13 January 2023

Emotions

'Physiognomic Artificial Intelligence' by Luke Stark and Jevan Hutson  in (2022) 32  Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 922   comments

The reanimation of the pseudosciences of physiognomy and phrenology at scale through computer vision and machine learning is a matter of urgent concern. This Article, which contributes to critical data studies, consumer protection law, biometric privacy law, and anti-discrimination law, endeavors to conceptualize and problematize physiognomic artificial intelligence (AI) and offer policy recommendations for state and federal lawmakers to forestall its proliferation. 

Physiognomic AI, we contend, is the practice of using computer software and related systems to infer or create hierarchies of an individual’s body composition, protected class status, perceived character, capabilities, and future social outcomes based on their physical or behavioral characteristics. Physiognomic and phrenological logics are intrinsic to the technical mechanism of computer vision applied to humans. In this Article, we observe how computer vision is a central vector for physiognomic AI technologies, unpacking how computer vision reanimates physiognomy in conception, form, and practice and the dangers this trend presents for civil liberties. 

This Article thus argues for legislative action to forestall and roll back the proliferation of physiognomic AI. To that end, we consider a potential menu of safeguards and limitations to significantly limit the deployment of physiognomic AI systems, which we hope can be used to strengthen local, state, and federal legislation. We foreground our policy discussion by proposing the abolition of physiognomic AI. From there, we posit regimes of U.S. consumer protection law, biometric privacy law, and civil rights law as vehicles for rejecting physiognomy’s digital renaissance in artificial intelligence. Specifically, we argue that physiognomic AI should be categorically rejected as oppressive and unjust. Second, we argue that lawmakers should declare physiognomic AI to be unfair and deceptive per se. Third, we argue that lawmakers should enact or expand biometric privacy laws to prohibit physiognomic AI. Fourth, we argue that lawmakers should prohibit physiognomic AI in places of public accommodation. We also observe the paucity of procedural and managerial regimes of fairness, accountability, and transparency in addressing physiognomic AI and attend to potential counterarguments in support of physiognomic AI.

Stark's 'The emotive politics of digital mood tracking' in (2020) 22(11) New Media and Society 2039-2057 comments 

A decade ago, deploying digital tools to track human emotion and mood was something of a novelty. In 2013, the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project released a report on the subject of “Tracking for Health,” exploring the growing contingent of Americans keeping count of themselves and their activities through technologies ranging from paper and pencil to digital smart phone apps (Fox and Duggan, 2013). These systems generate what Natasha Dow Schüll terms more broadly “data for life” (Schüll, 2016), traces of our everyday doings as recorded in bits and bytes. Mood tracking, about which the survey queried, received so few affirmative responses that it did not rate at even 1% of positive answers. 

Yet in the interim, emotion in the world of computational media has become big business (McStay, 2016, 2018; Stark, 2016, 2018b; Stark and Crawford, 2015). Using artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, social networks such as Twitter and Facebook have joined dedicated health-tracking applications in pioneering methods for the analysis of emotive and affective “data for life.” These mood-monitoring and affect-tracking technologies involve both active self-reporting by users (Korosec, 2014; Sundström et al., 2007) and the automated collection of behavioral data (Isomursu et al., 2007)—methods often collectively known as digital phenotyping (Jain et al., 2015), or the practice of measuring human behavior via smart phone sensors, keyboard interactions, and various other features of voice and speech (Insel, 2017). This continuum of technologies allows an analyst to extrapolate a range of information about the physiology, activity, behaviors, habits, and social interactions from everyday digital emanations (Kerr and McGill, 2007). 

The past few years have also seen policymakers and the public becoming increasingly attuned to the political impacts of digital media technologies, including AI and machine learning (ML) systems (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Crawford and Schultz, 2013; Diakopoulos, 2016). Citizens, activists, and elected politicians are eager to address the ways in which technical particularities of such systems influence social and political outcomes via design and deployment (Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018; Dourish, 2016; Johnson, 2018). Yet critical analyses and responses to these tools of what Zuboff (2019) terms “surveillance capitalism” must account for the role of human affect, emotion, and mood in surveillance capitalism’s extraction and contestation. As Raymond Williams observed, working toward an understanding of the barriers to economic and social justice means being first and foremost “concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt” (Williams, 1977: 132). 

Here, I perform a close reading and comparative values in design (VID) analysis (Flanagan and Nissenbaum, 2014; Friedman et al., 2006) of MoodPanda and Moodscope, two popular consumer applications for tracking mood. Human emotions themselves arise from a tangled nexus of biological, cultural, and contextual factors (Boehner et al., 2005; Sengers et al., 2008). As such, I argue that the design choices in each service shape the particular dynamics of political economy, sociality, and self-fashioning available to their users, and that these design decisions are exemplary of the ties between the computational politics of surveillance capitalism (Tufekci, 2014; Zuboff, 2019), and the quantification and classification of human emotion via digital mechanisms (Stark, 2018a). 

Drawing on Tufekci (2014, 2017), Papacharissi (2014), and others (Ahmed, 2004; Martin, 2007), I articulate how the affordances of mood-tracking services such as Moodscope and MoodPanda are indexical to a broader emerging emotive politics mediated and amplified by digital systems. The dynamics of emotive politics underpin many contemporary digitally mediated sociotechnical controversies, ranging from media manipulation by extremist actors, negative polarization, and “fake news,” to collective action problems around pressing global crises such as climate change. Human passions have always been understood as an element of political life, but the particular technical and social affordances of digital systems configure these responses in particular ways: emotive politics foreground contestations regarding how we as social actors should interact together in what Papacharissi (2014) terms as “affective publics,” and the weights and ways in which we as designers, participants, and citizens should treat human feeling as dispositive features of civic discourse. Mood tracking’s explicit engagement with human emotion as a mediated, embodied state points toward how emotive politics emerge out of designer expertise, technical features, and the social contexts and practices of everyday digital mediation (Dourish, 2004; Kuutti and Bannon, 2014). 

In this analysis, I also seek to highlight the ways in which user interface and experience (UI/UX) design shape political outcomes alongside the structures of algorithms and databases (Dourish, 2016; Montfort and Bogost, 2009: 145)—though the groundbreaking work of scholars such as Johanna Drucker (2014) and Lisa Nakamura (2009) means this insight should be of surprise to no one. “The same quantitative modulations and numerical valuations required by the new information worker,” Alexander R. Galloway likewise observes, come “in a dazzling array of new cultural phenomena…to live today is to know how to use menus” (Galloway, 2006). Analyses taking interface design into account as an aspect of broader conversations around the fairness, ethics, and accountability of digital systems, which I seek to model here, will bolster the interdisciplinary work of interrogating the impact of these automated systems on our collective political future.

'The “Criminality from Face” Illusion' by Kevin W. Bowyer, Michael C. King, Walter Scheirer, and Kushal Vangara comments 

 Criminal or not? Is it possible to create an algorithm that analyzes an image of a person’s face and accurately labels the person as Criminal or Non-Criminal? Recent research tackling this problem has reported accuracy as high as 97% [14] using convolutional neural networks (CNNs). In this paper, we explain why the concept of an algorithm to compute “criminality from face,” and the high accuracies reported in recent publications, are an illusion. 

Facial analytics seek to infer something about an individual other than their identity. Facial analytics can predict, with some reasonable accuracy, things such as age [10], gender [6], race [9], facial expression / emotion [25], body mass index [5], and certain types of health conditions [29]. A few recent papers have attempted to extend facial analytics to infer criminality from face, where the task is to take a face image as input, and predict the status of the person as Criminal / Non- Criminal for output. This concept is illustrated in Figure 1. 

One of these papers states that “As expected, the state-of- the-art CNN classifier performs the best, achieving 89.51% accuracy...These highly consistent results are evidences for the validity of automated face-induced inference on criminality, despite the historical controversy surrounding the topic” [40]. Another paper states that, “the test accuracy of 97%, achieved by CNN, exceeds our expectations and is a clear indicator of the possibility to differentiate between criminals and non- criminals using their facial images” [14]. (During the review period of this paper, we were informed by one of the authors of [14] that they had agreed with the journal to retract their paper.) A press release about another paper titled “A Deep Neural Network Model to Predict Criminality Using Image Processing” stated that “With 80 percent accuracy and with no racial bias, the software can predict if someone is a criminal based solely on a picture of their face. The software is intended to help law enforcement prevent crime.” The original press release generated so much controversy that it “was removed from the website at the request of the faculty involved” and replaced by a statement meant to defuse the situation: “The faculty are updating the paper to address concerns raised” [13]. 

Section II of this paper explains why the concept of an algorithm to compute criminality from face is an illusion. A useful solution to any general version of the problem is impossible. Sections III and IV explain how the impressive reported accuracy levels are readily accounted for by inadequate experimental design that has extraneous factors confounded with the Criminal / Non-Criminal labeling of images. Learning incidental properties of datasets rather than the intended concept is a well-known problem in computer vision. Section V explains how Psychology research on first impressions of a face image has been mis-interpreted as suggesting that it is possible to accurately characterize true qualities of a person. Section VI briefly discusses the legacy of the Positivist School of criminology. Lastly, Section VII describes why the belief in the illusion of a criminality-from- face algorithm potentially has large, negative consequences for society.

11 January 2023

GPT

'GPT Takes the Bar Exam' by Michael James Bommarito and Daniel Martin Katz comments

 Nearly all jurisdictions in the United States require a professional license exam, commonly referred to as “the Bar Exam,” as a precondition for law practice. To even sit for the exam, most jurisdictions require that an applicant completes at least seven years of post-secondary education, including three years at an accredited law school. In addition, most test-takers also undergo weeks to months of further, exam-specific preparation. Despite this significant investment of time and capital, approximately one in five test-takers still score under the rate required to pass the exam on their first try. In the face of a complex task that requires such depth of knowledge, what, then, should we expect of the state of the art in “AI?” 

In this research, we document our experimental evaluation of the performance of OpenAI’s text-davinci-003 model, often-referred to as GPT-3.5, on the multistate multiple choice (MBE) section of the exam. While we find no benefit in fine-tuning over GPT-3.5’s zero-shot performance at the scale of our training data, we do find that hyperparameter optimization and prompt engineering positively impacted GPT-3.5’s zero-shot performance. For best prompt and parameters, GPT-3.5 achieves a headline correct rate of 50.3% on a complete NCBE MBE practice exam, significantly in excess of the 25% baseline guessing rate, and performs at a passing rate for both Evidence and Torts. GPT-3.5’s ranking of responses is also highly correlated with correctness; its top two and top three choices are correct 71% and 88% of the time, respectively, indicating very strong non-entailment performance. 

While our ability to interpret these results is limited by nascent scientific understanding of LLMs and the proprietary nature of GPT, we believe that these results strongly suggest that an LLM will pass the MBE component of the Bar Exam in the near future. 

10 January 2023

Truthiness

With the US George Santos controversy in mind the 2018 Congressional Research Service Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice report states

 The U.S. Constitution expressly grants each house of Congress the power to discipline its own Members for misconduct, including through expulsion, stating that: [e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. 

Expulsion is the process by which a house of Congress may remove one of its Members after the Member has been duly elected and seated. The Supreme Court has considered expulsion to be distinct from exclusion, the process by which the House and Senate refuse to seat Members-elect. In so concluding, the Supreme Court has held that exclusion cannot be used as a disciplinary tool, and Congress, accordingly, cannot undertake disciplinary measures on Members until after those Members have taken the oath of office. 

The constitutional limits on the power of expulsion are informed by the Expulsion Clause’s text, historical background, judicial precedent, and historical practice. Presently, the only explicit standards for expulsion are the requirement for approval of two-thirds majority of the body imposing the punishment and the requirement that the individual subject to the expulsion has been formally seated as a Member of that body. The history of the Expulsion Clause suggests that the expulsion power is broad and confers to each house of Congress significant discretion as to the proper grounds for which a Member may be expelled. Accordingly, courts generally have declined to adjudicate the standards by which expulsions might be considered in the House or Senate. To date, 20 Members of Congress have been expelled: 5 in the House and 15 in the Senate. A large majority of those expulsions were predicated on Members’ behavior deemed to be disloyal to the United States at the outset of the Civil War. Nonetheless, the two most recent expulsions followed Members’ convictions on public corruption charges. One significant area of debate is whether a Member can be expelled for behavior arising prior to his or her election. The historical practice in each house of Congress is limited and mixed as to whether such expulsions are appropriate. The extent to which these historical practices could be said to bind Congress as precedent is unclear, as is Congress’s authority to discipline Members for conduct that occurred prior to their election or reelection to office. These debates are centered on two general concerns that may be in tension with each other: maintaining the ability of each house of Congress to preserve the integrity of the institution and overriding the will and right of constitutents to choose their representatives. 

This report discusses the nature of the power of Congress to remove a Member, including the historical background of the Clause, the implications of the limited judicial interpretations of the Clause’s meaning, and other potential constitutional limitations in the exercise of the expulsion power. The report then analyzes the potential grounds upon which a Member might be expelled, including an overview of past cases resulting in expulsion and a discussion of the potential exercise of the expulsion power for conduct occurring prior to the Member’s election or reelection to Congress.

09 January 2023

Extremism

Last year's Victorian Legislative Council Inquiry into Extremism in Victoria report states 

1 Introduction 

F 1: The language used to describe any form of extremism is important and should be considered carefully. 

F 2: The present threat of violence from far-left extremism is not equivalent to the present threat of violence from far-right extremism, but the domestic violent extremism threat landscape is continually evolving and changing. 

F 3: Extremist movements have been identified as a significant issue in Australia. Findings from any future Commonwealth inquiry into these matters would be beneficial in increasing understanding of the issue at a national level. 

2 Extremism is a global issue 

F 4: The relationship between global, national and state economic policies can contribute to an environment where anti-immigration and anti-government sentiments grow, increasing the appeal of far-right extremist groups which claim to address these issues. 

F 5: Global and domestic populist movements, particularly the mainstreaming of anti-immigration and anti-democratic ideas, are risk factors for legitimising the rhetoric of extremist movements. 

F 6: The disruption from ongoing environmental deterioration and climate change should be considered a risk factor for increasing the threat of both far-left and far-right extremist groups. 

F 7: The transnational elements of extremist movements must be considered alongside their domestic manifestations because of the borderless and leaderless nature of some violent extremist movements. 

F 8: The impacts of and responses to violent extremism can be experienced globally, not just locally, with information about both extremist events, and government and community approaches in response to them, being accessible by a global audience. 

3 Risk factors for far‑right extremism in Victoria 

F 9: Far-right extremism is not new in Australia or Victoria, but there has been a re-emergence of far-right extremism, most notably from 2015 and 2016 onwards. 

F 10: Social isolation, economic insecurity and inequality are risk factors that may play a part in increasing susceptibility to extremist narratives. Addressing these issues is important for wellbeing and social cohesion and may reduce the appeal of extremist narratives. 

F 11: Evidence from stakeholders to the Inquiry and recent investigations suggest that trust in government and politicians has declined in Victoria, and in other jurisdictions globally, and this has been further exacerbated by the global COVID-19 pandemic. 

R 1: That the Victorian Government and Members of Parliament seek ways to build public trust in the Parliament, including developing measures to improve transparency. This should include investigating the potential benefits of introducing an integrity charter. 

F 12: Mainstream media has a critical role to play in the dissemination of accurate information during crises, as well as in reporting responsibly on the activities of far-right extremist groups and individuals, and not creating negative stereotypes of specific communities. 

F 13: Reporting of extremist activities, groups and individuals should be subject to strong media guidelines to minimise amplification of extremist propaganda that benefits or platforms extremist movements. 

F 14: An increasing focus on young people as a target of radicalisation and recruitment by the extreme far-right is of significant concern. 

F 15: The Committee is concerned that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reported that in 2021 minors made up 15% of new counter-terrorism investigations (up from 2–3% in recent years) and, on average, comprised more than half of ASIO’s highest priority investigations per week. Young people who experience feelings of social isolation, disengagement and alienation may be more vulnerable to radicalisation, and are among key targets of extremist propaganda and recruitment. 

F 16: In formulating intervention and prevention measures aimed at countering youth radicalisation to extremism, it is imperative that alienating, criminalising or discriminating against young people is avoided as far as possible. 

4 The threat of far‑right extremism in Victoria 

F 17: Both groups and individuals are capable of carrying out ideologically motivated terrorism, however, the risk from an individual acting alone is currently considered by authorities to be the more likely scenario. 

F 18: Far-right extremism poses a threat to democracy. Strengthening democratic processes and increasing transparency by providing information to the public about political processes and practices is an important part of mitigating this threat. 

F 19: Responses to extremism need to avoid measures that curtail civil liberties in a disproportionate manner. 

F 20: Violent extremism poses a risk to politicians and public figures in Victoria, who may be targeted by groups or individuals motivated by ideological, religious or single-issue grievances. 

F 21: Left-wing aligned (or perceived to be left-wing aligned) politicians and public figures have been targeted by far-right extremist groups and individuals. 

F 22: Racism and racist scapegoating, Islamophobia and antisemitism are common elements of far-right extremist ideologies, messaging and activities. 

F 23: When public and elected figures accept racist rhetoric and action this blurs the lines between what is acceptable and what is not in the community and leads to risks that multicultural communities will be targeted. 

F 24: Evidence from stakeholders suggests that far-right extremism can be gendered, and that misogyny and anti-feminist sentiment are common but not necessarily well understood features of far-right extremist movements. 

R 2: That the Government consider funding research investigating the links between extremism and family violence, anti-women or anti-feminist sentiment, and masculinity to identify further opportunities for counter-extremism measures. 

F 25: Both real and perceived threats from far-right extremist groups cause harm to the LGBTQIA+ community in Victoria. Government measures to support these communities are important. 

F 26: Improved collection and analysis of hate incident data is needed to inform prevention of hate crimes, and responses to hate, as well as to better understand the extent of far-right and other forms of extremism in Victoria. 

R 3: That the Victorian Government continue to implement the recommendations from the Legislative Assembly Legal and Social Issues Committee’s report on the Inquiry into anti-vilification protections, in particular recommendations 33 and 34. 

5 Extremist recruitment and communication 

F 27: Public trust in mainstream media has declined, while social media as a primary source of information has increased. 

F 28: The increasing use of social media and other online platforms by the wider public has enabled the increased ability of extremists to disseminate their ideology and attract people to their cause. 

F 29: Regulatory frameworks that govern the use of encrypted online communication platforms should be formulated to be able to effectively respond to and keep pace with developments in technology and behaviour. 

6 The impact of COVID‑19 on extremism in Victoria 

F 30: The factors that increase susceptibility and engagement with far-right extremism were heightened by the social and economic disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. This included the public health restrictions enacted by the Victorian Government in response to the pandemic alongside those of other states and the Commonwealth Government. The Committee notes that these restrictions were enacted to protect public health. 

F 31: Conspiracy theories and disinformation were attractive to some who felt disenfranchised by public health measures enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Far-right extremist groups and individuals capitalised on this by promoting conspiracy theories and disinformation to generate support for their ideologies. 

R 4: That in future public health emergencies, the Victorian Government build on its outreach and communication efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure that there is an emphasis on public information that is in plain language, timely, accessible and easy to interpret. 

F 32: Vile threats and abuse were made during the pandemic against public office holders, government officials and minorities. This kind of discourse has no place in an open, plural and multicultural democracy such as Victoria and should be condemned in the strongest terms. 

F 33: A small number of far-right extremist groups and individuals attended protests against the Victorian Government’s COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates in 2021, however, extremist ideology was not the primary motivating factor for the majority of those attending. Rather, a range of personal grievances relating to the impacts of the Victorian Government’s COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates were the primary motivators, despite the restrictions being implemented to protect public health. 

F 34: There has been a growth in exposure to far-right extremist ideology in Victoria since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the extent to which this exposure has translated to significant long-term growth in the far-right extremist movement remains unknown. The Committee found that personal grievances relating to COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates were the primary motivation for protests seen in Melbourne in late 2021. Nevertheless, it is important for the Victorian Government to remain vigilant against the threat of far-right radicalisation in this context. 

7 Countering extremism 

F 35: Countering extremism is a whole-of-society issue. Governments and law enforcement can and should play a proactive role in the process of countering extremism, however, communities need to be supported with resources to ensure they have the capacity to effectively participate. 

F 36: Individual, needs-based interventions that look at a person holistically and work with them over a long period of time to build their strengths will be more effective for countering extremism in people already engaged in extremist behaviours. 

R 5: That the Victorian Government ensure all of Victoria’s countering violent extremism programs, including but not limited to the community integration support program (CISP), continue to be reviewed externally on a regular basis to ensure that they are effective and adapting to the evolving extremism landscape. 

F 37: Community-led and grassroots initiatives to promote social cohesion and community building are an important measure for countering extremism and have been demonstrated as effective in Victoria. 

R 6: That the Victorian Government develop a strategy to support community-driven social cohesion initiatives aimed at building connections and trust amongst community members and between community members and civic institutions. 

F 38: Anti-racism public education campaigns and education programs that teach respect and appreciation for multiculturalism are important for improving social cohesion in Victoria. 

F 39: Education about the Holocaust is particularly important for understanding some of the consequences of racism and vilification throughout history and should have ongoing inclusion in the Victorian school curriculum. 

R 7: That the Victorian Government support the ongoing provision of existing anti-racism education programs and actively seek to improve and increase the provision of such programs in the community. 

FINDING 40: Digital and critical literacy are essential skills for young people to navigate the internet safely, to develop resistance to the influence of extremist messaging and to analyse the quality of information they are exposed to. 

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Victorian Government should review the digital and critical literacy skills taught via the primary and secondary school curriculum to identify opportunities for improvement and expansion. 

F 41: Youth workers play a critical role in the delivery of effective support measures that work to both increase social cohesion and mitigate the risks of radicalisation to extremism. 

R 9: That the Victorian Government ensure youth workers are adequately and appropriately resourced to provide effective service delivery of youth supports and programs aimed at strengthening trust and social connectedness and mitigating the risks of radicalisation. Further, that youth workers are proactively engaged and consulted in the development and implementation of the Government’s youth policies and strategies. 

F 42: While online content regulation sits beyond the purview of state governments, the Committee reiterates the value of the Christchurch Call and the measures it outlines with regard to violent extremist and terrorist content. 

F 43: Multidisciplinary and cross-jurisdictional research into extremism offers valuable insights into emerging problems and prevention strategies. Norway’s Center for Research on Extremism would be a good model on which to base an Australian body working on developing empirical and theoretical knowledge on extremism in Australia and collaborating with domestic and international stakeholders to further information and understanding in this area. 

F 44: Access to firearms obtained legally or illegally by members of far-right extremist groups poses potential risks to the community and is of significant concern. 

F 45: Acquisition and use of firearms by far-right extremists, not all of whom may be easily identifiable, leads to a critical gap in counter-terrorism strategy that could be assisted by a coherent, national framework on firearm regulation.

07 January 2023

UK Presumption Of Death

The 2012 House of Commons Justice Committee Presumption of Death Report - leading to the Presumption of Death Act 2013 - states 

1. On 21 July 2011 we announced our inquiry into the law and processes relating to presumption of death. Concerns surrounding this issue were brought to the attention of some of our Members by their constituents, particularly about the cumbersome and Byzantine procedures which the relatives of missing people are required to negotiate. The UK Missing Persons Bureau, which collates data on those reported missing, told us that under 1% of the 200,000 people who are reported missing every year remain un-located after 12 months. In September 2011, the Bureau had around 5,500 outstanding missing persons and approximately 1,000 unidentified people, bodies and remains on its database. The number of people seeking to resolve issues concerning missing relatives at any one time is, therefore, relatively small, but those who are in that situation are inevitably already in distressing circumstances. We therefore decided to examine both the relevant law and procedures to establish whether there were as effective and efficient as possible. 

2. Our terms of reference focused on four specific areas: •

• Does the current system work effectively? • Does the current system create difficulties for families, and if so, how can these be resolved? • What can we learn from the experiences of Scotland and Northern Ireland which have Presumption of Death Acts? • Is there a need for legislative or procedural change in England and Wales? If so, what form should these changes take? ... 

3. When a person dies the executors of the will, anyone named in the will or, in the absence of a will, next of kin are able to obtain a grant of probate (or letters of administration if the deceased died without making a will) on production of the death certificate. Death certificates state that two doctors are satisfied that the deceased died from an identified cause. When a person goes missing, however, even if the circumstances of the disappearance strongly suggest he or she has died, the impossibility of a death certificate being issued leaves their affairs unresolved. 

4. The law that relates to resolving the affairs of people who go missing is an extensive mixture of statutory and common law provisions; indeed, one witness described it as a “crazy paving of legislation, of statutory and non-statutory provisions.” The most well- known provision, that the court will assume a person to be dead when there has been no evidence of his or her continued existence for seven years, is a rebuttable common law presumption. The court will usually presume death if: there is no evidence that the missing person has been alive during the previous seven years; the people most likely to have heard from the missing person have not had any contact; and, during those seven years, inquiries have been made for the missing person, without success. If not satisfied on the facts of the case the court will reject the application. An application may be allowed before the person has been missing for seven years if the facts of the case allow, for example if inquiries were thorough and wide-ranging. A court order stating the missing person is presumed to have died will resolve the issue that is the point of the application, but not others. This may leave a need for multiple applications: for example an order sought to pay out life insurance could not then be used to put an end to a joint mortgage. The Ministry of Justice told us that no central records are kept of the numbers of applications for such orders, or for the number granted by the courts. 

5. An alternative to a presumption of death, and one that does not require the applicant to wait seven years, is an application under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules. Clifford Chance, a law firm who have undertaken pro bono work for Missing People, described the process as follows:

The Non-Contentious Probate Rules allow a district judge or registrar to grant an applicant leave to swear to the death of a person "to the best of his information or belief" in cases where death is presumed rather than proven. Such leave can be taken at any point after the person's disappearance, i.e. there is no need for the elapse of seven years. It is important to note, however, that in granting leave the High Court is not making a presumption of death but merely giving the applicant the opportunity to swear to the death as a pre-condition for obtaining a grant of probate in order to administer the missing person's affairs.

6. Specific facts may mean that probate will be granted without such an order. An example was the Asian tsunami in 2004. People who could prove their family member was in the area at the time were allowed by the then Department of Constitutional Affairs to apply for probate on production of the evidence. 

7. The statutory provisions applying to applications to resolve the affairs of missing people are found in a number of acts going back to the nineteenth-century. Clifford Chance listed the statutory provisions as including: the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004; the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; the Non-Contentious Probate Rules (made by Statutory Instrument in 1987 under the authority of the Supreme Court Act 1981) and the Social Security Act 1998. 

8. Each statutory provision is designed for specific situations, an example being section 19 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and section 37 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 where a spouse or civil partner can dissolve the marriage or civil partnership if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the missing person is dead. It is unclear, however, whether such an order can be used to try to resolve other issues. We heard from one solicitor who had found it could not, despite the clear intention of the judge who made the order. 

9. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also has the power to issue a “consular death registration document” for people who die or who are presumed to have died abroad. The legal status of this document is unclear. The Ministry of Justice told us: This type of document does not constitute a UK death certificate and does not replace a locally issued death certificate. Consular death registration is not a legal requirement but it means: an entry will be made in the death register by the British Consulate in the country concerned; an applicant will be able to obtain a British style certificate; and a record of the death will be held by the General Register Office in the UK. ... 

10. The UK Missing Persons Bureau (UKMPB) told us that the problems facing families seeking to resolve a missing relative’s affairs could be summarised as follows: • the lack of knowledge and understanding and expertise evidenced by police and legal professionals; and • the need to follow different processes to dissolve a marriage and administer a missing person’s affairs. 

11. We received ample evidence of the first issue from many of our witnesses. Vicki Derrick, whose husband Vincent Derrick disappeared on a works night out in 2002, told us “I initially spoke to the police for advice and guidance who suggested I contacted a solicitor...I have spoken to quite a few solicitors and have yet to meet one who has dealt with anything like this.” Her evidence was echoed by Rachel Elias, whose brother Richard Edwards went missing in 1995, who told us her “family solicitor, from an established and experienced firm, stated that he had never before dealt with such a matter. Indeed he informed us that he would be required to ‘go away and look further into the matter’ before he could proceed and assist us.” 

12. R Nelson, whose brother disappeared in 2000, found “most solicitors have essentially no experience in this field.” 

13. Stephanie Hynard, whose husband went missing in March 2011, told us that one of the police authorities with which she dealt was “unable to provide me with any information about the correct procedure to follow in dealing with legal issues or whom to turn to for advice”. The police are usually the first place families go following the disappearance of a relative. However, the UKMPB told us that referrals to sources of advice “are seldom made because police officers are unaware of or unknowledgeable about existing provisions”. They also told us that although a lack of specific training in this area could be a factor, “the complexity of the diverse processes and legislation regarding presumption of death compounds this problem”. Martin Houghton-Brown, of the charity Missing People, which provides information and support for the families of missing people, told us the reason why families found it difficult to access information was the complexity of the relevant law: “Because the process is, in effect, a crazy paving of legislation, of statutory and non-statutory provisions, it is very unclear how families should proceed.” In addition, and as illustrated by the evidence of Mrs Derrick and Ms Elias, long-term missing people cases are relatively rare. The UKMPB told us that research suggests, of the 200,000 people who are reported missing every year, 99% are found within a year. Of the 2000 who remain missing many, particularly young people, are likely to have few or none of the financial and legal issues that are usually the reason families are compelled to take legal action. Inevitably, therefore, the police, lawyers, people working in the financial sector and others with whom families come into contact are unlikely to have either experience or training in advising the families of people who are missing long-term. The Association of British Insurers told us that the current system could work with regard to insurance policies when the insurance company was involved at an early stage. Otherwise, the evidence we received was unanimous in agreeing that the combination of the complexity of the law, and the rarity of cases, made obtaining reliable information difficult.

14. In addition, Patricia Barrett, of Clifford Chance, told us “lawyers advising the families of missing persons are likely to have to spend a disproportionate amount of time researching the common law and statute law provisions”,a situation which is likely to have a substantial impact on the cost of proceedings. 

15. Not only is this emotionally draining and costly for the family, it can also lead to a messy legal position in which the missing person is declared dead for one purpose but remains legally living for another. Vicki Derrick told us that, despite the fact her husband had gone missing eight years previously, and their marriage had been dissolved on those grounds, she was still unable to take his name off their joint mortgage: “There is absolutely nothing I can do with my mortgage. My husband’s name is on that mortgage, and he is not around to sign it over to myself.” Mrs Derrick told us that without the financial, as well as emotional, support of her family she “would probably have had my house repossessed, because I would not have been able to keep up the mortgage repayments” following the loss of her husband’s income, but without the life insurance dividend she would have received if Mr Derrick had been known to have died. Dr Nelson had to have face-to face interviews with the Probate Registry and threaten to involve his MP to convince it to accept his personal submission for probate for his brother’s estate, despite the evidence his brother had been missing for over 10 years.

Ceilings

'The Silicon Ceiling: How Artificial Intelligence Constructs an Invisible Barrier to Opportunity' by Elana Zeide in (2022) 91(403) University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, comments 

Algorithmic assessments increasingly shape individuals’ success in education and employment. Schools, recruiters, and companies now rely on automated platforms and analytics services to sort through an overwhelming number of options. Similar technologies help students and workers find opportunities to pursue. The “opportunity brokers” who provide these tools not only vet applicants, but also personalize advertisements, curate user-facing recommendations, and identify potential candidates to recruit or promote. 

Because algorithms rely on data reflecting historical bias and inequality, artificial intelligence can retrench existing patterns of inequity. Automated systems compound this disadvantage as a few dominant companies draw on the same data and apply similar criteria. Further, the scale and pressures of the platform economy encourage both organizations and opportunity seekers to prioritize options with the highest probability of success. This leads to less diverse outcomes across industries and over time, constructing an imperceptible, but systemic, barrier to opportunity that I call the Silicon Ceiling. 

Like the glass ceiling, the Silicon Ceiling undermines traditional regulatory regimes focused on discrete decisions and ex post remediation/fair scores and procedural guarantees. Algorithmic intermediation occurs out of view as targeted advertising, personalized recommendations, and passive recruiting shape the candidate pool well before formal decision making. As a result, the automated opportunity system precludes, rather than denies, access to opportunity. Most people will not know the details of the decisions, the entities making them, or that they have even been evaluated. It is not just that the “black box” of algorithmic opacity obscures inflection points; the barrier itself is invisible. These paradigmatic shifts call for new conceptualizations of harm and structural reforms to shatter the Silicon Ceiling.

06 January 2023

Appearance

''Before Equal Protection: The Fall of Cross-Dressing Bans and the Transgender Legal Movement, 1963–86' by  Kate Redburn in (2023 Law and History Review 1-45 comments 

 Scholars are still unsure why American cities passed cross-dressing bans over the closing decades of the nineteenth century. By the 1960s, cities in every region of the United States had cross-dressing regulations, from major metropolitan centers to small cities and towns. They were used to criminalize gender non-conformity in many forms - for feminists, countercultural hippies, cross-dressers (or “transvestites”), and people we would now consider transgender. Starting in the late 1960s, however, criminal defendants began to topple cross-dressing bans. 

The story of their success invites a re-assessment of the contemporary LGBT movement’s legal history. This article argues that a trans legal movement developed separately but in tandem with constitutional claims on behalf of gays and lesbians. In some cases, gender outlaws attempted to defend the right to cross-dress without asking courts to understand or adjudicate their gender. These efforts met with mixed success: courts began to recognize their constitutional rights, but litigation also limited which gender outlaws could qualify as trans legal subjects. Examining their legal strategies offers a window into the messy process of translating gender non-conforming experiences and subjectivities into something that courts could understand. Transgender had to be analytically separated from gay and lesbian in life and law before it could be reattached as a distinct minority group.

Redburn states 

In the early afternoon of March 24, 1964, John Miller was approaching his home on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. He had just crossed the intersection of West End Avenue and Ninety-First Street when a police officer stopped him and asked his name. When he replied “Joan Miller,” he was taken into custody. iller, later described by The New York Times as a “tall, burly man of 58,” was a father with a military record. He was also a transvestite, or cross-dresser, which meant that he enjoyed dressing as a woman.  His crime was violation of Section 887(7) of New York State's vagrancy law, by then over a century old, which made it illegal to appear in public with one's “face painted, discolored or concealed, or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calculated to prevent. . . being identified.” While the law did not explicitly reference clothing, police often used it to punish cross-dressing, and courts usually accepted that interpretation. Most of the time, people arrested under such laws did not mount expensive legal defenses, and those who did rarely appealed past the trial court level. 

John Miller was different. Yes, like many gender outlaws before him, he could not afford to mount a legal defense.  In fact, his arrest cost him his job. But Miller had advantages that his predecessors did not: he could turn to a community of other transvestites through new networks of identification and support. Miller was on the guiding council of Full Personality Expression (FPE), one of the earliest social and political organizations for transvestites, whose reach eventually encompassed much of the United States and parts of Western Europe. The organization pledged $300 to his cause. Miller also broadcast requests for financial support in Transvestia and Turnabout, two early transvestite publications, and received at least seventy contributions from the United States, Canada, and England. The geographic range of this support reflected both the broad scope of the emerging transvestite network, and the community's shared desire to challenge cross-dressing regulation. As one donor from Texas put it in a quick note with his contribution, “We need to get rid of these damn laws.” 

Laws banning cross-dressing were ubiquitous in urban America by the middle of the twentieth century. Most were more explicit than New York's Section 887(7), like the law in Columbus, Ohio, which criminalized any person who “shall appear upon any public street or other public place . . . in a dress not belonging to his or her sex.” Starting in the late 1960s, however, criminal defendants began to successfully undermine cross-dressing bans in a range of cities, from New York and Los Angeles to Toledo and Champaign-Urbana. Hoping to challenge their arrests, these defendants argued that anti-cross-dressing laws were facially unconstitutional, or unconstitutional as applied to them. As their successes mounted, gender outlaws began to bring civil lawsuits against cities to enjoin them from enforcing their anti-cross-dressing ordinances, marking a shift from the defensive posture of the criminal defendant to the offensive posture of the civil litigant. By 1980, criminal defendants had successfully challenged cross-dressing arrests in at least sixteen cities, introducing many courts to transvestite and transsexual people in the process. 

To the extent that historians have addressed the decriminalization of cross-dressing, they have understood it as an adjunct to a broader attack on vague municipal laws. This article restores the anti-cross-dressing cases to their place within the LGBT constitutional narrative. In that story, the campaign to decriminalize sodomy looms large. Substantive due process rights to sexual privacy and equal protection for sexual and gender minorities became the primary constitutional vehicles for vindication of LGBT rights and full sexual citizenship, culminating in the Supreme Court's endorsement of same-sex marriage in 2015. By reconstructing the disjointed efforts to repeal anti-cross-dressing laws across the country, this paper points to the multiplicity of legal paths for constitutionalizing gender non-conformity in the early days of LGBT constitutional litigation. 

The challenges also bring into focus a distinct legal movement of gender outlaws. Although they were not centrally coordinated, gender outlaws across the country developed their own legal strategy to decriminalize cross-dressing, and in some cases, constitutionalize protections for gender non-conformity. They did so in an era before legal nonprofits organized a cohesive gay and lesbian legal agenda, before that group added transgender legal issues to the mix, and indeed before the identity category “transgender” was in wide circulation. 

Historians of LGBT law in this period tend to emphasize how gay and lesbian “homophile” activists of the 1950s and 1960s promoted the idea that homosexuality was an identity rather than stigmatized conduct or medical pathology. In their efforts to organize against police harassment, they drew inspiration from the Black civil rights movement to portray homosexuals as an oppressed minority group. Despite changes in medical taxonomy and self-identification, police and courts did not easily differentiate between sexual orientation and gender identity. 

For homophile activists, that was part of the problem. To make the analogy sympathetic, they distanced their politicized homosexual identity from its former bedfellows—gender inversion, racial impurity, sex work, poverty, and crime. Their legal strategy reflected that analysis from the beginning as they mobilized gay identity to articulate a gay legal subject with protected rights to assemble, have sex, organize on campuses, work, and form families as gay people.  Those campaigns laid the groundwork for the constitutional arguments most associated with the contemporary LGBT movement: sexual privacy and the civil rights of “discrete and insular minorities” under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Unlike many gay rights legal claims of the same period, challenges to cross-dressing bans often succeeded without analogizing gender non-conformity to identity-based minority groups. The split in legal claims mirrored social transformation on the ground. Gender outlaws entered courts amid a major shift in how medical authorities and social groups understood the relationship between sexuality and gender, an epistemic change that Joanne Meyerowitz has called the “taxonomic revolution.”  In these formative years of movement and identity consolidation, gender outlaws strategically deployed and obscured their identities, exploiting confusion about gender-bending and playing off of courts’ ignorance. 

In some cases, challengers attempted to introduce the legal system to transvestites, transsexuals, and drag queens without closing the door on other gender outlaws. These efforts met with mixed success: courts began to recognize constitutional rights, but litigation also limited which gender outlaws would benefit. Some challengers sought to expand personal freedoms to include gender expression through clothing, but others yoked trans civil rights to medical authority, defining the trans legal subject as a person seeking medical treatment for pathologized transsexualism. Examining their legal strategies offers a window into the messy process of translating gender non-conforming experiences and subjectivities into something that courts could understand. It also emphasizes the role of legal institutions, alongside social life and medical discourse, in shaping the analytical categories of gender. Over time, one strand of gender outlaw experience consolidated and became legible to courts as a rights-bearing subject, which I call the trans legal subject. 

Three tactics typify the overall strategy. First, gender outlaws challenged cross-dressing bans for vagueness, inviting courts to invalidate the laws without asking judges to adjudicate, or even understand, their gender identities at all. In a second set of challenges, lawyers argued that cross-dressing was a form of expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Under this theory, cross-dressing conduct could be protected regardless of the defendant's gender identity. In a final set of cases brought under the Eighth Amendment, lawyers did make claims based on a consolidated sense of identity, telling courts that cross-dressing was a treatment for medically diagnosed transsexuality. 

Many historians have noted the salience of gender non-conformity in anti-homosexual policing in the decades following World War II. But such policing was not limited to gays and lesbians, precisely because homosexuality was not thought apart from other stigmatized behavior. Police targeted a broad range of activities, which Emily Hobson has called “street life,” including Black and Brown youth culture, “homosocial contact among working-class men, homosexuality and gender transgression, sex work, and interracial contact of various kinds.”  Homophile activists believed that social inclusion and legal recognition required a more respectable image.  Many histories build from this foundation by following the homosexual once he was shorn of his seedier associations, leaving the subject of gender non-conforming policing both widely remarked upon and relatively under-studied. 

This article asks what happened to the gender outlaws who did not, could not, or would not see themselves in the new homosexual political identity. The answer reveals early constitutional arguments that gender non-conformity deserved protection on its own terms. It also invites a reconsideration of the contemporary LGBT legal movement. Legal histories often describe a gay and lesbian civil rights movement emerging from the ashes of gay liberation in the early 1970s, and only adding the “T” to LGBT in the 1990s. Returning to the history of the late 1960s and 1970s, however, suggests an alternative periodization in which campaigns for trans and gay civil rights sprouted from the same root, and grew in parallel. Transgender had to be analytically separated from gay and lesbian in life and law before it could be reattached as a distinct minority group. 

The cases described in this article form a fractured archive of roughly thirty legal challenges from 1963 to 1986. They are national in scope, arising primarily in the West, Midwest, and Northeast, with some appearances in Texas and Florida. About two-thirds appear in published case reporters that include important details such as the names and affiliations of the attorneys and, in some cases, their written submissions. Other cases come from print media, mostly within gay, lesbian, transvestite, transsexual, and drag publications. The level of detail varies significantly, making it difficult to generalize about the attorneys who brought these cases or the arguments they raised. Regional branches of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) made several important contributions, as did the national office after 1973, and one significant case was brought by a legal clinic at Northwestern University School of Law. 

Despite these limitations, this article tells a new story. Gender outlaws and their lawyers drew on the popularity of unisex clothing, movements for free expression, and emerging medical discourses on gender identity to argue that cross-dressing could be a benign fashion choice, a protected expression, or a necessary medical treatment for transsexuality. Their successes helped topple cross-dressing regulation in cities and towns across the country, but not without ambivalent results for gender outlaws on the whole. In order to make gender non-conformity legible to the legal system, lawyers translated the diverse array of gender outlaw experiences into a distinctly trans legal subject, defined by medicalized trans identity. Out of disjointed legal defense of gender outlaws emerged a transgender legal movement.