04 January 2023

Identifiers

'Digital identity as platform-mediated surveillance' by Silvia Masiero in (2023) 10(1) Big Data and Society comments 

Digital identity systems are usually viewed as datafiers of existing populations. Yet a platform view finds limited space in the digital identity discourse, with the result that the platform features of digital identity systems are not seen in relation to their surveillance outcomes. In this commentary I illuminate how the core platform properties of digital identity systems afford the undue surveillance of vulnerable groups, leading users into the binary condition of either registering and being profiled, or giving up essential benefits from providers of development programmes. By doing so I contest the “dark side” narrative often applied to digital identity, arguing that, rather than just a side, it is the very inner matter of digital identity platforms that enables surveillance outcomes. 

Masiero argues

The term digital identity indicates the conversion of human identities into digital data. In digital identity schemes functions of identification, authentication and authorisation are performed digitally (Nyst et al., 2016): these functions indicate, respectively, the registration of individuals into identity databases, individuals’ ability to assert their own identity, and, as a result of that, their authorisation to access products or services. Built as an enabler of authorisation to access key services, digital identity has become part of efforts towards Sustainable Development Goal 16:9, to “provide legal identity for all including free birth registrations” (United Nations, 2015). Digital identity schemes are indeed meant to match subjects with their entitlements, preventing fraud and at the same time ensuring that correct provisions are supplied in development programmes (Gelb and Clark, 2013; Gelb and Metz, 2018). 

Countering this narrative, studies across disciplines have seen digital identity associated to erroneous exclusions of genuinely entitled users (Drèze et al., 2017; Muralidharan et al., 2020), as well as undue redirections of economic development policy (Masiero and Arvidsson, 2021). Coexistence of data-based social assistance with techniques of policing and profiling, resulting into what Iazzolino (2021) refers to as “infrastructures of compassionate repression”, has added to the same narrative. The result is that a digital-identity-for-development (D4D) orthodoxy, while diffused in policymaking, is systematically questioned on empirical grounds (Beduschi, 2019; Weitzberg et al., 2021). 

In portraying the digital identity orthodoxy and its problematisations, a view of digital identity systems as datafiers dominates the literature (Masiero and Shakthi, 2020). A datafier perspective views digital identity as a tool for the conversion of human beings into data: through that conversion subjects are matched to entitlements, preventing erroneous inclusion and exclusion (Gelb and Clark, 2013). But the same perspective illuminates how injustice is produced through digital identity, from the persistence of exclusion errors to undue profiling and enablement of policies that affect anti-poverty programme and aid recipients negatively (Martin and Taylor, 2021; Taylor, 2017; Weitzberg et al., 2021). 

Instrumental to understand data-induced injustice, a datafier perspective still leaves a gap: alone, it does not fully illustrate the core process through which digital identity operates. Illuminating such a process is a view of digital identity schemes as platforms where a core, a central ID database, serves as the basis for the construction of complements by third parties (Masiero and Arvidsson, 2021). A platform view suggests that platform features inform the outcomes of digital identity, from undue exclusions to distortion of social protection monitoring and redirection of policy away from people's needs (Masiero and Arvidsson, 2021). 

In this commentary I suggest that a platform view is essential to understand the workings of digital identity and, crucially, its surveillance outcomes. In surveillance studies literature, data-based profiling is teleologically linked to tracing and, in turn, to different modes of repression of the surveilled (Akbari and Gabdulhakov, 2019; Murakami Wood and Monahan, 2019). I argue that a platform perspective is key to understanding the roots of such outcomes, which stem from the core-complements architecture of digital identity systems. If it is so, the popular idea of a “dark side” of digital identity loses its meaning: rather than a “side”, it is the very architecture of digitally identity platforms to enable their surveillance outcomes. 

Three views of digital identity 

Masiero and Shakthi (2020) put forward a taxonomy of views of digital identity. In such a taxonomy, a datafier view is juxtaposed to alternative visions centred on platforms and routes to surveillance. 

Datafier view 

A long-established view sees digital identity in its role as a datafier, meant as a converter of individuals into data. In this perspective, as argued in Srinivasan and Johri (2013), technology creates “machine-readable men”, so that datafied individuals can be matched with their entitlements. This enables two core operations in social protection schemes: the recognition of entitled beneficiaries and, subsequently, the assignation of entitlements to them (Masiero and Das, 2019). Yet, it is the same view to back the study of digital identity injustice: exclusion of entitled users, diversion of entitlements from social protection programmes, and intrusions into humanitarian action are all predicated on a datafier vision (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2021; Madon and Schoemaker, 2021; Martin and Taylor, 2021). 

Platform view 

Integrating the datafier view, Masiero and Arvidsson (2021) illuminate a vision centred on the platform architecture of digital identity systems. In such an architecture, a core consists of the database where the demographic and biometric data of enrolees are stored. Upon the core, boundary resources such as Application Programme Interfaces (APIs) and Software Development Kits (SDKs) allow the construction of complements, which consist e.g., in public service agencies enabling access through digital authentication. In the platform view the functions of identification, authentication and authorisation theorised in Nyst et al. (2016) become evident: it is, however, the technical vision of platform components that overshadows its effects. Paradigmatically of this view, Madon et al. (2022) note that “the platform architecture provides scope for government to orchestrate the functioning of a range of local government and third-party players towards service delivery.” 

Surveillance view 

Beyond datafier and platform perspectives, a surveillance view is centred on the profiling and policing outcomes of digital identity. Instances are centred on linkings of access to digital identity data to police violence, capture and deportation (Akbari and Gabdulhakov, 2019; Murakami Wood and Monahan, 2019). A surveillance view confronts the D4D orthodoxy with the harm caused by profiling: Newell et al.'s study of the US-Mexico border (2016: 178) notes, for example, how research suggests “a causal link between the U.S. government's border control policies and rapidly increasing numbers of migrant deaths.” Differently from a platform view, whose focus is on platform architecture, a surveillance view centres on the surveillant outcomes that digital identity produces. 

All three perspectives are important in conceptualising digital identity, with the platform view holding more explicative power than it is commonly recognised. ...

03 January 2023

Pretendians

In Woodley v. Cipolla, 2022 ONSC 7096 McDermott J considers OPCA arguments and a 'pretension' claim.

The judgment states

...   [5] However, this is not the only reason the litigation is challenging. John Cipolla is displeased by the direction of these proceedings and has brought collateral attacks on this application on at least three occasions. Firstly, on February 8, 2021, he brought six civil lawsuits against various defendants, including the Applicant, the Applicant’s partner, the Applicant’s lawyer, executives and counsel for Legal Aid Ontario as well as several members of the Applicant’s family. He claimed damages of $2,250,000 in each of these lawsuits (other than the lawsuit against the Applicant, against whom he claimed $3,250,000) for trespass against his property. The property in issue was stated to be his daughter, Vela. 

[6] John Cipolla decided as well to have recourse to an “alternative court”, namely the “Common Law Court, Great Britain and International.” In a “Lawful Notice” dated February 17, 2021 and filed by John Cipolla, he states that “the Common Law Court, Great Britain and International was created on the 11th June 2017, to address the failings in the statutory judicial system and to provide a lawful remedy for living men and living women, this would address all harm, loss and injury suffered.” The notice states that “the ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT of JUSTICE had no authority over a living man or woman. This stance confirms that they are failing to comply with the Declarations of Arbroath 1320 and the Common Law Court 2018, they are therefore guilty of binding the people into slavery”. He accuses the Ontario Superior Court of Justice of “abuse of position, Theft of Property, Criminal Coercion, Uttering, the Failure to accept the positions of a living man or woman, Refusal to Comply with common law, Tyranny and Treason.” He demands that “the use of my property (VELA SUMMER CIPOLLA) must cease immediately.” 

[7] By endorsement dated March 8, 2021, Boswell J. of this court dismissed the six lawsuits under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as being frivolous and vexatious. He called the lawsuits “nonsensical”. He also issued a second endorsement on March 24, 2021 addressing the “lawful notice”, calling it “rubbish” and warned Mr. Cipolla to “clean up his act” failing which he would be found to be a vexatious litigant. 

[8] As this trial date approached, John Cipolla decided to have recourse to another “alternative court”, being the ASKIT Judicial Tribunal of the Anishinabek Solutrean Metis Indigenous Nation (ASMIN). On May 22, 2022, that “Tribunal” purported to issue a “perspicacity” granting John Cipolla decision making concerning Vela. It is confusing as to where Vela was to live as it says that care would be shared equally but also stated that Vela’s primary residence would be with the Respondent Father in New York State. 

[9] Since that “decision” was issued, John Cipolla has only participated marginally in these proceedings. He says that the decision of the ASMIN tribunal usurps the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. He refused to participate in the Trial Scheduling Conference before Justice Douglas on October 19, 2022, and Justice Douglas stated that the respondent “does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court and did not meaningfully participate” that day. He reiterated his position on jurisdiction before Justice Wildman at the Trial Management Conference on November 30, 2022 and asked her “to note in this endorsement that ‘this matter has been dealt with in full by the ASMIN tribunal and is now closed.’” 

[10] Before and after the “decision” of the ASMIN tribunal, John Cipolla engaged in litigation conduct that would be grounds for disciplinary action had a solicitor committed these offences. His conduct can only be described as outrageous and disrespectful. In his March 24, 2021 affidavit, he referred to Mr. Herron, solicitor for the Applicant as “Jeremy unscrupulous Herron.” On October 31, 2022 after the Trial Scheduling Conference, he communicated by email directly to Justice Douglas, stating as follows: The attached UCC1, UCC1 amendments, PPSA Registration and International Apostille filings prove that I hold both legal and Equitable title to my estate and Legal Title to the VELA SUMMER CIPOLLA estate in my capacity as Secured Party Creditor (SPC), Holder-in-Due-Course (HDC), and Real Party In Interest (RPII). The Crown does, however, hold legal title to opposition, THE JESSICA WOODLEY ESTATE, since she (Jessica Woodley) is presumed to be a "minor" in the nature of Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations 363.6 or the equivalent, applicable Canadian law as a British subject held in trust. 

[11] John Cipolla suggests to Justice Douglas that he could file a security interest in Vela under the Personal Property Security Act and states that Since VELA SUMMER CIPOLLA (in commerce) is my property, I require an order, from you, that JESSICA WOODLEY (Jessica Woodley), and her Crown Trustee, be ordered to pay child support, for Vela Summer Cipolla (Vela), to John Cipolla in the amount of $10,000. monthly for the next 15 years (Vela's 22nd birthday/last year of college). 

[12] John Cipolla threatened court staff who were just doing their job. When the trial coordinator sent him the Zoom link for the trial, he accused her of harassment, stating that: This is the 3rd time that I’ve advised you, SCJ, Family Branch and Family Registrar team (and J Wildman today) that this matter was adjudicated in the ASMIN Tribunal last May and a final order issued- see my 11/22/2022 email with attachments A-G. In addition, I stated that if if I received anymore correspondence with respect to this matter from SCJ, Family Branch Registrars, TC, Judges or opposing counsel that it would be deemed by me to be a threat, harassment and intimidation and that I would file criminal charges. Do I need to seek a restraining order? Cease and desist immediately. 

[13] But most of his vitriol has been reserved to the judges who were involved in this matter. In 2021, John Cipolla accused Healey J. of this court of corruption and incompetence. He recorded a case conference before Graham J. on February 19, 2021 contrary to s. 136 of Courts of Justice Act. John Cipolla had a Trial Management Conference with Justice Wildman on November 30, 2022 and again breached s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and prepared a transcript of the hearing. He emailed Justice Wildman, accusing her of conspiracy, intimidating a court participant, and terrorism. He purported to send an invoice for $25,000 per day to Justices Douglas and McCarthy for “carrying out Endorsements” that they had issued in this matter and accused Justice McCarthy of fraud. 

[14] When John Cipolla found out that I would be doing the trial, he began to email me directly as well. He emailed me an affidavit that stated that the ASMIN Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction n because of his aboriginal status. He said in his email that, as a result, “This concludes the matter in your court.” 

[15] The night before the trial, John Cipolla decided that he would have other members of ASMIN email me, other judges of the Superior Court in Barrie who have presided over this matter as well as the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice, the Senior Family Judge and the Regional Senior Justice. Members of the Ontario judiciary suffered through 10 to 15 unsolicited emails throughout the night. The emails attached the decision of the ASMIN tribunal and typically stated as follows: The long standing abuses to indigenous are continuing despite UNDRIP One People's Federation. Attached pls find ASMIN Tribunal Notice including final order and Envoy appointment from G.C. Mukwa to colonial Superior Court Justice J. McDermot Notifying him that he needs to heed Indigenous Tribunals, laws, customs and traditions. 

[16] John Cipolla denied having anything to do with this when he spoke to the matter at the commencement of the trial on December 7, 2022, but this was untrue: his email of December 6, 2022 to other members of ASMIN was mistakenly included with one of the emails to the court and stated, “Aloha. Can all of you pls send an email blast like the one below to all the same emails, attach the ASMIN tribunal letter and bc me before 9:15 am this morning? If it’s after 9:30 am send it any way regardless.” The email contained the script noted above. It was clear that he was responsible for numerous emails being sent to various judges of this court demanding that the court decline jurisdiction in this case. 

[17] John Cipolla appeared at this trial but only to argue that this court had no jurisdiction over him or his daughter due to their aboriginal heritage. That issue was argued and I determined that the trial would proceed and the court had jurisdiction. John Cipolla then asked me if he was being compelled attend the trial and I told him he was not. He then said that he would not participate in the trial and left the zoom meeting before the trial was completed. The trial was based on the Applicant Mother’s evidence by affidavit sworn December 2, 2022. John Cipolla did not file an affidavit, call any evidence, cross- examine the Applicant, as he was entitled to do, or file any material other than the affidavit disputing jurisdiction, and by the time the Applicant Mother had completed her case, he had left the trial. 

Jurisdiction 

[18] John Cipolla says that this court does not have jurisdiction for several reasons: a. He says that he is indigenous and that the decision of the ASMIN tribunal has usurped jurisdiction from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. b. He also, in his submissions, stated that his discharge of a bond has also removed jurisdiction from the Superior Court of Justice. 

[19] This application for a parenting order was brought by the Applicant under the provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act. Under s. 22(1)(a) of the CLRA, jurisdiction in a proceeding is dictated by the residence of the child: if the child is “habitually resident” in Ontario at the commencement of proceedings, the Ontario court, in this case the Family Division of the Superior Court of Justice, has jurisdiction to address parenting issues. There is no doubt that this was the case with respect to Vela, who was then (as of the date the Application was issued) living with her mother in Port McNicoll, Ontario. Mr. Cipolla was also living in Port McNicoll on that date and confirmed as much when he filed his Answer and Claim by Respondent on September 11, 2020. There is no question that this court had jurisdiction to address this matter under the provisions of the CLRA when Ms. Woodley commenced these proceedings. 

[20] John Cipolla not only requested in his Answer that the application be dismissed; he also requested a parenting order to be made by this court. In doing so, he attorned to the jurisdiction of this court. However, he suffered a number of setbacks in this proceeding, including dismissal of two motions for shared care and then “100% access”, the granting of two orders returning the child to the Applicant Mother after he overheld the child, the dismissal of his lawsuits against the Applicant, her parents and Legal Aid and finally an order quashing his witness summonses to legal aid officials. Because of this, John Cipolla decided that it would be best for him to proceed to obtain a default “order” made by the ASMIN Tribunal. He believed that this forum would be more favourable to him and he was right. 

[21] It is important to note that John Cipolla did not properly take steps to have this court decline jurisdiction which he should have done prior to proceeding in another forum. The proper course of action would be to move that this court decline jurisdiction under s. 25 of the CLRA and then bring new proceedings. It was not good practice for John Cipolla to bring default proceedings elsewhere in the face of a properly constituted court and then present the order as a fait accompli. 

[22] The decision of the ASMIN Tribunal proceeded by way of default hearing. In that decision John Cipolla was given legal “decision-making” over Vela with equal shared care. The decision was confusing and conflicting: although the “perspicacity” says that care would be shared, it also says that the primary residence of Vela was with John Cipolla in New York State. It further provided that Ms. Woodley would pay $300 per month in child support as well as more than $36,000 in costs. The document states that, “This Decision amends and supersedes any previous or subsequent orders, endorsements or agreements of any family court in which these parties are litigating on Turtle Island, unless a Treaty among ASMIN - Canada - USA directs otherwise.” 

[23] John Cipolla’s argument was summed up in his affidavit sworn on November 22, 2022, referred to in argument and emailed to me (but not properly filed with the court) which stated as follows:

The ASMIN Tribunal is the only venue with jurisdiction since Vela and i are Indigenous and this action occurred on our unceded land- see attached Daniels v. Canada 2016 [17] where the sec recognized the Metis of eastern Canada, Art Ill of UNDRIP(2021) & OAS(1990) recognized the right of self determination, Tsilhoq'in (2014) [69] sec held that Terra Nullius never applied in Canada, in Desaultel (2021) [72] the sec held the Crown had a duty to consult when they have notice of a aboriginal right or title and Canada's Truth & Reconcilliation Report part 5 that protects Indigenous posterity. In 2021 i was appointed Envoy of ASMIN. 

[24] There has been controversy in the news recently concerning individuals who have falsely claimed First Nations ancestry to gain an academic or occupational advantage. Similarly, an individual or a group of individuals do not become First Nations based only on their say so or membership in an illegitimate organization. ASMIN appears to be such a group and there was no evidence of recognition of ASMIN as being a First Nations in Canada or the United States. Indeed, the group remains unrecognized by any aboriginal or governmental authority as a first nation in this province and it appears that anyone, regardless of indigenous status, can join ASMIN by payment of a fee of $225: see Mukwa v. Farm Credit of Canada, 2021 ONSC 1632 as aff’d by 2022 ONCA 320.   

[25] This is not the first time that a member of ASMIN has utilized the arguments noted above concerning aboriginal right or title. For example, arguments concerning unceded land and the Tsilhoq'in case were relied upon by Mr. Mukwa in an attempt to stop foreclosure proceedings in the Farm Credit case noted above. Both this court and the Ontario Court of Appeal made short shrift of those claims, and quickly dismissed them. Indeed, the Plaintiff in that case, Grand Chief Wabiska Mukwa, appears to be the decision maker in the “perspicacity” of the ASMIN Tribunal noted above.   

[26] Mr. Herron, in his submissions, stated that John Cipolla had engaged in tactics known as OPCA [Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument]. Those tactics were described by Rooke C.J.A. in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 as comparable to “medieval alchemy”; a vain attempt to turn base metals into gold but held out as legitimate. Rooke C.J.A. described the arguments made by OPCA litigants as mostly nonsensical and a purposeful abuse of the court system in order to achieve a result without addressing the merits of the litigation. This is because, as discovered by John Cipolla, OPCA litigants almost invariably have no reasonable expectation of litigation success based on the merits. Rooke C.J.A., in a detailed decision, notes a number of OPCA tactics, including:

• unique nomenclature and name motifs; 

• a concept that “everything is a contract”; 

• a denial that the court has jurisdiction over an OPCA litigant; 

• use of “obsolete, foreign, or typically otherwise irrelevant legislation”; and 

• egregious litigation conduct. 

[27] In argument, John Cipolla took great exception to the statement by Mr. Herron that he engaged in OPCA tactics. However, I believe that his strong reaction to this suggestion shows that he is well aware that he meets the standard criterion of an OPCA litigant. In fact, the individual who gave John Cipolla his “default” hearing, “Grand Chief” Wabiska Mukwa, was denounced in several cases as having used OPCA tactics: See Mukwa v. Farm Credit Canada, supra, Sarac v. Wilstar Management Inc., 2021 ONSC 7776 and National Bank of Canada v. Guibord, 2021 ONSC 6549. Mr. Mukwa was unsuccessful in all of those cases, mostly involving mortgage remedies or landlord and tenant issues. 

[28] John Cipolla used similar tactics in this litigation as were described by Justice Rooke in Meads, which was, as with the present case, a matrimonial cause where the Respondent sought to avoid disclosure obligations. Cipolla goes by the name of “i; a man; have no legal name only a christian name. John Cipolla: a man. SPC/HDC/RPII/Trustee/Bailee.” He has used unique documentation, including identification by thumbprint. He relies upon a selective reference to Supreme Court of Canada decisions, including a statement that there is a “right to consult” under Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 even though that was a land claims case, not one involving parenting of a child. He filed an article concerning the applicability of United States jurisprudence in Canada and questioned the promulgation of the British North America Act. He engaged in odious litigation conduct noted above. 

[29] However, John Cipolla focused his arguments on jurisdictional issues. In Meads, Rooke C.J.A. said [at para. 267]: A very common OPCA scheme category is that the OPCA litigant is in some manner outside the jurisdiction of the court or state, or is somehow rendered immune from legal obligations. This category has three general forms:

1. the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to certain specific domains, and the OPCA litigant falls outside those categories; 

2. the jurisdiction of the court is eliminated due to some defect; and 

3. the OPCA litigant is in some manner immunized from the court's actions. 

[30] John Cipolla cloaks his argument in the guise of indigenous rights. He says that he, along with Vela, is indigenous and that the only valid authority is the ASMIN tribunal. He issued a trespass notice concerning these proceedings. He argues a number of Supreme Court of Canada precedents saying that the Canadian or Ontario Courts have no jurisdiction because of the “right to consult” contained in the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision. 

[31] As noted, these arguments have been previously used by the “Chief Justice” of the ASMIN tribunal, Wabiska Mukwa, in his own litigation. In Sarac, Myers J. determined that the ASMIN tribunal was “not a domestic tribunal exercising a jurisdiction on behalf of a First Nation that has been recognized by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.” The order of the ASMIN tribunal in this case was certainly not recognized by the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribal Court and the John Cipolla has not demonstrated any valid reason why this court should recognize the order. 

[32] Finally, in Guibord, Mew J. found Tsilhqot’in inapplicable to the commercial dispute before the court in that case [at para. 13]: No duty to consult arises in this case because, as will be further discussed below, the pleaded dispute between the parties does not raise justiciable issues of aboriginal title, nor is the Crown a party. 

[33] That is the case here. This is a matrimonial cause involving the parenting of a child. To suggest that the Respondent Father has a proprietary interest in his daughter (by, for example, filing a PPSA security interest) is, in the words of Boswell J., offensive. The case at bar involves the best interests of a child, not the disposition of property or a land claim. There is no “right to consult” in the present case. 

 McDermot engaged with the pretendian issue in stating

[34] In Sarac, Myers J. spoke of the suggestion that ASMIN is defending Aboriginal rights: This country recognizes that real injustices have been inflicted upon its Indigenous communities including the Metis People. Litigants who try to avoid their financial responsibilities by wrapping themselves in the garb of Indigenous Peoples' real victimhood and suffering to tie up the courts with illegitimate and abusive claims deserve not another moment of court time or attention. 

[35] I cannot agree more. There is no question that Indigenous people in Canada, especially children, have suffered greatly and deserve redress and respect. To make arguments in an in personam case based on an Indigenous land claim supported by a made-up tribunal promulgated by an illegitimate organization posing as a First Nation does nothing more than a disservice to the efforts of Canada’s First Nations. It dilutes and cheapens legitimate claims by Indigenous peoples in Canada and deserves no consideration by this court, which must focus only on the best interests of the child who is the subject matter of this case. It is to be noted that John Cipolla could have addressed Vela’s Indigenous ancestry in the context of Vela’s best interests under s. 24(3)(f) of the CLRA. However, as far as I can see, he has never raised that issue in this court or in these proceedings. 

[36] Moreover, John Cipolla cannot complain about this court having jurisdiction when he had filed an Answer and Claim by Respondent requesting a parenting order. That Answer was never withdrawn. By filing the Answer in this proceeding, John Cipolla attorned to the jurisdiction of this court and confirmed that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had the unquestioned authority to make parenting decisions concerning Vela. 

[37] There is also no evidence that Ms. Woodley agreed that the ASMIN tribunal had jurisdiction in this matter, especially insofar as the proceedings were noted as having been default proceedings. Moreover, even were that tribunal legitimate and even had Ms. Woodley attorned to that court, the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts is not necessarily dictated by attornment to any jurisdiction but rather the habitual residence of the child and the factors under s. 22 of the CLRA: see Murray v. Ceruti, 2014 ONCA 649 where the court stated [at para. 40]: However, assuming without deciding that the respondent did attorn, it is important to have regard to the role of attornment in a jurisdictional analysis under the CLRA. Attornment is not referenced in the CLRA. At most, it is a factor to be considered in the analysis mandated by s. 22(1)(b), and in the analysis of whether to decline jurisdiction under s. 25. On the facts of this case, it is not dispositive of either issue. 

[38] Finally, John Cipolla filed a document entitled “Discharge Document No. 3” which purports to be a discharge of a bond. There are a number of different documents contained in this filing, including a purported lien against the pleadings in this case, a “UCC Financing Statement” supposedly issued in Colorado, a “Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement” in favour of the “John Edward Cipolla Trust”, a “Common Law Copyright Notice” in favour of the said trust advising that this court was in breach of copyright law, a “Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship” and an “Affidavit of Truth” attaching discharged bonds. All of these documents appear to have been issued in the United States and many appear to be irrelevant to these proceedings. Many are confirmed by “digital fingerprint” and are largely incomprehensible and irrelevant. 

[39] During argument, John Cipolla asked me to confirm that this document deprived the Ontario Superior Court of Justice of jurisdiction. When I asked him how that could possibly be the case, John Cipolla told me to go and do my research. He was unwilling to explain to me how the document had anything to do with the case or the jurisdiction of the court, probably because the document was complete nonsense and incomprehensible. However, I suspect that these documents are related to the concept often relied upon by OPCA litigants that “everything is a contract” noted by Rooke C.J.A. in Meads, supra. The court’s review of the document confirms that it has nothing to do with this case or the best interests of Vela.

30 December 2022

EcoRights and Cosmovision

'Climate Change Law and the Rights of Nature: A Colombian Example Through an International Perspective' by Mario Alejandro Delgado Galarraga in (2022) 13(2) Revista Catalana de Dret Ambiental 1-44 comments 

In 2018, the Colombian Supreme Court bestowed rights to the Amazon Region. The growing climate change risks brought the Court to rule this way. The ruling relied on international environmental law, comparative law, and national policies. The discussion of Rights of Nature is not new; various States have relied on this practice to strengthen environmental protection. Constitutional provisions, legal acts and courts’ decisions are the source chosen by States to entitle the environment with rights. Remarkably, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights already identified how rights of nature are applied in certain American States, raising this discussion to international environmental law. The Colombian Court award may cause further discussions: first, it will allow rights of nature as an alternative in environmental litigation processes, included climate ones. Second, concerning international environmental law, it may contribute to the idea of constituting a regional state practice on rights of nature recognition. 

 Galarraga states that the Colombian Court 

 examined Colombia’s international obligations, national policies, and the measures taken to fulfil them. To this end, besides ordering administrative sanctions on the Government, the Colombian Court noted that there must be a more effective way to fight climate change than the measures already in practice. The Court concluded that to protect the environment and ensure the fulfilment of Colombia’s climate change obligations, the Colombian Amazon Region was to be entitled to certain rights: the right to protection, conservation, maintenance, and reparation. 

The judgement developed a new paradigm for addressing climate change commitments and their connection with the Rights of Nature (RoN), to the point of making it the cornerstone for upcoming judicial awards concerning the environment, and creating a consistent judicial practice. In the same sense, the importance of the ruling was in the decision to bestow rights to a whole ecosystem, rather than to a single entity like some previous cases. Finally, it linked three legal concepts: deforestation (climate change), rights of future generations, and RoN; an unusual occurrence in the legal world. 

This study, relying on this particular case, evaluates whether there is a link between international environmental law and the foundations of RoN. If so, it will review how the Supreme Court managed to merge both concepts. This investigation will give a general overview of RoN, citing the diverse roads taken by those States that have recognised this set of rights. Then, it will examine how the Court addressed general environmental issues and discuss its approach towards RoN by contrasting its arguments with existing international environmental law norms. Afterwards, this paper will examine how the Court, taking into consideration the existing climate change emergency, determined that recognizing the Amazon region as a bearer of rights was imperative. Finally, the study will review how RoN and climate change are interrelated by reviewing how these rights could contribute to climate litigation processes. Although this research does not intend to extensively discuss the legal and philosophical perspective of RoN, it will expose how national and international judges are using legal conceptual alternatives to address environmental matters, specifically, climate change.It will briefly display the current legal status of this set of rights.This study also explains how certain contested concepts, such as RoN, can be employed when interpreting an environmental legal claim, even though they are not part of a legal framework, such as in the Colombian case. Additionally, this document will expose the potential repercussions of the Colombian Court’s decision in future environmental-related legal claims at both the national and international levels.

24 December 2022

OPCA Straw

In R. v. Viau, 2022 ONSC 5825 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dealt with yet another OPCA claim. 

The judgment states 

 [4] This was a challenging case for the trial court when it came up on April 12, 2021. The appellant was self-represented and presented as an OPCA litigant. Right from the start of the case he refused to answer simple procedural questions or engage with standard courtroom ritual. 

[5] When the trial judge asked the appellant if he was ready for his trial, the appellant claimed that he was the victim of “trespass by way of robbery.” He claimed to be accused of “owing a debt” and that he and his property were being held “as ransom.” The trial judge repeated his question and was met with a farrago of legalese, and a claim of entitlement to a trial by jury, to which the trial judge responded that he was not entitled to one. This led to the following exchange: THE COURT: It is a summary conviction offence. [THE APPELLANT]: I don’t give a s***. I’m entitled to a trial by jury. 

[6] The appellant talked while the trial judge spoke and the trial judge warned the appellant that he was going to have the appellant removed and proceed in his absence if he continued to interrupt. While the trial judge directed the clerk to arraign the appellant, the appellant continued to interrupt. When the clerk began to arraign, and stated the appellant’s name and date of birth, the appellant responded: “I don’t know my date of birth, I was pretty young at the time that I was born. My date of birth is hearsay information.” 

[7] The trial judge at that point ordered the appellant removed pursuant to s. 650 of the Criminal Code “because he is misconducting himself and interrupting the proceedings so that to continue in his presence would not be feasible.” As he was required to do by s. 606(2) of the Criminal Code, the trial judge entered a plea of not guilty on the appellant’s behalf, at which point the appellant, who had not yet been removed, accused the trial judge of “practicing law from the bench.” 

[8] Briefly, the charge before the court involved an allegation that the accused had failed to re-attend court in the Superior Court of Justice on November 13, 2019. After arraignment, the Crown introduced into evidence a certificate of non-attendance, a transcript of the proceedings from the set date on October 4, 2019, and notices that were served on the appellant of the Crown’s intention to adduce those items into evidence at trial. The Crown explained that the transcript contained utterances from the appellant that he had made on the set date, to be used for their “truth” and for the Crown’s use “if [the appellant] was going to take the stand in his own defence.” The trial judge noted in response, “that doesn’t appear that that’s going to happen…[b]ut I will invite him to do so if he wishes to do so.” 

[9] As the transcript of proceedings of October 4, 2019 makes clear, on that date the appellant had been similarly obstructive. He had offered pseudo-legal statements and argument and he told the presiding justice that he would not re-attend court on the return date that was set, November 13, 2019. All the while, the appellant continued to ignore the presiding judge and talk over him. 

[10] After the Crown had filed the written material at the appellant’s trial, he suggested that the appellant be brought back into court “to see if he’s changed his mind at all at this stage” since he had had a “few minutes of cooling”. On the appellant’s return to court, the trial judge explained that the clerk had arraigned the appellant and the trial judge had registered a plea of not guilty on the appellant’s behalf in his absence. The appellant then continued in the same vein as earlier in the proceeding: that the judge could not practice law from the bench, that “guilt” means “debt” in German, and that the appellant should be presented with a bill so that he could pay his “debt”. The trial judge again had the appellant removed, as he was being disruptive, disrespectful, and interfering with the proceedings. 

[11] After that, the Crown called as a witness a court officer from the North Bay courthouse, who identified the appellant and gave evidence about his attendance on October 4, 2019 and his non-attendance on November 13, 2019. The Crown closed its case, and the trial judge immediately proceeded to give his reasons. 

[12] The trial judge first explained that he was aware that the appellant has the right to make full answer and defence but given the appellant’s behaviour in court on two occasions, “I am satisfied that that is beyond his focus today.” He made reference to aspects of the appellant’s conduct. The trial judge then referred to s. 650(2)(a) of the Criminal Code and explained that he had acted in accordance with it. The trial judge continued that when the appellant was recalled, “he simply refused to acknowledge anything that I said.” The trial judge then scrupulously reviewed the evidence offered by the Crown and found the appellant guilty of the charge. 

[13] After the finding of guilt, the Crown made sentencing submissions, in the appellant’s absence. The appellant was brought back into court and conducted himself as he had earlier. When the trial judge referred to him as “Mr. Viau”, the appellant denied being a “mister”; he was a “man”. The court then explained to him, “Okay, man. We have now completed the Crown’s case.” The appellant then spoke about being presented with a bill so that he could pay his debt. The trial judge continued: “I’m at the point where I found you guilty and I have to sentence you…. I want to know if you want to say anything with respect to sentence?” The appellant responded that “I don’t consent to any of this” and then continued into pseudo-legalese. The trial judge imposed the sentence that the Crown had proposed in the appellant’s absence. 

[14] At this point, the appellant asked, “Where was my fair trial in an impartial and independent tribunal?” The trial judge briefly spoke of his reasons for excluding the appellant from the courtroom, and the appellant claimed that the court was “a British private court.” Invoking the “Constitution”, the appellant asserted that he had been denied an “independent or impartial tribunal”. 

Grounds of appeal 

[15] The Notice of Appeal is consistent with the appellant’s presentation at trial. In answer to the question on the form, “Plea at trial”, the appellant wrote a response: “no plea was entered by the man known as Joel.” 

[16] Listed among the grounds are many that are familiar from this and other OPCA litigants, such as, among others:

“1. Failure to provide subject matter jurisdiction…. 

2. Interfered with International Human Rights Documents…. 

4. Failure to provide a sworn affidavit in support of the claims made against me as a man…. 

6. No valid contract between the Corporation of HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN and the Corporation of JOEL RAYMOND VIAU…. 

12. Invocation of Article 61 of the Magna Carta in 2001… 

19. The Crown templar prosecutor abandoned the rule of law by creating and continuing a conflict…. 

22. There had been aggreement [sic] of the parties by tacit acquiesce [sic].”

It is not my intention to comment on these grounds, as they are frivolous OPCA nonsense. 

[17] Some grounds could perhaps be construed as legitimate grounds, even if poorly or contemptuously worded:

“14. Interference with my rights as a man to an independent court of record where all parties swear to tell the truth…. 

16. Fraud on the court by the judge….”

It is not my intention to tease meaning into these grounds, as it is unnecessary to do so given other legitimate concerns raised by the appellant. 

[18] Those legitimate concerns relate to the appellant’s exclusion from court during his trial, and to the court’s failure to give him the opportunity to make full answer and defence. While the respondent submits in its factum that s. 650 of the Criminal Code was not directly raised by the appellant, I believe that a court must take a more expansive view of the appellant’s grounds, as he continues to represent himself and should not be deprived of his opportunity to seek appellate redress. I view the following listed grounds as engaging that provision of the Criminal Code:

3. Judge/administrative clerk interfered with Rights protected by the Constitution 

10. Interferance [sic] with my right to face my accuser 

13. Interferance [sic] with my rights as a man to a fair trial 

15. Interference with my rights as a man to have all the guarantees for my defense [sic]

22 December 2022

Secrecy

The national Attorney-General has announced a review of Commonwerlth secrecy legislation, over a decade after the ALRC Report on that regime. 

The announcement states 

 A March 2021 survey of Commonwealth secrecy legislation conducted by the Attorney-General’s Department found there are 11 general secrecy offences and 487 specific secrecy offences in Commonwealth legislation. Separately, over 200 non-disclosure duties function as specific secrecy offences because a breach of these duties is criminalised by section 122.4 of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the Criminal Code). Section 122.4 will sunset on 29 December 2023. 

Secrecy offences play a legitimate and important role in circumstances where the unauthorised disclosure of Commonwealth information may cause harm to essential public interests, such as national security and the safety of the public. However multiple reviews, including the 2010 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) report Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia, have raised concerns about the number, inconsistency, appropriateness and complexity of a range of Commonwealth secrecy offences. 

In June 2018, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (the Committee) recommended that, following the enactment of the general secrecy offences in Schedule 2 of the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (the EFI Act), the Attorney-General initiate a review of secrecy offences in other Commonwealth legislation, taking into account the set of principles contained in the ALRC report, Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia. 

In its unanimous and bipartisan report, the Committee noted the “array of specific secrecy offences … that will continue to exist once the proposed new general offences” were introduced by the EFI Act, and considered it likely that “many of these existing offences will no longer be required, or will require amendment”. The Committee recommended that the review of secrecy offences commence as soon as possible. However, no review was formally commenced during the life of the 45th Parliament. 

In August 2020, in its Inquiry into the exercise of law enforcement and intelligence powers on the freedom of the press, the Committee re-iterated its recommendation for a review of Commonwealth secrecy offences. The Committee recommended that such a review be prioritised for finalisation and report by June 2021, and that the review specifically consider whether relevant Commonwealth legislation adequately protects public interest journalism. On 15 February 2021, the then-Assistant Minister to the Attorney-General, Senator the Hon Amanda Stoker, approved terms of reference for the Attorney-General’s Department to conduct a limited review of Commonwealth secrecy offences with a specific focus on public interest journalism. However, that review was not completed. 

On 28 July 2022, the Attorney-General asked the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (the INSLM) to complete a review into the operation and effectiveness of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (the NSI Act). 

Separately, the INSLM has also commenced a review of the EFI Act, including the general secrecy offences introduced by that Act. However, the INSLM is not expected to report until 2024. 

On 11 August 2022, the Interim Report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide recommended (among other things): For serving and ex-serving ADF members whose lived experience is intrinsically linked to security classified or operationally sensitive information, the defence available under the Criminal Code section 122.5(5) should be extended to cover information communicated to a Royal Commission. A defence to other secrecy offences will also be needed. 

Scope of the Review 

Having regard to the context set out above, the Attorney-General’s Department will conduct an inquiry and report on:

  • any specific secrecy offences in Commonwealth legislation that are no longer required in light of the introduction of the general secrecy offences in the EFI Act; 

  • the suitability and appropriate framing of the general and specific secrecy offences in Commonwealth legislation, having particular regard to: the principles outlined in the ALRC’s report Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia; and other relevant principles, including but not limited to those set out in the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers; 

  • any amendments to general and specific secrecy offences in Commonwealth legislation that are necessary to adequately protect individuals who provide information to Royal Commissions (balanced against other essential public interests); and a 

  • ny amendments that are necessary to adequately protect public interest journalism (balanced against other essential public interests).

The Department’s inquiry and report should not include recommendations for amendments to the secrecy offences in the NSI Act, noting that the INSLM is likely to complete a review of those provisions in 2023. The Department’s report should identify and have regard to existing reports and inquiries, including but not limited to the INSLM’s report on the impact on journalists of section 35P of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. For the purposes of this document, a reference to “specific secrecy offences” includes a reference to the 200 non-disclosure duties that function as specific secrecy offences because a breach of these duties is criminalised by section 122.4 of the Schedule to the Criminal Code. 

20 December 2022

Vetting

The Guardian and New York Times report that claims by recently-elected congressman George Santos may be largely fictitious. 

 Santos may not have worked at Citigroup or Goldman Sachs, graduated from a New York college or run a pet rescue charity. Santos claimed that his family owned a portfolio of 13 properties; the Times found only one – an apartment in Rio de Janeiro. Claims that he owns a corporation providing an annual salary of U$750,000 and millions in dividends have also been questioned. The Times found records of a 2010 charge in Santos' native Brazil for using a stolen chequebook to buy shoes, and two eviction proceedings against him in New York over the past seven years. He asserted in an interview that his company, the Devolder Organization, had “lost four employees” at the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando. Reportedly none of the 49 victims were connected to Devolder. 

In statements to the Times Goldman Sachs and Citigroup indicated they had no record of Santos ever working there. Baruch College did not find any record of Santos studying there and the Internal Revenue Service was unable to locate a record for an animal rescue group, Friends of Pets United, that Santos claimed he had run for five years beginning in 2013.

Shades of past resume concoction such as that noted here and here.

19 December 2022

NonHuman Animal Personhood

'(Feminist) Animal rights without animal personhood?' by Maneesha Deckha in Feminist Animal Studies (Routledge, 2022) comments 

This chapter takes up the pressing question of whether rights are compatible with animals’ status as legal beings. In Animals as Legal Beings in 2021, Deckha theorises a new animal-friendly legal subjectivity, which she calls “beingness”, as a better replacement for property, animals’ present abysmal legal status. Drawing upon feminist and other critical theory, the book argues that beingness can provide the protective shield against instrumental treatment that legal personhood is meant to provide, but unlike personhood, beingness does not demand that animals conform to paradigmatic human benchmarks to qualify for such protection. For many animal law scholars, the form that protection should take is rights. But it is not immediately clear to many how rights can exist without personhood. Given feminist arguments against recuperating personhood, a concept too anthropocentric in origin and design, this chapter asks whether the same fate must befall the concept of rights. Are they also unsalvageable as a liberatory tool for animals? The chapter reviews the hard-hitting critiques that feminist animal theorists have lodged against rights, but ultimately argues that rights as a legal tool may be retained and recuperated as part of a feminist revisioning of law for animals. ... This is not to say that rights are the ideal type of protection for animals, but simply that they are not foundationally limiting for animals as I have argued person- hood is. Part I of this chapter summarises my argument against personhood, which I developed in Animals as Legal Beings, as the replacement for property as animals’ legal status. It begins by considering an existing neo-Kantian account of why rights for animals are fine but personhood is not, to help differentiate the critical theory- informed reasons for why I say personhood is problematic. This background is necessary to understand why I say that personhood must be dispensed with but not rights, despite the limitations of rights, which I consider in the remainder of the analysis. Part II of the chapter reviews the critiques that feminist animal theorists have lodged against rights models given their liberal humanist tradition and replies to them.This part suggests that rights can be oriented away from this tradition, pointing to critical feminist and postcolonial scholarship that has advanced this position, in a way that personhood cannot be cementing the argument that rights and beingness are compatible. Part III then moves to consider whether rights are not only compatible with beingness, but actually might be productive in actualising this new legal outcome for animals.

Deckha's Animals as Legal Beings: Contesting Anthropocentric Legal Orders (University of Toronto Press, 2021) 

critically examines how Canadian law and, by extension, other legal orders around the world, participate in the social construction of the human-animal divide and the abject rendering of animals as property. Through a rigorous but cogent analysis, Deckha calls for replacing the exploitative property classification for animals with a new transformative legal status or subjectivity called "beingness." In developing a new legal subjectivity for animals, one oriented toward respecting animals for who they are rather than their proximity to idealized versions of humanness, [it] seeks to bring critical animal theorizations and animal law closer together. Throughout, Deckha draws upon the feminist animal care tradition, as well as feminist theories of embodiment and relationality, postcolonial theory, and critical animal studies. Her argument is critical of the liberal legal view of animals and directed at a legal subjectivity for animals attentive to their embodied vulnerability, and desirous of an animal-friendly cultural shift in the core foundations of anthropocentric legal systems.