanded that the court identify the defendant himself. These communications have included misguided and distracting debate about the meaning of words such as 'you', and whether the defendant's name when expressed in capitals, refers to him or to some other entity. Some of the views expressed by the defendant might be regarded as irrational, bizarre, or even offensive. 

The communications received by the court on 30 November 2022 referred to at [5], demonstrate the flavour of these comments. I have annexed a selection of that correspondence to this judgment at Annexure A and Annexure B. 

For present purposes, the mischief in the comments with which I am concerned relates not to whether these views are correct or sensible, but rather to the acceptance or rejection of the court's authority. 

It appears that to one extent or another, the views expressed by the defendant are shared by a growing group within society that has loosely been referred to as the sovereign citizen movement and perhaps by other names or descriptions. There are aspects of the views of that movement that have come before this and other courts, including some of the views expressed by this defendant, which reflect a rejection to one degree or another of the court's authority. Those views, and their apparent increasing popularity, or acceptance, cannot be dismissed as harmless or bemusing nonsense. The promulgation of such views and beliefs represents a dangerous corrosion of some of our society's most fundamental values in the maintenance of the rule of law and the administration of justice. The events in the United States of America over recent years reinforce the vigilance required to protect those values and the danger inherent in taking them for granted. 

But at the same time, I am not persuaded, and certainly not beyond reasonable doubt, that it is the holding of such views which inspired Mr Matic to engage in the particular conduct that I have found amounted to the contempt of which he was convicted on 27 October 2022. 

I am therefore not persuaded that for the purposes of this judgment, I should proceed on the basis that views expressed by this defendant regarding the authority of the court, were the motivating force for the particular behaviour that amounted to the contempt. 

In the circumstances, it seems to me that the most important consideration is personal deterrence; that is, imposing a penalty that makes clear to the defendant that he should be conscious of the requirement to obey the court's orders. In Wood v Staunton (No 5), Dunford J summarised the relevant matters to consider in respect of the proper punishment to be imposed for contempt in refusing to answer a series of questions at a Royal Commission. That summary has been adopted in the context of disobedience of a court's order at a civil proceeding by this court; see for example State of Western Australia v Galati [No 4]. The relevant matters are as follows:

(i) the nature and seriousness of the contempt proved; (ii) the consequences of the contempt; (iii) the context in which the contempt was committed; (iv) the reason for the contempt including whether the contemnor intended subjectively to commit the contempt; (v) any benefit received by the contemnor; (vi) whether there has been any apology or public expression of contrition; (vii) the circumstances, character and antecedents of the contemnor; (viii) general and personal deterrence; and (ix) denunciation of the contempt.