25 March 2023

Rights

In 'Robot Rights? Let’s Talk about Human Welfare Instead' (2020 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES’20), February 7–8, 2020) Abeba Birhane and Jelle van Dijk comment

The ‘robot rights’ debate, and its related question of ‘robot responsibility’, invokes some of the most polarized positions in AI ethics. While some advocate for granting robots rights on a par with human beings, others, in a stark opposition argue that robots are not deserving of rights but are objects that should be our slaves. Grounded in post-Cartesian philosophical foundations, we argue not just to deny robots ‘rights’, but to deny that robots, as artifacts emerging out of and mediating human being, are the kinds of things that could be granted rights in the first place. Once we see robots as mediators of human being, we can understand how the ‘robot rights’ debate is focused on first world problems, at the expense of urgent ethical concerns, such as machine bias, machine elicited human labour exploitation, and erosion of privacy all impacting society’s least privileged individuals. We conclude that, if human being is our starting point and human welfare is the primary concern, the negative impacts emerging from machinic systems, as well as the lack of taking responsibility by people designing, selling and deploying such machines, remains the most pressing ethical discussion in AI.

24 March 2023

Contempt

In Yap -v- Matic [No 7] [2023] WASC 55 the Court has dealt with  contempt by a sovereign citizen, stating 

[18] Contempt of court is a matter that lies both within the court's inherent jurisdiction and is provided for by the statutory regime relating to the court's powers. It is a tool that the court may employ to protect the due administration of justice. A finding of contempt may be dealt with summarily and may, if appropriate, result in the imprisonment of a contemnor without trial. 

[19] The ability of the court to charge a party with contempt, to determine the matter of guilt and to impose a penalty of its own volition is an immense power and must be exercised sparingly It is therefore important to distinguish between that conduct of which the court disapproves, and that which attracts the court's condemnation and punishment. 

[20] In John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae, their Honours Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ quote from Cotton LJ in Hunt v Clarke as follows: 

A penalty will not be imposed in its exercise 'unless the thing done is of such a nature as to require the arbitrary and summary interference of the court in order to enable justice to be duly and properly administered without any interruption or interference'.

[21] Conduct which the court considers unusual, irritating, rude or even belligerent does not necessarily invoke the summary powers of the court. A party may express beliefs about the legitimacy of a court order, or the quality of a judgment, or may resist particular principles of law. It is not enough that the court is insulted, or that the beliefs expressed do not align with those of the judicial officer. The threshold requirement is that the court must find that the conduct interferes with the administration of justice or in some way demonstrates a contumelious disrespect for the authority of the court. 

[22] In matters such as this it is particularly important to emphasise that the court does not impose punitive measures in relation to people's beliefs. Mr Matic is quite entitled to his beliefs even if they are irrational, irritating or even offensive to others. In a tolerant and humane society people must be entitled to hold such beliefs without fear of sanction or punishment from the State. History is littered with the tragic consequences of intolerance and injustice perpetrated by state authorities for beliefs that do not meet with the approval of the governing or ruling elite. However, at the same time the court must be concerned with, and must remain vigilant to protect, the administration of justice from conduct, including on occasion the expression of views, that corrodes public confidence in and respect for the courts and the justice system. A just and tolerant society must zealously guard the instruments and institutions that preserve justice and tolerance. ...

[26] ... In Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam [No 2] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309, 313 - 314, Kirby P observed:

Contempt law has been fashioned by the courts to protect the administration of justice. This is an activity, self-evidently of the greatest importance to society. It represents a vital part of the peaceful government of a community such as ours. In Ditfort v Calcraft (1989) 98 FLR 158 at 160, I said: '... These well known features of our legal system make the faithful compliance with subpoenas issued by the courts essential to the proper administration of justice.' A conviction of contempt of court is a conviction of an offence, criminal in nature. Punishment of the convicted contemnor must therefore take into account the considerations normally applicable to the punishment of crime and apt to uphold the purpose of this jurisdiction, viz, the undisturbed and orderly administration of justice in the courts according to law. Thus, in determining the punishment which is apt to the circumstances which have led to a conviction of contempt, it is appropriate to bear in mind the purposes of punishing the contemnor; deterring the contemnor and others in the future from committing like contempts; and denouncing the conduct concerned in an approximately [sic appropriately] emphatic way: see Director of Public Prosecutions v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732 at 741. ...

[27] Recently, the Western Australian Court of Appeal considered the purpose of punishing contemnors in R v T. In that decision, Mazza, Mitchell and Vaughan JJA said:

Sentencing for a contempt of court constituted by a breach of the court's orders may serve two distinct purposes. These purposes may be described as coercive and punitive. A sentence for contempt may provide a coercive means by which the court orders can be enforced and future compliance with the order secured for the benefit of a party to the proceedings can be ensured. However, a sentence for contempt may also punish wilful disobedience of a court's order so as to vindicate judicial authority and maintain the integrity of the court's process in the public interest.

[28] Their Honours went on to observe that:

It is also clear that punishment of past intentional disobedience of court orders is a significant consideration in sentencing for contempt of court. As the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia recognised in Tate:

Normally, the purpose of contempt proceedings against a person for breach of such an order is to coerce them to comply with it. However, it is quite clear that another purpose of bringing proceedings for contempt against a person who has breached a non-monetary order of the court may be that of punishment. The purposes of imposing punishment would appear to reflect the need for individual and general deterrence and retribution for the party's failure to comply with the order. Retribution is called for because it is essential to the proper working of the court system that court orders are obeyed. If they are defied or ignored, the whole system of dispute resolution by litigation breaks down. While there are other means of dispute resolution available, in the final analysis a citizen has the right to approach a court to determine a dispute and the court has a duty to do so.

... 

[30] In relation to those factors, I make the following observations. (a) Sandi Matic's contempt was serious in the sense that it was a deliberate and defiant disregard of an order of this court. However, other than continuing to delay the proceedings, and the distraction and diversion of public resources caused thereby, the consequences of the contempt were limited. (b) The context of the contempt is unfavourable to Sandi Matic. At the time of the conduct that gave rise to the charge of contempt, that is 30 November 2022, Sandi Matic had already been convicted of contempt once before, on 27 October 2022. (c) The reason for the contempt, at least insofar as Mr Matic has submitted, was a lack of understanding of the significance of, or doubt in relation to the authenticity of, the relevant orders. In part for the reasons set out in Yap v Matic [No 4], and in part in relation to the oral submissions proffered by Mr Matic on 13 December 2022, I do not accept those reasons. (d) There is no evidence that Mr Matic gained any benefit from his contempt, other than to delay the proceedings by a week. (e) Mr Matic has expressed no remorse, nor contrition, for his contempt in any real sense. In fact, since being convicted for contempt in December 2022, Mr Matic has continued to fail to appear at hearings, including the hearing of 30 January 2023. (f) Other than matters I have canvassed in previous decisions in these proceedings, Sandi Matic has not put before the court any evidence of his character, personal circumstances, or antecedents. There is no evidence of any criminal record. However, I note again that at the time of the relevant contempt, Sandi Matic had already been convicted of contempt, and since that conviction, has been separately convicted of criminal contempt by her Honour Archer J. (g) General and personal deterrence, and denunciation of the contempt, are important factors in this case. I shall return to these issues. ... 

[39] The case of Sandi Matic raises important questions about the nature of contempt, and the metes and bounds of the court's authority. I shall emphasise again, that the function of this charge and penalty is not to punish Sandi Matic for his beliefs, or to necessarily seek to correct the beliefs that Sandi Matic holds in his private life. 

[40] However, Sandi Matic's behaviour has not been without a cost. That cost involves the court resources that are wasted in hosting repeated hearings when parties fail to appear. There is importantly, a social and reputational cost to the court when litigants are given wide berth to disregard or ignore court orders. There is a cost to other parties, who have the right to expect that court orders will be complied with. 

[41] Additionally, there is a clear need for personal and general deterrence. While Sandi Matic has previously been afforded by me the benefit of doubt in relation to his contemning, the circumstances of this contempt are different. That is most plainly illustrated by the origin of each of the charges. The first conviction for contempt was made out following an application from the plaintiffs in this matter. The second conviction, with which I am now dealing, arose of the court's own initiative. 

[42] In my view, it is tolerably clear that Mr Matic has chosen to knowingly defy court orders. All of the surrounding circumstances, including Sandi Matic's communications with the court and his conduct at hearings relating to this conviction, lead in my view to an irresistible inference that Mr Matic's conduct is born from a lack of genuine acceptance of the authority of the court. 

[43] Mr Matic has at various points, been at pains to express that his failure to appear in accordance with court orders was not a rejection of the court's authority. Rather, he has asserted that his lack of compliance rests on his confusion about the proceedings and set of misguided beliefs about the justice system. ... 

[44] I have previously outlined that Mr Matic's beliefs appear to align with those of the self‑proclaimed ' sovereign citizen ' movement. This is a movement that has been gaining popularity and traction in Australia over the last few years but has also been prolific in other jurisdictions for longer. The growing prevalence of this class of beliefs and associated conduct is a matter of concern for the preservation of the authority of the court and the administration of justice. It reinforces the importance of general deterrence in the community. I reiterate again that Mr Matic is at liberty to hold his beliefs but that does not absolve him of the responsibility to adhere to the rule of law which includes acceptance of, and compliance with, court orders. 

[45] While Mr Matic has stressed in oral submissions and written communications that he is attempting to be 'honourable' and that he does 'respect the court authority', that is not a sentiment frankly, that can be taken seriously against the background of his actual conduct. By the time of the original hearing in relation to this penalty decision, that is the hearing on 30 January 2023, Mr Matic had twice been convicted of contempt by me. He had once been arrested and made to appear before the court. He had been instructed in no uncertain terms that 'if the court orders you to attend, it's not an invitation; it's an order'. On 13 December 2022, when listing the penalty hearing on 30 January 2023, Sandi Matic's family commitments were accommodated and his preferences were taken into account. Sandi Matic told the court that if the penalty was listed 'towards the later part of January...I can attend.' Sandi Matic also expressly confirmed that the date and time set by the court were convenient to him. I therefore did not consider it necessary to order that he appear at the penalty hearing. Nevertheless, Sandi Matic once again failed, without notice or explanation, to attend court on 30 January 2023. 

[46] Additionally, as part of Mr Matic's previous conviction for contempt of court, on 8 December 2022 I ordered that Mr Matic pay the plaintiffs' costs of their contempt application, fixed in the amount of $16,057 and payable forthwith. As at the time of this judgment, Sandi Matic remains in default of that order. This may be a further demonstration of Mr Matic's lack of respect for the authority of a court order. That ongoing default also casts doubt over the utility of making a costs order or imposing a fine on Sandi Matic. 

Sovereigns

In Re Finocchiaro; Ex parte The Proper Officer [2023] NTSC 23 the Court, in dealing with refusal to seal two writs, states 

[12] The second writ that Mr Finocchiaro seeks to have sealed was received by the registry on 8 February 2023. This document purports to bring an action against the Commonwealth of Australia for “punitive damages” for infringement of Mr Finocchiaro’s religious rights as a person of the Christian faith. In summary, his concern is that the practice of the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages in using capital letters in the printing of his name on his birth certificate creates a graven image contrary to Biblical scripture, in particular the Second Commandment, and is offensive to his religious convictions. 

[13] This proposed writ does not contain any facts or matters that could found a cause of action that could possibly succeed. The mere use of capital letters in a document could never found any claim at common law or under statute. 

[14] The proposed writ refers to a supposed law of the Commonwealth described as the “Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages 1963 Act of Parliament compelling every state and territory to enforce the registration of names at birth”. No such statute ever existed. From his submission it appears that Mr Finocchiaro was referring to the Registration of Births Deaths and Marriages Act 1963 (NI), a continuing law of Norfolk Island. 

[12] Mr Finocchiaro’s interpretation of that law, which has only ever applied in Norfolk Island, is plainly incorrect and cannot support his claim. 

[15] It follows that I agree with the Proper Officer that this proceeding would be an abuse of the process of the Court if commenced, and the originating process should not be sealed. 

[16] Finally, I note that some of Mr Finocchiaro’ correspondence includes a “declaration of sovereignty” and that the proposed writs refer to an “Affidavit and Declaration of Sovereignty Status” and an “Affidavit of Truth Declaration” having been sent by him to various government and public officials. For completeness, I record that such “declarations of sovereignty”, however described, have no legal basis or effect and do not provide any foundation for the proposed proceedings.

In AVI v MHVB, 2020 ABQB 489 Graesser J states 

 [1] Pseudolaw is a collection of spurious legally incorrect ideas that superficially sound like law, and purport to be real law. In layman’s terms, pseudolaw is pure nonsense. 

[2] Pseudolaw is typically employed by conspiratorial, fringe, criminal, and dissident minorities who claim pseudolaw replaces or displaces conventional law. These groups attempt to gain advantage, authority, and other benefits via this false law. In Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 [Meads], Associate Chief Justice Rooke reviewed many forms of and variations on pseudolaw that have been deployed in Canada. In his decision, he described populations and personalities that use these ideas, and explained how these “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” [“OPCA”] concepts are legally false and universally rejected by Canadian courts. Rooke ACJ concluded OPCA strategies are instead scams promoted to gullible, ill-informed, and often greedy individuals by unscrupulous “guru” personalities. Employing pseudolaw is always an abuse of court processes, and warrants immediate court response: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283 at paras 180, 670-671 [Unrau #2]. 

[3] To date Canada has weathered two waves of pseudolaw. In the 2000 “Detaxers” held seminars and taught classes on how to supposedly avoid paying income tax, for example by claiming that ROBERT GRAESSER is a legal person and a taxpayer, while Robert-A.: Graesser is a physical human being and therefore exempt from tax: Meads at paras 87-98. The Detaxers faded away by the end of that decade as their schemes consistently failed, and their gurus were charged, convicted, and incarcerated: e.g. R v Porisky, 2016 BCSC 1757, aff’d 2019 BCCA 159; R v Watts, 2016 ONSC 4843, aff’d 2018 ONCA 148, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38141 (27 October 2018); Donald J Netolitzky, “The History of the Organized Pseudolegal Argument Phenomenon in Canada” (2016) 53:3 Alta L Rev 609 at 624 [Netolitzky, “History”]. 

[4] Next came the Freemen-on-the-Land, a group founded by street comedian Robert Arthur Menard: Netolitzky, “History” at 624-27. Freemen claimed that Canadian law only applied to them if they consented to it, and, unsurprisingly, Freemen usually didn’t. Unpleasantly, many Freemen turned out to be criminals who decided to “opt out” of being subject to narcotics and firearms legislation, and even prohibitions against sexual assault of children: Unrau #2 at paras 194-198; R v Berg, 2019 ABQB 541. Freeman activity peaked in the early 2010s, and in the following years Freemen were encountered less and less in Canadian courts, at least in part again due to the fact that Freeman pseudolaw was no more successful than the schemes promoted by Detaxers: Netolitzky, “History” at 626-627. 

[5] However, the wheel of time grinds on, and so it is not surprising that this new decade has brought with it an emerging and different pseudolaw community, or “movement”: Meads at paras 168-198. Over the past several months judges and officials in Alberta Courts have been receiving peculiar nearly identical “fill-in-the-blank” boilerplate documents with titles like “Notice of Lawful Objection & Declaratation of Standing in Law” [sic] (see Appendix “A”) and “Notice of Conditional Acceptance” (see Appendix “D”). These documents are emblazoned with a strange crest titled “Practical Lawful Dissent” (see Appendix “E”). The authors of these items declare that they have sworn an oath of allegiance to Lord Craigmyle of Invernesshire, and say that on that basis they are outside Canadian law. This extraordinary claim is allegedly the result of Article 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta and the actions a group of rebel barons whose resistance to Crown treason, strangely enough, began in 2001, almost eight centuries after the death of King John in 1216. ... 

[8] This decision has two objectives: 1. to reject Robinson’s attempt to engage the Court as an interloper in other individuals’ affairs, and to evaluate whether additional steps are potentially warranted in response to Robinson’s developing misconduct; and 2. to examine and refute the pseudolaw concepts that Robinson is employing, and apparently teaching to others. ... The rule of law does not countenance proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and OPCA litigation falls in all three categories. ...

 [11] “Jacquie Phoenix” has been sending documents to Alberta Courts on her own behalf as well. In these documents she self-identifies as “Jacquie Phoenix, Sovereign Woman Living on the Land, Legal Beneficiary / Soul Administrator To the Trust of the Legal Fiction Known as Jacqueline Robinson”. 

[12] This confusing and nonsensical language indicates that Phoenix/Robinson subscribes to a pseudolaw concept called “Strawman Theory”. It is very cult-like and is best equated with works of science fiction. Strawman theory has been described as an exorcism ritual pretending to be law: Donald J Netolitzky, “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments as Magic and Ceremony” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 1045 at 1069-1078. 

[13] This theory is described in Meads at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 67-88; and Potvin (Re) at paras 83-92; 110-120. Strawman Theory purports that people have two halves: 1) a physical “flesh and blood” element that is outside the authority of governments, police, and courts, and 2) the “Strawman”, an immaterial legal aspect that is subject to “conventional” authority. There are many Strawman Theory variations. In most the two halves of the duality are identified by letter case and punctuation, where mixed case names are human beings, and all capitals names are the Strawman. 

[14] In Phoenix/Robinson’s case she is calling her physical half a “Sovereign Woman Living on the Land”, and that “Sovereign Woman” is called “Jacquie Phoenix”. The Strawman half is “Jacqueline Robinson”, a “Legal Fiction” “Trust”. “Phoenix” appears to be claiming she is the beneficiary and administrator of this “Trust”. These variations on the overall Strawman Theory concept have no legal relevance or merit. As Master Schulz observed in Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency) at para 83, different versions of Strawman Theory are “nothing but the Strawman tarted up in a new dress.” 

[15] All this is a whole lot of nothing. Canadian Courts have for twenty years rejected Strawman Theory. It was a keystone of many Detaxer theories and failed: Meads. Robert Arthur Menard promised his Freemen followers they did not have to follow the law - only their “legal fiction” Strawman did. That also did not work. Instead Freemen and other OPCA litigants went to jail (e.g. R v Berg; R v Zombori, 2013 BCSC 2461, aff’d 2016 BCCA 9), lost their homes (e.g. Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652; Knutson (Re), 2018 ABQB 858; Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry, 2018 ABQB 951), and had access to their children restricted or terminated (e.g. CP (Re), 2019 ABQB 388; ANB v Hancock, 2013 ABQB 97). 

[16] The Strawman duality is so notoriously false that simply asserting Strawman Theory creates a presumption that the person who advances this concept does so in bad faith and for an abusive and ulterior purpose: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 at paras 37-40. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly rejected leave applications based on Strawman Theory concepts: Donald J Netolitzky & Richard Warman, “Enjoy the Silence: Pseudolaw at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2020) 57:3 Alta L Rev 715. ...   

V. Pseudolaw Concepts 

[37] The documents that Robinson, MHVB, and other aligned individuals have sent to this Court are obviously OPCA materials and attempt to implement a pseudolaw scheme to defeat state and court authority. This particular variation on pseudolaw appears to be new, at least in Canada. This decision is therefore a useful opportunity to investigate, document, and dismiss these Magna Carta Article 61 claims as legally false, spurious, and factually absurd. 

A. The Magna Carta Lawful Rebellion Scheme 

[38] First, I will indicate my understanding of what the documents that have been received by the Court from Robinson, MHVB, and others are intended to do, and how they purport to achieve that result. As far as I am aware no court in Canada or the Commonwealth has to date responded to this new OPCA scheme so I will name it “Magna Carta Lawful Rebellion” or “MCLR”. 

1. MCLR Language and Terminology 

[39] Many of the terms and much of the language used in MCLR materials is vague, inconsistent, or apparently simply invented out of thin air. I will provide several examples. 

[40] Robinson’s July 27, 2020 document says “... [t]he Court of Queens Bench is an Unlawful Assembly ...” [sic]. Correspondence from “EZuk P.P. Jacquie Phoenix” says either a court officer or the Court is “operating as a Foreign Corporation”. MHVB’s “Notice of Lawful Objection & Declaratation of Standing in Law” says all courts are “Private Corporation Businesses ... run by criminally established private corporation enterprise”. So, what is it? Are courts an “Assembly”, “Foreign Corporation” or “Private Corporation”? Does Robinson know what the words “Assembly” and “Corporation” mean? 

[41] Robinson’s documents invoke “the Constitution and the People of the Commonwealth Realm”. What are these? Is Robinson identifying the Canada’s Constitution: The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11? How about the constitutional documents of other Commonwealth nation states? Or is she referring to something else, a universal constitution of all Commonwealth tradition nations? MCLR documents (e.g. Appendix “A”) also refer to a “English and Commonwealth constitution”. If the latter alternative is what is intended then I have never heard of any such thing. None of the materials received to date from MCLR adherents indicate where the “Constitution” they claim to enforce might be located and read. 

[42] Another example is Robinson’s materials frequently mention that something called the “Constitutional Royal Protocol” has been “invoked”. While that phrase sounds impressive, “Constitutional Royal Protocol” does not appear anywhere in the UK BAILII (www.bailii.org) database that contains hundreds of thousands of reported cases from across the UK and archives all UK legislation. This phrase is also never mentioned in the Australian and New Zealand AustLII (www.austlii.edu.au) and Canadian CanLII (www.canlii.org) court decision and legislation databases. A search of “Google Books” for “Constitutional Royal Protocol” located nothing that related to the UK, the Commonwealth, or Canada. It looks like this phrase was simply made up by the MCLR’s progenitors. 

[43] As a further example I also checked caselaw databases to validate whether any UK, Australian, New Zealand, Republic of Ireland, or Canadian court had referenced or applied the “Maxim in law: “Any act done by me against my will is not my act”” (see Appendix “D”). Courts in all those jurisdictions had apparently never heard of this “Maxim”. That is nothing new, as OPCA litigants make up imaginary “Maxims of Law” all the time: e.g. Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 399 at paras 42-50. 

[44] Since the language and terminology used in MCLR documents has at best a tenuous relationship to recognized legal or constitutional concepts I am not going to try to structure my understanding of what these materials claim to do in a “conventional” way, but instead use MCLR adherents’ own frame of reference. I caution the reader that this approach does not necessarily make MCLR claims any more coherent. 

2. The MCLR Process 

[45] The first step in the MCLR process appears to be that the MCLR adherent swears allegiance to a UK nobleperson pursuant to Article 61 of the Magna Carta of 1215. MHVB’s “Oath of Allegiance” is reproduced in Appendix “H”. Curiously, Article 61 was repealed within a short time from the signing of the original Magna Carta and was not re-introduced in any of the replacement Magna Cartas. 

[46] In any event, this step purportedly changes the MCLR adherent’s “standing in law” via “lawful excuse” so that the MCLR adherent is no longer subject to legislation, courts, police, or government actors who are guilty of “High Treason” for failing to abide by “Constitutional law” and “Common Law”. I note that when OPCA litigants use the term “Common Law” they do not mean accumulated judge-made legal principles that result from court decisions, but instead some kind of obsolete historical past state of law or natural law: Meads at paras 336-340. [47] To date all MCLR “Oath of Allegiance” documents have been directed to Lord Craigmyle of Invernesshire. I suspect Lord Craigmyle was chosen by the instigators of this plan because he was one of the peers in the House of Lords who signed a petition to Queen Elizabeth in 2001 in opposition to the UK’s ratification of the European Union’s [“EU”] Treaty of Nice. That Treaty increased the powers of the EU Parliament over the member nations. 

[48] Twenty-eight peers signed a petition to the Queen asking her to withhold royal assent from any legislation attempting to ratify the Treaty. They invoked Article 61 of the Magna Carta. These peers alleged that the effect of the Treaty of Nice was to surrender the British People’s powers to the EU. Ratifying the Treaty was characterized as an act of treason. These peers declared themselves to be in “lawful rebellion”, acting under the Magna Carta. They alleged that the effect of the Treaty of Nice was to surrender the British People’s powers to the EU. That was characterized as an act of treason. These Lords declared themselves to be in “lawful rebellion”. Nothing came of their revolt and the Treaty of Nice was ratified by the UK. .... 

[51] Lord Craigmyle of Invernesshire has no connection to the Magna Carta. He is the great- grandson of the first Lord Craigmyle of Invernesshire, who was a politician and judge. The peerage dates to May, 1929. Lord Craigmyle is not descended from any of the rebel barons from 1215. [52] According to a refreshingly candid interview with Lord Craigmyle on YouTube (https://youtu.be/RevKbM1L981), he didn’t know exactly what he was doing when he signed the petition, but thought it might be helpful in the opposition to the Treaty. Since then he has received thousands of letters from people claiming to have sworn an oath to him. He does not know what to do with them. There were at the time, he says, too many to read. ... 

 [55] I am reluctant to use YouTube, Google and Wikipedia information as legitimate sources of information. They can be sources of illegitimate information. Internet searches are rife with references to Article 61 and promoting disinformation about it and what may have been its first purported use in 2001. Simply type in “magna carta article 61” and follow the numerous links. It would appear from my research that use of Internet tools is the only way of finding information on cult-like groups such as OPCA adherents. Some of my search results are reported later in this decision. Absent any other information from more conventional sources, I must consider what I have been able to glean. 

[56] The current Lord Craigmyle enjoys no prominence on the Internet and there is nothing indicating that he is seeking followers, or that there is any particular reason to follow him. There is also no indication that he is living a rebellious life free from adherence to any of the laws of the United Kingdom. 

[57] Regardless of any mystery surrounding Lord Craigmyle and his connection with the aftermath of the failed 2001 petition to Her Majesty, a MCLR adherent who has sworn allegiance to Lord Craigmyle then declares their rebellion status by sending a series of documents to court justices, and perhaps other government and state officials. MHVB has so far sent three such documents to Associate Chief Justice Nielsen of this Court: 1. “Notice of Lawful Objection & Declaratation of Standing in Law” dated July 5, 2020 (Appendix “A”); 2. “Notice of Default and Opportunity to Cure” dated July 20, 2020 (Appendix “B”); and 3. “Notice of Default” dated August 5, 2020 (Appendix “C”). 

[58] Summarizing these documents, the “Notice of Lawful Objection” declares that MHVB is no longer subject to conventional legal authorities because they are traitors and quislings who have subverted the true “Common law”. MHVB instead has sworn allegiance to UK barons who in 2001 invoked the 1215 Magna Carta. .... 

[61] Canadian courts have seen OPCA documents of this general type many, many times over the past 20 years. These are a “Three/Five Letters” scheme, which I will discuss in more detail below. Based on previous experience the Court will now receive one or two more documents that “seal the deal” further and/or (purportedly) impose more obligations and/or penalties on Associate Chief Justice Nielsen. ... 

3. The New Rebellion of 2001 

[63] History reports that in 1215 English landowners, “barons”, rebelled against King John, who was then the monarch of that realm. After negotiations between the two sides on June 10, 1215, King John assented to terms and conditions on his conduct that are known as the Magna Carta of 1215. While that did not end the political scheming in medieval England, and the occasional subsequent civil war, as far as I knew the historic meeting at Runnymede had settled the baron’s complaints vs that monarch. 

[64] I was surprised to learn that had been a revolt of the “barons” in 2001. Some MCLR documents attach as exhibits items that relate to these new rebels, their complaints, and what they did about that. 

[65] First is a document titled “The Barons petition 2001” [sic], which purportedly was “presented under clause 61 of Magna Carta 1215” to Queen Elizabeth II on February 7, 2001. This document complains that the UK’s “national independence” and “ancient rights, freedoms and customs” have been lost and eroded since the UK joined the EU. The document focuses on the 2000 Treaty of Nice, warning that this treaty would cause further “losses of national independence”, would “introduce an alien system of criminal justice”, abolish habeas corpus and jury trials, allow foreign militaries (“men at arms”) into the UK, subvert the UK military’s chain of command, and impose an alien “Charter of Fundamental Rights”. The authors of this “petition” therefore say the Queen ought to withhold Royal Assent to any legislation that ratifies the Treaty of Nice. This document is signed by 28 Peers, including Lord Craigmyle. For convenience I will call these individuals the “new rebel barons”. 

[66] So, in short, “The Barons petition 2001” has a fairly narrow focus. The 28 new rebel barons seek that Queen Elizabeth II block implementation of the Treaty of Nice. I note the 28 new rebel barons have nothing to say about Canada. They have nothing to say about the Commonwealth. This is a political demand, of a kind, by a group of hereditary nobles in the UK, concerning UK governance. [67] MCLR documents also include a second document, dated March 23, 2001, purportedly a letter invited by the Queen and addressed to Sir Robin Janvrin, the “Queens Private Secretary” [sic]. This document repeats that the new rebel barons complain that the Treaty of Nice conflicts with the “Constitution of the UK”, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the Queen’s Coronation Oath. The new rebel barons expand on the various rights they indicate are being affected or eliminated by enacting the terms of the Treaty of Nice. 

[68] The new rebel barons declare that government ministers who are implementing the Treaty of Nice are already oath-breakers. The writers state the Coronation Oath is a signed contract, and that if the Queen does not block implementation of the Treaty of Nice, then she has breached that contract, and, with that, the UK descends into chaos: The Coronation Oath is a moral obligation, a religious obligation, a sworn obligation, a contractual obligation, a statutory obligation, a common law obligation, a customary obligation, an obligation on all who swear allegiance, it is the duty of government, and it is sworn for the nation, the commonwealth and all dominions. The Coronation Oath is the peak of a pyramid, and all subordinate oaths are bound by its limitations. The armed services swear allegiance to the sovereign, not to the government of the day. This helps clarify the principle that allegiance is necessary, and not optional - an essential part of the checks and balances of our constitution. Without these oaths, and their lawful enforcement, we have little to protect us from government by tyranny. [Emphasis in original.] ...

[70] And that is it, at least as far as the MCLR materials that document how in 2001 the new rebel barons invoked Article 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta and, purportedly, struck the spark to start a new rebellion so that MCLR adherents may swear allegiance and then ignore treasonous and seditious UK (and Canadian) authorities. But the March 23, 2001 letter to the Queen does not actually say that. The new rebel barons instead declare they are Queen Elizabeth II’s “most loyal and obedient subjects”. The most they seek is to form an advisory committee. Where’s the revolt? The call to arms and resistance? 

[71] Did the new rebel barons in 2001 truly send the UK into constitutional disorder? I think I may take judicial notice that no bands of sworn oathsmen and women headed by the new rebel barons (let alone by Lord Craigmyle as their leader) have been seizing castles and other royal property across the UK over the past nearly 20 years. I am no UK constitutional scholar, but reading the plain text of the materials found in Robinson’s MCLR documents leads me to conclude that the purported baronial rebellion of 2001 was nothing more than political drama, theatre, and showmanship. I have seen nothing in my own research to the contrary. 

B. Magna Carta Article 61 

[72] Beyond the remarkable alternative history that I have just recounted and a baronial revolt and revolution that apparently no one in the UK has noticed, there are many historical, legal, and logical errors and misconceptions in Robinson’s scheme to escape court, state, and police authority via the Magna Carta. I do not intend to deal with these in great detail but should comment on these fallacies lest they be repeated in other proceedings by other MCLR adherents. 

1. The 1215 Magna Carta was repealed in 1216 

[73] King John died in 1216 and the rebel barons and King John’s son, Henry III (through his regents) came to a new arrangement: the Magna Carta of 1216. That document eliminated Article 61, such that the Article 61 lawful rebellion process essentially died with King John. Subsequent iterations of the Magna Carta did not include Article 61 or anything like it. Thus, MCLR adherents are relying on a clause that had meaning and legal effect for less than a year, more than 800 years ago. 

2. Robinson is a Rogue Servant 

[74] Article 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta said nothing about the rights of ordinary individuals, but instead authorized a counsel of 25 rebel barons to seize all of King John’s “castles, lands, possession, or anything else” if King John did not adhere to the terms of the Magna Carta of 1215. What about rights given to non-barons? Article 61 permits “[a]ny man who so desires may take an oath to obey the commands of the twenty-five barons ...” [emphasis added]. That would appear to be obedience to the commands of the elected council, not a single baron. 

[75] Robinson appears to have sworn herself to be a loyal servant to Lord Craigmyle of Invernesshire. So what? There is no suggestion anywhere that Lord Craigmyle has been elected or appointed to speak for any Article 61 council. There is also nothing to suggest that Lord Craigmyle has “commanded” Robinson to do anything at all, or to do anything in return for her allegiance, let alone that she write to this Court, claiming to represent MHVB, advancing claims that MHVB owns Z as chattel property, and threaten, let alone impose, “the Gallows”. Robinson therefore appears to be rogue servant and Lord Craigmyle should perhaps be concerned about what is being done by her, purportedly under his authority. 

3. Magna Carta Article 61 Explicitly Exempts Children 

[76] Article 61 of the Magna Carta does not authorize the seizure of an ordinary person’s child. Article 61 is about the King’s “castles, lands, possessions”. In fact, not only does Article 61 not apply to children, it explicitly states it does not apply to the king as a person “... and those of the queen and our children ...”. So, even if Robinson were to travel back in time to 1215, swear her allegiance to baron so-and-so, Robinson would not only have no right to assert a property claim on a child of an ordinary person of that day and time, Robinson also would be explicitly prohibited in relying on Article 61 to interfere with King John’s children. 

4. The “Modern” UK Magna Carta 

[77] Next, Ms. Robinson’s position runs afoul of the fact there have been a succession of Magna Cartas. The one that still is (somewhat) in effect in the UK is the Magna Carta (1297), 1297 C 9 25 Edw 1. This document is considered legislation of the English Parliament. It has 40 clauses. None authorize barons and their sworn minions to seize castles and the like. Worse for the MCLR adherents, all but three Articles of the 1297 Magna Carta have been repealed. Of the remaining Articles, Article 1 recognizes the immunity of the Church of England. Article 9 grants the City of London its “ancient liberties”. Article 29 recognizes the rights of “free-men” shall not be infringed, except by legal processes. 

[78] None of these remaining provisions authorizes Robinson’s demands that, as the representative of MHVB, child Z must be produced as chattel property. In fact, by ignoring Canadian courts and their processes Robinson has instead breached Article 29 and is acting as a vigilante, outside “the laws of the land”. I will, however, not extend this finding of unlawfulness to Lord Craigmyle. There is no evidence he ever asked Robinson to do anything. Lord Craigmyle is simply the unlucky recipient of Ms. Robinson’s “magic” paperwork. 

5. The Magna Carta is Not a Supraconstitutional Authority 

[79] It appears that Robinson assumes that the 1215 Magna Carta has supraconstitutional status. The 1215 Magna Carta is purportedly the highest law that cannot be challenged, revoked, superseded, etc. There are several problems with that claim. 

[80] First there is the problematic legal foundation on which the MCLR advances this claim. Certain MCLR documents (e.g. Appendix “D”) include this passage - “Magna Carta is as binding upon the Crown today as it was the day it was sealed at Runnymede.” - purportedly quoted from Halsbury’s Laws of England. If that were an actual statement of the law extracted from that august legal resource then this declaration would be a significant factor worthy of consideration. However, that sentence is nowhere to be found in Halsbury’s Laws of England (2018). In fact, the only times “Runnymede” is ever mentioned in Halsbury’s is that several case citations involve the “Runnymede Borough Council”, and that certain land in Runnymede vested with the US pursuant to the John F Kennedy Memorial Act, 1964 C 85. [81] I then checked the BAILII database that contains hundreds of thousands of reported cases from across the UK to see if any reproduced this important principle from Halsbury’s. I found exactly nothing. The same happened when I searched the AustLII and CanLII databases. 

[82] Undaunted, I turned to “Google Books” to see if perhaps this mysterious passage had been culled from an older edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England. At last I found a match - not in Halsbury’s - but instead in a book: Ashley Mote, Vigilance: A Defence of British Liberty (Petersfield: Tanner, 2001) at 261. Mote provided no citation or source for the “Magna Carta is as binding” passage. Is Mote a legal scholar? No, Mote instead is a former Member of the European Parliament who was convicted and jailed for nearly half a million pounds in false and fraudulent expense claims: “Former MEP Ashley Mote jailed over expenses fraud”, BBC (13 July 2015). 

[83] Given these results I see little explanation other than the “sealed at Runnymede” quote is a complete fabrication. That is not anything new. OPCA litigants fabricate supposed legal principles and findings all the time: e.g. Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213 at paras 41-42, aff’d 2018 ABCA 14; ANB v Hancock at para 93; Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 at paras 46-60. At this point I stopped attempting to validate the legal sources and authorities identified in MCLR materials. Whoever concocted these documents appears to take a “make it up as you go” approach to law. 

[84] What is worse for Robinson’s argument is that Commonwealth jurisdiction courts have consistently repudiated the claim that the Magna Carta is anything special. In The Mayor Commonalty and Citizens of London v Samede (St Paul’s Churchyard Camp Representative), [2012] EWCA Civ 160, the Master of the Rolls specifically rejected the argument that the Magna Carta has extraordinary status: [The appellant] challenged the judgment on the ground that it did not apply to him, as a 'Magna Carta heir'. But that is a concept unknown to the law. ... [The appellant] also invokes 'constitutional and superior law issues' which, he alleges, prevail over statutory, common law, and human rights law. Again that is simply wrong – at least in a court of law. 

[85] The Master of the Rolls continued to confirm that in the UK only Articles 1, 9, and 29 of the 1297 Magna Carta have any legal relevance. 

[86] Outside the UK the Magna Carta is in most instances legally irrelevant, other than as part of legal history. For example, the High Court of Australia in Essenberg v The Queen, B55/1999 [2000] HCATrans 385 (High Court of Australia) ruled: Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights are not documents binding on Australian legislatures in the way that the Constitution is binding on them. Any legislature acting within the powers allotted to it by the Constitution can legislate in disregard of Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights. At the highest, those two documents express a political ideal, but they do not legally bind the legislatures of this country or, for that matter, the United Kingdom. Nor do they limit the powers of the legislatures of Australia or the United Kingdom. [87] Similarly, in Canada notorious Detaxer OPCA guru David Kevin Lindsay argued in R v Lindsay, 2008 BCCA 30 at para 18, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31204 (18 September 2008), “... the Magna Carta is the foundation of the rule of law itself and that it protects the rights, freedoms, and liberties of all citizens. In [Lindsay’s] submission, the Magna Carta was received in Canada as part of our constitutions ...”. 

[88] Smith JA responded by surveying the numerous Canadian court and academic authorities that conclude that in Canada the Magna Carta is not a constitutional document but, at most, legislation: R v Lindsay, paras 19-22. 

[89] Other Canadian OPCA litigants have advanced variations on this claim that the Magna Carta has extraordinary status. Detaxer guru Eldon Warman declared he is “... a commoner with all applicable common law rights and freedoms, including those rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitutional document, Magna Charta 1215 ...”. The British Columbia Court of Appeal responded that Warman’s claim was: ... a complete denial of the constitutional history of this country as it applies to the rights and obligations of its people before the law. ... The submissions of the appellant must be and are rejected as being without any legal, historical or constitutional foundation whatsoever. (R v Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras 13-14.) 

[90] Similarly, in Harper v Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 a Freeman-on-the-Land referenced “... the Magna Carta to insulate himself from those portions of Canadian law that he does not like or finds inconvenient. ...”. Justice Foley reviewed the many cases that had already investigated and rejected that the Magna Carta has supraconstitutional status and struck out the Freeman’s lawsuit. 

[91] So that is a further problem with Robinson’s claims. She relies on historic English legislation that was very long ago replaced in that country, and which outside of England has been consistently identified as having no modern legal relevance. She is far from the first OPCA litigant to point to the Magna Carta and make demands. Just like the Detaxers and Freemen who came before her and made the same arguments, Robinson’s Magna Carta pseudolegal demands have absolutely no legal merit. In Canada the 1215 Magna Carta is a historical landmark but with no current legal effect. 

6. One Oath to Bind Them All [ 

92] Another problem with the MCLR scheme is that it relies on the UK Royal Coronation Oath operating as a kind of contract. The new rebel barons in their March 23, 2001 letter appear to take the position that if the Queen breaks her Coronation Oath, then that cascades to invalidate oaths all over the UK, and, perhaps, even the Commonwealth too. Once the Queen is a traitor, everyone is a traitor. 

[93] This claim that the Coronation Oath has a keystone function is not a new OPCA concepts. Others have made the same claim, and argued that once the Queen has turned traitor, all social order and organization disappears. For example, Albertan Brenden Randall Rothweiler claimed Queen Elizabeth II breached her contractual oath by:

• “Allowing the forming of political parties and demon-crazy (democracy) to divide, weaken, conquer and ruin the people (Deuteronomy 5:32, 17:20; Matthew 12:25).”; • her “... encouraging and promoting sodomy ...”, and knighting “high-profile sodomites” including Elton John, Ian McKellen and John Gielgud, “... instead of having them Lawfully executed as a deterrent to others.”; • “... collecting of graven-images and expensive jewellery (her famous art and Faberge collections, etc.)”; and • allowing and condoning Witchcraft, which includes according a title to author J. K. Rowling “who promotes witches”, and also the development and employment of vaccines and other pharmaceuticals: “witches’ brews/potions”.

 (Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 399 at para 62.) 

[94] I agree with Associate Chief Justice Rooke that Canada does not dissolve into “a post-Elizabethan chaos” because of alleged failures of the Queen in relation to her Coronation Oath. 

[95] Beyond that, Canadian courts have repeatedly concluded the Coronation Oath and its status has no relevance to Canadian authority and law: e.g. Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 399; R v Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99; Potvin (Re); CP (Re), 2019 ABQB 310....

 D. Three/Five Letters Processes 

[110] The OPCA documents that have been received by this Court from Robinson, MHVB, and other MCLR adherents are a very familiar pseudolegal scheme, the “Three/Five Letters” process, that supposedly creates binding outcomes by sending someone a series of documents. At each step a document makes demands or states threats, sets a deadline, and purports that failure to meet those demands or silence means agreement. These documents, “foisted unilateral agreements”, are a common theme in OPCA litigation world-wide: Meads at paras 447-528. However, foisted unilateral agreements are not legally binding because silence does not mean agreement, nor can one unilaterally impose contract obligations on another: Meads at paras 458-472. 

[111] The Three/Five Letters scheme follows a kind of script. Rooke ACJ in Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 13 laid out the overall progress of the scheme. 1. The first letter in the sequence demands a response by a deadline, and usually identifies the purported consequences of an inadequate response or no answer. 2. If no response or an inadequate response is received then the OPCA litigant sends to the target one or more notices that a response is overdue. 3. If no response is still received then the OPCA litigant sends the target one or more documents that indicates the issue (allegedly) in question is decided, and a binding agreement or admission has resulted. See also Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771 at para 69. 

[112] The Three/Five Letters were introduced into Canada by Freeman-on-the-Land guru Robert Arthur Menard who called this a “Notary Public Protest Method” that creates an “Administrative Judgment”: Donald J Netolitzky, “Humdrum Becomes a Headache: Lawyers Notarizing Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Document” (2019) 49:3 Advocates’ Quarterly 279. The Three/Five Letters subsequently spread elsewhere, including to the UK where the Three/Five Letters were used by the dubiously named “Get Out Of Debt Free” OPCA website to purportedly eliminate debts: Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky

[113] Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 16 lists numerous Canadian cases where OPCA litigants have deployed the Three/Five Letters. It never worked. Associate Chief Justice Rooke concluded at para 21 that this scheme is so notoriously false, and has been rejected so often by Canadian courts, that when someone employs the Three/Five Letters that: ... as a principle of law, when a court or government actor encounters a person who claims that they have obtained a binding result as a consequence of a Three/Five Letters process, then the court or government actor may presume that deployment of the Three/Five Letters argument is proof that the person using these concepts is engaged in a vexatious, abusive argument, and does so for an improper and ulterior purpose. That reverses the onus of proof, so that it is up to the OPCA litigant who has advanced the Three/Five Letters to prove their action, complaint, or defence is not vexatious and an abuse of court processes. 

08 March 2023

Rights

The national Human Rights Commission has released a Human Rights Act Position Paper that: 

• identifies the gaps in Australia’s current framework and makes the case for a federal Human Rights Act (Chapters 2 and 3) 

• outlines the Commission’s proposed model for a Human Rights Act (Chapters 4 to 12) 

• considers existing parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms and improvements that can be made with the introduction of a Human Rights Act (in Chapter 13) 

• focuses on the role of Commission and the enhanced contributions the Commission can make to promoting and protecting human rights in the light of a federal Human Rights Act (Chapter 14) 

The Paper states

Why Australia needs a Human Rights Act 

• Australia does not adequately protect human rights at the present time xx Australia has a patchwork legal framework of human rights protection. The rights that are protected are located in scattered pieces of legislation, the Constitution and the common law. It is incomplete and piecemeal. xx The Australian Constitution offers only limited protection for a small number of discrete human rights. This includes the implied right to freedom of political communication; and a prohibition on making federal laws that establish a religion, impose a religious observance or prohibit the free exercise of any religion. The High Court has rejected suggestions that other basic rights, like the right to equality, are implied by the text of the Constitution. xx The common law recognises a number of rights and freedoms. The common law protects human rights indirectly through statutory interpretation principles such as the ‘principle of legality’, which presumes that Parliament ‘does not intend to interfere with common law rights and freedoms except by clear and unequivocal language’. However, common law protections are fragile, as Parliament can pass a law that overrides them at any time. xx While Parliamentary scrutiny measures enable some consideration of human rights during the law-making process, these measures alone have not resulted in an embedded human rights culture within Parliament. Parliament routinely passes laws that are not human rights compliant. While discrimination laws implement key aspects of the international treaties Australia has ratified, they are only a partial implementation of them, with many key international rights finding no corresponding federal protections. xx Human Rights Acts have been passed in Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and, most recently, Queensland. The lack of an overarching federal instrument means that a person’s access to rights protections is wholly contingent on where they live. xx The Commission’s ability to resolve human rights complaints can be very limited. Unlike complaints alleging unlawful discrimination, if the Commission cannot conciliate a human rights complaint, the person cannot then bring court proceedings, nor obtain any enforceable remedies. UN Treaty bodies have repeatedly concluded that core treaties have not been adequately incorporated into Australia’s legal system. Many of Australia’s commitments to human rights are confined to rhetoric without corresponding domestic protections. xx The need for a Human Rights Act can be summed up in one simple statement: people’s human rights matter all of the time. Government that is here to serve the people, should consider their impact on people whenever they make decisions. 

• The current rights framework in Australia is not easily explainable, or readily comprehensible, to all people in Australia. xx The above patchwork of rights is difficult to explain to everyday Australians, whose rights are meant to be protected. Not only should the law afford appropriate protection to the people of Australia, but it should be capable of being understood by all. 

• A Human Rights Act for Australia is an evolution not a revolution Human Rights Acts have been passed in three states and territories in Australia and been in operation since 2004. Throughout this paper there are references to case studies of how a Human Rights Act has made a positive difference to the protection of human rights in these jurisdictions, as well as in the multiple countries that have introduced such legislation over the past 20 years. xx The proposed model for a federal Human Rights Act builds on the success and lessons from these existing models, while also tailoring a Human Rights Act to the specific constitutional requirements of Australia. xx The proposed model for a Human Rights Act set out in this paper also seeks to build on the lessons from the Australian Human Rights Commission having administered a human rights and ILO 111 complaints handling stream under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) since 1986. There are deficiencies to how these complaint processes operate, which limit their effectiveness. In the Commission’s model for a Human Rights Act, these existing human rights complaint streams would be replaced with a much clearer set of rights in the Human Rights Act. By learning from the lessons of other models, and building on the legacy of the AHRC Act processes that have been in domestic law for 36 years, the Commission’s proposal for a Human Rights Act is an evolution not a revolution.xx

The Commission proposes, in summary, 

Federal policy-makers and decision-makers 

Government, administrators and public service providers would be required to consider human rights and to act in accordance with human rights when making policy or decisions that affect individual lives. They would have to consult with the people who would be directly or disproportionately affected by policies or laws, especially First Nations people, children, and people with disability. 

Federal law-makers 

Parliament would be required to place greater priority on the human rights impacts of all new proposed laws. 

Federal courts 

Courts would be required to interpret legislation, where possible, in a way that is consistent with human rights. However, courts would not have the power to strike down laws for not being compatible with human rights. 

Limitations on human rights 

Limitations could be placed on some human rights in certain circumstances. For example, it might be necessary to balance the right to freedom of expression with the right to privacy, or the right to access information with national security interests. 

When deciding whether to pass a new law that limits human rights, Parliament would have to consider whether the proposed limitation is proportionate. For example, any limitation on individual rights would need to be reasonable and necessary to achieve an important public interest and be put in place for the shortest time possible. 

Complaints 

Individuals who consider that their human rights have been breached would have the option of making a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission. A complaint could proceed to conciliation, a facilitated process for the parties to seek a resolution on their own terms. 

Access to the court for a remedy 

If a complaint about human rights cannot be resolved through conciliation, then the individual would have the option of taking the complaint to the relevant federal court. The court could provide remedies such as preventing government from taking an action that would breach human rights, or ordering government to pay compensation.

05 March 2023

Thinking?

'Talking About Large Language Models' by Murray Shanahan offers a useful caution amid much of the academic over-excitement regarding ChatGPT. 

Shanahan states 

 Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as “knows”, “believes”, and “thinks”, when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere. ... 

The advent of large language models (LLMs) such as Bert (Devlin et al., 2018) and GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019) was a game-changer for artificial intelligence. Based on transformer architectures (Vaswani et al., 2017), comprising hundreds of billions of parameters, and trained on hundreds of terabytes of textual data, their contemporary successors such as GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020), Gopher (Rae et al., 2021), and PaLM (Chowdhery et al., 2022) have given new meaning to the phrase “unreasonable effectiveness of data” (Halevy et al., 2009). 

The effectiveness of these models is “unreasonable” (or, with the benefit of hindsight, somewhat surprising) in three inter-related ways. 

First, the performance of LLMs on benchmarks scales with the size of the training set (and, to a lesser degree with model size). Second, there are qualitative leaps in capability as the models scale. Third, a great many tasks that demand intelligence in humans can be reduced to next token prediction with a sufficiently performant model. It is the last of these three surprises that is the focus of the present paper. 

As we build systems whose capabilities more and more resemble those of humans, despite the fact that those systems work in ways that are fundamentally different from the way humans work, it becomes increasingly tempting to anthropomorphise them. Humans have evolved to co-exist over many millions of years, and human culture has evolved over thousands of years to facilitate this co-existence, which ensures a degree of mutual understanding. But it is a serious mistake to unreflectingly apply to AI systems the same intuitions that we deploy in our dealings with each other, especially when those systems are so profoundly different from humans in their underlying operation. 

The AI systems we are building today have considerable utility and enormous commercial potential, which imposes on us a great responsibility. To ensure that we can make informed decisions about the trustworthiness and safety of the AI systems we deploy, it is advisable to keep to the fore the way those systems actually work, and thereby to avoid imputing to them capacities they lack, while making the best use of the remarkable capabilities they genuinely possess.

Trade

'Cross-border data flows and privacy in global trade law: has trade trumped data protection?' by Mira Burri in (2023) 39(1) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 85–97 comments 

This article is set against the complex backdrop of the evolution of the data-driven economy and its regulation, and seeks to provide a better contextualization of the topic of data protection as a matter of trade law. It looks at the recent proliferation of rules on data flows, specifically addressed in free trade agreements (FTAs), at how data protection has been framed in these treaties, as well as at the available reconciliation mechanisms developed to interface trade and privacy. The article explores the most advanced models that have been developed in this regard so far, with a focus on some US-led and EU-led treaties. These analyses build the basis for testing the conjecture as to whether trade law has gone too fast and too deep, encroaching on domestic privacy law developments that unfold at a much slower pace.

Burri states 

Legal adaptation in the face of technological advances, including in the area of trade law, is not necessarily a new topic. This is true also for digital technologies as, on the one hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership realized fairly early on with the 1998 Work Programme on Electronic Commerce that all areas of trade are deeply affected by the Internet and changes in the existing rules for trade in goods, trade in services, as well as those for the protection of intellectual property (IP) rights, may be needed. On the other hand, this acknowledgment has been accompanied by a host of studies that explored where such changes are most urgent and what they might look like, as well as considering their political feasibility. Yet, it is fair to note that this dual mobilization of policy and scholarship was based on a wave of technological changes that were still, so to speak, at level 2.0, where the Internet was seen as a mere platform enabling the online sale of services and goods, often framed under ‘e-commerce’, but failed to recognize the disruptive potential of the Internet as a general purpose technology (GPT) with far-reaching spillover effects. With the changing conditions of trade and the emergence of global value chains (GVCs), intensified convergence, and servicification, these effects did become palpable and were considered by a series of later studies. Yet, the centrality of data remained largely ignored, as their embeddedness in the economy and their profound societal effects were at an early stage. It is only recently, with the advent of the so-called ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, that the impact of data across all sectors of the economy and the disruptive character of digitization were fully acknowledged. And it is only in very recent times, with the shaping of Big Data and artificial intelligence (AI) as distinct new phenomena, that both policy and academic circles, not exclusively in the area of trade, recognized the need for a change in legal design that goes beyond plain adjustments. 

These later stages exposed also in a new way the link between digital trade, or data-enabled/driven trade, and privacy protection, and their regulation became intensely contested. Previously privacy and trade law were rarely connected and nor has their interface been addressed in the legal frameworks. While there has been a robust scholarly and policy debate on the impact of the ‘hard’ rules of international economic law on non-economic interests, privacy has seldom been one of the major concerns. The new field of contestation was defined by the increased value of data and the affordances of Big Data and Big Data analytics. In this context, there is now broad agreement that data are so essential to economic processes that they are commonly said to be the ‘new oil’. Many studies have revealed the vast potential of data, and the dependence of new and emerging technologies, like AI, on data. 

Yet, this increased dependence on data brought about a new set of concerns. The impact of data collection, use, and re-use upon privacy was particularly recognized by scholars and policy-makers. These challenges triggered a new preoccupation for law-makers and led to reform of data protection laws around the world, best exemplified by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The reform initiatives are, however, not coherent and are culturally and socially embedded, reflecting societies’ understandings of constitutional values, relationships between citizens and the state, and the role of the market, as illustrated later on by a reference to the US and EU’s approaches to data protection. 

The tensions around data have also revived older questions about sovereignty and international cooperation in cyberspace. Data’s intangibility and pervasiveness pose particular difficulties for determining where data are located, as bits of data, even those associated with a single transaction or online activity, can be located anywhere. With the increased value of data and the associated risks and because of the contentious jurisdictional issues, governments have proactively sought new ways to assert control over them—in particular by prescribing diverse measures that ‘localize’ the data, their storage or suppliers, so as to keep them within the state’s sovereign space. Erecting barriers to data flows has, however, serious implications for trade and brings about a tension between data protectionism and data sovereignty and the inherent to trade agreements striving to liberalize trade, foster growth, and innovation. 

Overall, with the amplified role of data in societies, the interfaces between trade and privacy protection have become multiple and intensified. They raise important questions as to adequate regulatory design that can reconcile economic and non-economic concerns, national and international interests. This article is set against this complex backdrop and seeks to provide a better understanding and contextualization of the topic of data protection as a matter of trade law. It looks at the recent proliferation of rules on data flows, specifically addressed in free trade agreements (FTAs), at how data protection has been framed in these treaties as well as at the available reconciliation (or escape) mechanisms developed to interface trade and privacy. The article explores the most advanced models that have been developed in this regard so far, with a focus on some US-led and EU-led treaties. These analyses build the basis for testing the conjecture as to whether trade law has gone too fast and too deep encroaching on domestic privacy law developments that unfold at a much slower pace.

Electrification

'The rise and stall of world electricity efficiency: 1900–2017, results and insights for the renewables transition' by Ricardo Pinto, Sofia T Henriques, Paul E Brockway, Matthew Kuperus Heun and Tânia Sousa in (2023) 269 Energy comments 

In the coming renewables-based energy transition, global electricity consumption is expected to double by 2050, entailing widespread end-use electrification, with significant impacts on energy efficiency. We develop a long-run, worldwide societal exergy analysis focused on electricity. Our 1900–2017 electricity world database contains the energy carriers used in electricity production, final end-uses, and efficiencies. We find world primary-to-final exergy (i.e. conversion) efficiency increased rapidly from 1900 (6%) to 1980 (39%), slowing to 43% in 2017 as power station generation technology matured. Next, despite technological evolution, final-to-useful end-use efficiency was surprisingly constant (∼48%), due to “efficiency dilution”, wherein individual end-use efficiency gains are offset by increasing uptake of less efficient end uses. Future electricity efficiency therefore depends on the shares of high efficiency (e.g. electrified transport) and low efficiency (e.g. cooling and low temperature heating) end uses. Our results reveal past conversion efficiency increases (carbon intensity of electricity production reduced from 5.23 kgCO2/kWh in 1900 to 0.49 kgCO2/kWh in 2017) did little to decrease global electricity-based CO2 emissions, which rose 380-fold. The historical slow-pace of transition in generation mix and the need to electrify end-uses suggest that strong incentives are needed to meet climate goals.