Governance

The Tasmanian Legislative Council Select Committee final report on provisions of the University of Tasmania Act 1992 (Tas) touches - gingerly - on systemic problems in institutional governance that are evident in other Australian universities. 

The Committee made an overarching recommendation -

 As a priority, the Government conduct a comprehensive review of the University of Tasmania Act 1992, including matters specified in recommendations in this report, and promptly legislate the results of that review. 

It goes on to make 19 recommendations: 

 1. The Act be amended to include a preamble. 

2. The Act be amended to provide for casual staff to be included in the constitution of the University. 

3. Section 6 of the Act be reviewed and amended to ensure contemporary and appropriate functions are included. 

4. Consider a mechanism to assess the performance of the University against the functions in Section 6 of the Act. 

5. The Act be amended to establish restrictions or prohibitions on the disposal or long-term lease of land that has been granted to the University by the Crown, land purchased with public money, or Crown land. 

6. The Act be amended to provide for the constitution of the University Council to include a minimum of two student members, with at least one elected from the student body. 

7. The Act be amended to provide for the constitution of the University Council to include a minimum of two members of the academic staff elected by the academic staff. 

8. The Act be amended to provide for the constitution of the University Council to include a minimum of two members of the professional staff elected by the professional staff. 

9. The Act be amended to ensure there is more balance between the number of appointed and elected members on the University Council. 

10. The Act be amended to clarify the purpose and function of Ministerial appointments to the University Council. 

11. The Act be amended to ensure when considering the best interests of the University, University Council must explicitly include consideration of the University’s obligations to the Tasmanian community. 

12. The Act be amended to prescribe key requirements for the constitution and method of appointment of the Academic Senate, to ensure a higher proportion of academic representatives rather than managerial appointments and fewer ex officio appointments. 

13. The Act be amended to prescribe the functions of the Academic Senate to include a determinative role on core academic matters. 

14. Amend the Act in relation to annual reporting by the University, including: a. more specific detail on what the Annual Report is required to contain in relation to income and expenditure; b. a requirement to report on the delivery of the functions of the University; c. a requirement to include detail of all salaries, remuneration and fringe benefits for executive management roles at the University; and d. a requirement for more timely tabling of the University’s annual report in Parliament. 

15. In addition to the Annual Report, include a requirement in the Act for the University to produce: a. an annual corporate plan to be published at the beginning of the year; and b. an annual Environment, Society and Governance (ESG) report. 

16. Review Section 7(2) of the Act to retain Treasurer’s approval for University borrowings and ensure it reflects contemporary borrowing and borrowing-like arrangements. 

17. Consider formalising processes for regular Parliamentary scrutiny of the University, including: a. The Annual Report b. The annual corporate plan c. Major infrastructure projects 

18. The Act be amended to include a requirement to protect and promote academic freedom. 

19. The Joint Standing Committee on Integrity consider an inquiry into the performance of the Integrity Commission and the Ombudsman in relation to complaints regarding the University of Tasmania.

The recommendations reflect a range of findings -

 1. The original University of Tasmania Act 1889 contained a preamble which was removed in 1951. 

2. There is broad support for reinstating a preamble in the Act. 

3. The Dawkins reforms of the 1980s, and various reforms since, have resulted in significant changes to funding models, leading to corporatisation of the Australian higher education system. 

4. With increased corporatisation, it is important universities achieve an appropriate balance between being a public institution and generating funds. There is a need for greater independent scrutiny, transparency and accountability to ensure this balance is being achieved. 

5. Concern was expressed that the University appears to prioritise commercial over community interests in its core functions, with a significant focus on corporatisation, which undermines the University’s core role and identity.  

6. The University considers the current Act constitutes its membership as the active, living, collegial community engaged in the University's tasks of learning, teaching and research. The University is to serve and be accountable to these members. 

7. Section 3 of the Act does not include casual staff in the definition of academic and professional staff, therefore in Section 5 of the Act causal staff are not included in the constitution of the University. 

8. Witnesses pointed to inconsistencies between membership of the University and representation on the University Council. 

9. The Committee received evidence of a perception the University has deviated from its core functions of education and research specified in Section 6 of the Act, and has shifted to a more commercial focus. 

10. The University does not consider commercial activity should be prescribed as a function of the University in the Act. 

11. The University recognises the physical, educational and financial barriers that impact access to higher education in Tasmania and outlined a number of measures to assist in overcoming these barriers, with regard to principles of merit and equity. 

12. There is an opportunity to review Section 6 of the Act to ensure the functions of the University as prescribed are contemporary and appropriate, and provide a basis for accountability of governance and decision-making. 

13. Calls were made for regular independent review of the University to provide greater accountability in relation to delivering on the functions in the Act. 

14. There is a perception that the exercise of the powers outlined in Section 7 are not required to be accountable to the functions prescribed in Section 6. 

15. There is a perception that there is not an explicit relationship between the exercise of the powers outlined in Section 7 to the functions prescribed in Section 6. 

16. Section 7(1) provides for the University to exercise its powers “both in Tasmania and elsewhere, all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its functions.” 

17. The powers prescribed in Section 7 of the Act are comparable to those provided for in the acts of other universities. 

18. When the 1992 Act was passed by Parliament, the Hansard does not include any discussion of the intent or purpose of removing restrictions on the disposal of the land vested to the University in Sandy Bay (as specified in Schedule 3 of the Act). 

19. In removing restrictions on the disposal of vested land in the 1992 Act, it is not clear whether the wholesale disposal of the Sandy Bay campus was contemplated. 

20. Evidence provided to the Committee raised concerns about the absence of restrictions in the Act on the power of the University to dispose of the vested land in Sandy Bay. 

21. The University regards the powers under the Act are appropriate and necessary in order to manage the financial position of the University and deliver its functions in a challenging funding environment. 

22. Australian public universities operate on land that has been granted to them by the Crown, land purchased with public money, or Crown land. All the public universities in the Australian States – except for the University of Tasmania – are subject to legislative restrictions or prohibitions on the selling or dealing with land. 

23. Since the University was established in 1889, there have been several changes to the governance structures prescribed in the Act. 

24. The Act was reformed in 2001, reducing the membership of the University Council from 24 to 17, as a response to the Federal Government’s drive to reform governance of Australian universities. 

25. The Act was further reformed in 2004 aligning membership appointments with the national governance protocols, reducing the size of the University Council to operate with a minimum operating level of 10 members and maximum of 14. 

26. The Act exists as part of a complex framework and legislation that regulates public universities in Australia, including the TEQSA act and its subordinate legislation. 

27. Witnesses identified there was a need for balance between managerial leadership and academic leadership in the dual governance model employed by modern universities. 

28. Witnesses expressed a view that values of managerialism can be inconsistent with the values of academic decision-making. 

29. In response to national reforms and consistent with national trends, the Act has been amended in 2001, 2004 and 2012, decreasing the size and changing the composition of the University Council. The number of members on Council is consistent with other Australian universities, albeit at the lower end of the range. 

30. By national standards, the proportion of elected staff and student positions on University Council is low compared to other Australian universities and concerns were raised that this decrease has resulted in reduced democratic representation on University Council. 

31. There are contested views on the Act’s current requirements regarding the constitution of the University Council. 

32. Concerns were expressed regarding the lack of academic staff and professional staff representation on University Council and witnesses called for an increase in the number of these positions. 

33. University governing bodies across the sector typically have two student members, with at least one elected by the student body. 

34. Under previous iterations of the Act, the student member on the University Council was elected by the student body, via a process designed by the Tasmanian University Union. 

35. While previously an elected position, currently the Act prescribes that the University Council appoints a student member to Council after consultation with relevant student associations. It is unclear whether the Act requires University Council to consult those associations on reappointment of student members. 

36. Under Section 8 of the Act, the number of members appointed to the University Council may be up to four times the number of members elected to the Council. 

37. Concerns were raised that the high proportion of members appointed to the University Council has resulted the development of a self-perpetuating culture, a lack of vigorous debate or dissenting views, and a tendency for ‘group think’ in Council decision-making. 

38. While the Act prescribes two Council members are appointed by the Minister, there is no requirement for, or practice of, those members maintaining a relationship with, or providing reports to the Minister. 

39. The Act prescribes the Minister appoints two Council members, however provides no guidance or requirements regarding the purpose or function of those appointments, as distinct from positions appointed through other means under the Act. 

40. When recruiting for vacant positions, the University Council uses a skills and attributes matrix to identify the expertise required to ensure an appropriate and ongoing balance of skills among members of Council. Recruitment for vacant Council positions is then publicly advertised. 

41. Historically, the University Council included a position for two members of Parliament, however these positions were removed when the Act was amended in 2001. No dedicated positions for members of Parliament are prescribed under legislation for any Australian university council. 

42. Concerns were raised regarding the level of accountability of University Council under the Act, in particular the lack of accountability to the wider community which constitutes the University or the broader Tasmanian community it serves. 

43. Evidence suggested there is potential for conflict under the Act between the University Council’s consideration of ‘the best interest of the university’ and the overarching function of the University to ‘promote the social, cultural and economic welfare of the community and make available for those purposes the resources of the university’. It is unclear how such a conflict should be resolved. 

44. The Act prescribes the overarching function of the Academic Senate to advise the University Council on all academic matters relating to the university, while the constitution, functions, powers and proceedings are specified in Ordinance. 

45. The University considers Academic Senate membership is best prescribed by ordinance rather than by the Act, as it allows for the necessary flexibility in membership, function and proceedings. 

46. Concerns were raised regarding the membership of the Academic Senate, including: a) b) c) a significant number of ex officio appointments; a majority of members are in upper-level management roles; elected members are a minority; and d) a small proportion of members being senior academic staff actively engaged in significant teaching and research. 

47. Concerns were expressed the Academic Senate is not constituted in a way which allows members to give frank and fearless advice, with a perception that the Senate is under the control of the executive management due to the top-down managerial structure and direct reporting lines. 

48. Concerns were expressed that Academic Senate membership does not adequately represent the views of staff and students, and that academic decision-making is being undertaken by those with managerial rather than academic roles. 

49. Concerns were expressed that the Academic Senate lacks genuine decision-making power, and instead performs a ‘rubber stamp’ function. 

50. The Chair of the Academic Senate acknowledged evidence received by this Inquiry and outlined changes made to the operations of the Senate in response, including: a) b) management now seeks exploratory feedback on new policies or initiatives; the establishment of a new monitoring and assurance committee (5 academic staff representatives and 1 student representative) to increase input from academic staff who are not currently in management roles; and c) recognition that student voice needs to be included in academic governance. 

51. The Act does not include any requirements to ensure accountability of executive decision- making. 

52. Concerns were expressed regarding inadequate consultation with staff and students in executive decision-making processes, resulting in a detrimental impact on staff and student experience and outcomes. 

53. The University has a Guide to Decision Making, however there does not appear to be a formal policy requiring consultation, nor does the Act contain a requirement for consultation in decision-making. 

54. Under the Commonwealth Funding model, the University must generate independent sources of revenue and funding in order to deliver core activities. 

55. Compared to other Australian universities, remuneration for the University Vice- Chancellor is above the median, however remuneration for academic and professional staff is at the lower end of the range. 

56. While it is not necessarily appropriate to legislate to limit or direct the remuneration of executive management at the University, greater scrutiny and accountability for these decisions is desirable. 

57. The Act’s requirement that the Annual Report contain ‘a full account of the income and expenditure of the University for the financial year to which it relates’ (Section 12(2)), does not ensure an appropriate and accountable level of detail in the report. 

58. As the Act allows 6 months after the end of the financial year for the Annual Report to be provided to the Governor, and 10 sitting days beyond that for the Minister to table it in Parliament, Annual Reports have commonly been tabled up to 8 months after the end of the financial year. 

59. In addition to the Annual Report, a corporate plan published at the beginning of the year would provide a further mechanism for transparency and accountability. 

60. The University has indicated a willingness to consider opportunities for more detailed and transparent financial reporting. 

61. The University has indicated a willingness to produce an Environment, Society and Governance (ESG) Report to provide accountability for key non-financial obligations. 

62. The Act prescribes a role for the University that directly references the broader Tasmanian community (Section 6(g)), however there is no requirement for accountability to the community in the delivery of that role. 

63. The Civic Universities Movement is a response by universities internationally to develop more explicit partnerships with their communities to address recognised challenges. 

64. While the Act requires Treasurer’s approval for University borrowings, the University has other borrowing-like arrangements that are not captured by this requirement. 

65. There is a lack of clarity on the relationship between the University and the State’s respective financial positions. 

66. The University has been established under statute, therefore it should be accountable to the Tasmanian public through the Parliament. 

67. The relationship between the University and State Parliament has changed over time, with fewer formal connections and a lack of active scrutiny. 

68. The reduction in connection over time between the University and the State Parliament has led to missed opportunities to identify and proactively address issues as they have arisen. 

69. While some Australian states have a Minister for Higher Education, the Tasmanian government does not include this as an explicit portfolio responsibility. 

70. While the University is a publicly-funded institution, there is no external scrutiny processes of its major infrastructure expenditure. 

71. The University considers academic freedom to be a fundamental value of a university, and that it is protected by its academic freedom and free speech policy. 

72. The University of Tasmania Act 1992 does not specifically include reference to academic freedom, independence and autonomy, which is consistent with legislation establishing many other Australian universities. 

73. Academic freedom is supported under the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency and legislation such as the Higher Education Support Act 2003. 

74. The protection of academic freedom in policy does not provide the same level of protection as an enforceable requirement in legislation. 

75. There are conflicting views on whether it is necessary to protect academic freedom through inclusion in the University of Tasmania Act 1992. 

76. It was reported that managerial bullying and workplace culture issues have led to reluctance within the university workforce to speak out or criticise management for fear of reprisal. 

77. Casualisation of the University workforce and associated lack of job security has contributed to a reluctance to speak out or criticise management. 

78. The use of gagging clauses (including non- disclosure agreements and non-disparagement clauses) functions to reduce public criticism of the University by former staff. 

79. The University’s complaint management mechanism, the Safe and Fair Communities Unit, is not considered by some staff and students to be a reliable, safe or independent means to seek redress for managerial bullying. 

80. Currently, in relation to the University of Tasmania, the Tasmanian Ombudsman has a statutory role for administrative complaints and the Tasmanian Integrity Commission has a statutory role for misconduct complaints.  

81. There is a lack of confidence in the internal University and external statutory complaint handling and dispute resolution processes. 

82. The University needs to be mindful of its performance and ranking in order to continue to attract domestic and international students, and maintain the quality and rigour of its academic staff and research outputs. 

83. It is challenging for a relatively small, state-wide university located across multiple regional and capital city campuses to maximise student access while also maintaining teaching and research of a high quality. 

84. A regional presence is important to encourage student access to higher education, as well as providing the opportunity for the University to respond more effectively to skills needs state-wide. 

85. There is an apparent reduction in the degree to which the University values its art, cultural, heritage and scientific collections, and a reduction in the provision of public lectures, music and theatre performances. 

86. The Alumni Advisory Committee was inactive from 2017 to 2023, and there appears to have been no similarly structured mechanism for engagement of alumni and advice to the University. 

87. A lack of opportunity for Alumni to be engaged and involved in the University risks diminishing support for the University, including financial contributions such as donations and bequests. 

88. In 2018, the independently incorporated University Foundation was dissolved and the University Foundation Committee of the Council was established. Concerns were raised that this would result in a lack of transparency in relation to bequests and philanthropic ddonations

Neurotech

'Neurotechnologies and human rights: restating and reaffirming the multi-layered protection of the person' by Christoph Bublitz in (2024) 28(5) The International Journal of Human Rights 782 comments

Advances in neuroscience and neurotechnology and the significant powers they confer over minds and bodies of persons have given rise to grave concerns and caught the attention of lawmakers, ethicists, international organisations, and the human rights community. Following recent reports and statements by the OECD, the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC), the Interamerican Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States (IJC), the Council of Europe and the European Parliament which highlight a range of threats to human rights posed by neurotechnologies, the UN Human Rights Council requested its Advisory Committee to prepare a comprehensive study on the topic. The IBC recommends, among other measures, to further develop the interpretation of existing rights and ‘the adaptation of existing human rights instruments and the proclamation of new human rights’, e.g. in a new ‘Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Neurotechnology’. Heeding the recommendation, UNESCO has started to develop the first global standard-setting document on the ethics of neurotechnologies, and the idea about a subsequent binding international treaty is in the air. 

Current interest in neurotechnologies arises from their potential to affect central characteristics of persons such as altering their thoughts and feelings, their bodily and mental capacities, their memories or personalities, as well as the technology’s potential to reveal and expose supposedly private aspects of the human mind. The technology develops fast, increasingly implements machine learning methods (Artificial Intelligence, AI), and is driven by start-ups with significant investments by venture capital. More and more products become mature for market release as medical or consumer devices. The attention of the UN, human rights and regulatory agencies is thus timely and warranted. A key topic in the aforementioned reports, crucial for policy and regulatory activities, is the worry that current human rights law might be insufficient to protect persons against many conceivable attacks with the help of neurotechnologies. In this vein, some scholars and neuroscientists have suggested that human rights law has substantive gaps that require closing by the introduction of novel human rights, so called ‘neurorights’, which has become a summary term for novel but vague rights that apply to neurotechnologies. The call for novel rights is grounded in a narrative of deficiency of existing rights. But whether this narrative is persuasive and whether current law indeed leaves substantial gaps that require closing is an open question. Although it is logically prior to the call for novel rights, it has not received thorough examination from neurorights advocates or legal scholars. Providing an analysis of how established human rights relate to neurotechnological challenges is the aim of the following. 

Contrary to the narrative of the deficiency of established rights, the analysis will show that reasonably constructed, established rights provide a nuanced multi-layered protection of the person, including her mind, against virtually all conceivable threats by neurotechnologies. More concretely, it will be argued that all worrisome uses of neurotechnologies either interfere with the rights to bodily and mental integrity or the right to privacy. In addition, severe interferences may affect the right to freedom of thought or human dignity. As not all of these rights have been fully examined by human rights scholarship, tentative definitions will be proposed. that render them, especially the nascent right to mental integrity and the long-established yet practically irrelevant freedom of thought, applicable to neurotechnological challenges. Moreover, the paper will offer four readings of human dignity that may inform further interpretations of specific rights and revolve around the idea of protecting individuals as persons and subjects, respecting their subjectivity while rejecting their objectification. In sum, this analysis restates existing rights and reaffirms their applicability to neurotechnologies; it demonstrates the adaptability of established rights to novel circumstances without contravening the text of provisions or the spirit of instruments; on the contrary, it makes explicit the multi-layered protection of the person that is deeply entrenched in core instruments. Accordingly, considerable gaps in the protection of the person at the level of generality of human rights that require closing by novel rights are not evident. Instead, novel technologies invite and require the actualisation and specification of existing guarantees. 

Whether these proposed constructions of rights will stand the test of time and be accepted by courts of course remains to be seen. Real case material does not exist yet, and in its absence, only an abstract anticipatory analysis of the scope and limits of rights is possible. It must leave out the many context-specific considerations that may arise in the many conceivable cases in which neurotechnologies may affect persons. The argument in the following lies on a different plane, it argues that defining features of the modus operandi of neurotechnologies makes any worrisome use of them fall under the ambit of established rights. The proposed constructions of rights may guide courts and policymakers, inspire rightholders to invoke them in legal proceedings, and redirect the current discourse about novel rights by debunking its premise of the deficiency of existing rights.

Doctorates

The Universities Australia and Australian Council of Graduate Research report 'Investing in PhD candidates in Australia' states 

Current risks to Australia’s research workforce 

Despite an increase in domestic PhD completions by 41 per cent from 2000 to 2023, enrolment has declined by 8 per cent from 2018 to 2023, highlighting a concerning trend amid growing population demands. At the same time, there is a significant pool of potential PhD candidates due to a 195 per cent increase in Honours degree completions since 2003. Addressing these challenges requires targeted financial support and structural reforms to make PhD study more feasible for both domestic and international students. 

The profile of Australia’s PhD candidates in 2024 

The typical PhD candidate in Australia is often older than expected, with an average commencement age of 34, bringing valuable work experience to their studies. Many candidates, especially women, pursue their studies part-time, balancing responsibilities that often extend beyond academia. This diversity in backgrounds and life stages enriches their research, but it also presents additional financial challenges, especially with limited access to government support.

Barriers to PhD study 

A strong job market, inadequate financial support and insecure employment prospects in academia have deterred many domestic candidates from pursuing PhDs. Cost-of-living pressures, coupled with the low base stipend ($32,192 in 2024, barely above the poverty line) are significant obstacles for potential candidates, particularly those with dependents or prior financial commitments. Additionally, PhD candidates are excluded from key government benefits like Parental Leave Pay, adding to the financial burden.  

International PhD candidates’ contributions and constraints 

International PhD candidates are essential to Australia’s research and development workforce, addressing critical shortages in fields such as engineering and information technology. However, the 10 per cent cap on international PhD candidates within the Research Training Program (RTP) limits the potential for more international students, particularly impacting regional universities that benefit from the population and cultural diversity brought by international students. The current model often requires universities to find alternate funding sources for these candidates — a challenge for smaller institutions. 

Urgent reforms needed: increasing the stipend and adding flexibility 

Universities Australia and the Australian Council of Graduate Research have long advocated for increasing PhD stipends — a need that has become urgent with the rising cost of living. Raising the RTP stipend would allow PhD candidates to focus on research and reduce financial barriers, thereby promoting equity and diversity in the PhD landscape. While universities can theoretically increase stipends, doing so without a larger RTP budget reduces the number of scholarships available. 

Additionally, RTP indexing lags behind inflation, leaving current stipends inadequate. In response, Universities Australia has previously recommended increasing the base stipend to $35,000 in 2025, along with an expanded RTP funding pool to maintain the number of scholarships. A more flexible RTP cap on international students would also allow universities to attract talent aligned with Australia’s research priorities. Noting that this recommendation was not delivered in the 2024–25 Budget, we now recommend a 2026 base rate of $36,000, estimating that this would cost the Government approximately $300 million over four years (an increase of just 5.8 per cent over current program funding). 

The need for Australian PhD graduates 

Australia’s PhD graduates are crucial for meeting research needs beyond academia, with many pursuing careers in industry, government and healthcare. The skills acquired through PhD programs — such as advanced research, problem-solving and analytical capabilities — are highly valuable across various sectors. PhD graduates are equipped to contribute to policy-making, enhance public services and address pressing challenges, reinforcing their relevance to Australia’s workforce and economic growth. 

Recommendations for reforms 

To secure Australia’s research future, we recommend: 

1. Financial support and equity measures for domestic PhD candidates — $300 million over four years1 • increase the minimum stipend to a sustainable level aligned with the cost of living, with regular indexation. • expand the RTP funding pool to cover the increased stipend while maintaining the number of domestic candidates. • extend eligibility for government-funded parental leave to PhD candidates. • remove taxation on part-time stipend scholarships to ease financial burdens. 

2. Enhanced support for international PhD candidates • raise the RTP funding cap for international students from 10 per cent to 20 per cent, especially for regions with critical workforce needs (no cost to Government). • increase the RTP funding pool to support additional international candidates without compromising the number of domestic candidates. (up to approx. $500 million over four years). These reforms will create a more resilient research workforce by improving access to PhD programs for top domestic and international talent, supporting Australia’s standing as a leader in research and contributing to national workforce and economic needs.

Current risks to Australia’s future research workforce 

Over the past two decades, domestic PhD completions have increased by 41 per cent, from 4,557 completions in 2000 to 6,447 in 2023, but this growth has not kept pace with the overall population growth of 41 per cent, or the 60 per cent growth in higher education enrolments. From 2018 to 2023, domestic PhD enrolments declined by 8 per cent (43,174 to 39,8012) even as the population grew by over 7 per cent. This decrease poses as a serious threat to Australia’s research and development capacity. 

At the same time, the number of Australian citizens or permanent residents eligible to commence a PhD is larger than ever before. There has been an 195 per cent increase in students completing Honours degrees (27,389 in 2021 compared to 9,297 in 2003), which are often a pathway to PhD programs. This indicates that there is a significant untapped pool of potential PhD candidates who could contribute to Australia’s research efforts with the right incentives. 

Universities

The 'Respect at Uni Interim Report' from the Australian Human Rights Commission states 

 The Australian Government Department of Education (DoE) has engaged the Commission to undertake a groundbreaking study into the prevalence, nature and impact of racism in Australian universities (the Study). The Race Discrimination Commissioner leads the Study. 

The Study aims to understand the prevalence, nature and experiences of racism at universities for both staff and students, at the individual and systemic level. At the conclusion of this work, the Commission will deliver comprehensive research findings and recommendations on how to effectively address and reduce racism, in all its forms, at universities. 

This interim report is the first deliverable of the Study. Its purpose is to outline how the Commission will undertake this work and provide initial insights that reflect stakeholder feedback, emerging themes and early issues for consideration. 

Part 1 provides an overview of the Study, its objectives, scope and deliverables. 

Part 2 is an environmental scan and analysis of recent developments in relation to racism in universities. 

Part 3 presents initial insights based on stakeholder feedback, expert advice, an environmental scan and desktop research. These initial insights have informed the Study’s research methodology. In its initial consultations, the Commission heard from First Nations and other negatively racialised staff and students that experiences of racism including antisemitism and Islamophobia are pervasive, and that systemic and structural racism is deeply entrenched within the university system. Themes emerging from consultation include the diverse nature of staff and student experiences of racism at universities, the dissatisfaction of staff and students with complaints mechanisms, the disjuncture between universities’ stated policies on racism and practice and the challenge of finding a common language and understanding around racism. 

Part 4 outlines the Study methodology and approach to data collection. Given the complexity of the research task, which involves investigation across all universities and various stakeholder groups, it is essential to establish a best practice approach that delivers cultural safety for surveys and fieldwork. The Interim Report will explain the crucial foundational work that underpins the success of the Study’s next phase. 

This Interim Report describes the establishment of the Study's governance and initial stakeholder engagement. Creating a solid conceptual framework, along with effective governance and stakeholder involvement, is essential for the success of the Study and the delivery of the Final Report. Achieving these foundations has been a top priority for the Commission. 

The Commission is undertaking this work with a strong commitment to anti- racism. The Study will centre lived experiences and perspectives, be designed and conducted through a trauma informed lens, facilitate cultural safety and will focus on the systemic nature of racism. 

Universities should foster a love of learning, challenge thinking and nurture talent. Underpinning this requires a culture of respect and inclusion and systems that enable safety and equality. Unfortunately, this is not the experience for all students and staff, with experiences of racism negatively impacting study and employment. 

Racism in universities is a long-standing problem, with research showing it is a persistent and systemic issue for students and staff from First Nations and other negatively racialised backgrounds. The broader socio-political context impacts the prevalence and patterns of racism in universities. First Nations communities experienced significant racism leading up to the Voice Referendum in 2023 and this has continued even following the result. 

Major world events also impact universities. Following the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel by Hamas and the Israeli response, there has been an increase in reported antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism. 

International students also report alarming levels of racism, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Racism in universities is certainly not a new problem, but action is long overdue. The severity of recent incidents of antisemitism and Islamophobia, combined with other experiences of racism across different groups, create an urgent need to act decisively. 

The first step in an effective response is a robust, evidence-based understanding of the issue. There is no comprehensive data collection of experiences of racism in universities and current evidence about prevalence is limited. The Australian Universities Accord recommended a Tertiary Education Racism Study. Recommendation 33 of the Australian Universities Accord Final Report, released on 25 February 2024, states:

That to contribute to making the tertiary education system as safe as possible for students and staff, the Australian Government conduct a study into the prevalence and impact of racism across the tertiary education system, on campus and online, guided by an expert committee with representation from a wide range of stakeholder groups, with the Australian Tertiary Education Commission tasked with leading the response and acting on the outcomes.

The DoE engaged the Commission to lead this Study. 

This groundbreaking Study will provide an independent, comprehensive analysis of the prevalence and impact of racism in universities. Given the lack of comprehensive data and evidence, this Study is critical to building understanding and developing concrete solutions. 

The Race Discrimination Commissioner leads the Study, with support from the DoE and the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD). The National Indigenous Australians Agency (NIAA) is also providing advice on issues related to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander staff and students. The DoE has allocated the Commission $2.5 million for the Study.

The interim report goes on to state

The Terms of Reference (Appendix I) outline the Study's objectives, scope, consultation, governance and timing. 

(a) Aim and objectives 

The Study will comprehensively investigate the prevalence and impact of racism in universities, establish a baseline of racism experiences and develop recommendations to create a safe, respectful and inclusive environment for all university students and staff. 

(b) Scope 

The Study has a wide-ranging scope and will identify prevalence and impact, including:

• The prevalence, nature and experiences of racism, including antisemitism and Islamophobia at universities for both staff and students at the individual and systemic levels. Universities with dual-sector operations that integrate higher education with vocational education and training (VET) are included in the scope of the Study. 

• Which cohorts of students and staff experience racism, including but not limited to the distinct incidences of antisemitism, Islamophobia and the experience of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, people from other negatively racialised backgrounds and international students. 

• The unique context and circumstances of racism for different groups of students and staff, including a specific focus on the experiences of Jewish, Muslim and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students and staff.

The Study will also conduct practical research to develop recommendations for the Government, universities and other relevant stakeholders to address racism and discrimination. 

(c) Research questions and approach 

The Study utilises a mixed methodology, combining quantitative and qualitative data from the survey analysis with qualitative data from survey responses, focus groups, interviews and roundtable discussions. The Terms of Reference establish the areas for inquiry and scope. These areas have been operationalised into specific research questions to guide research design:

• What is the prevalence, nature and impact of racism on university staff and students? 

• How do different cohorts of students and staff experience racism? • How effective are current responses to racism? 

• Do current responses sufficiently understand and provide targeted responses to the distinct experiences of different cohorts? 

• How can universities embed anti-racism into policy and practice? 

• What can we learn from national and international promising practice and prevention? 

• How can Government, universities and other stakeholders prevent racism and improve responses to racism?

The Study is designed with a strong commitment to anti-racism, including centring lived experiences and perspectives, trauma informed, facilitating cultural safety, intersectional and focusing on the systemic nature of racism. In addition, upholding privacy and ethical principles are also important components of the Study methodology. 

(d) Deliverables 

The Study deliverables will include:

• a robust survey instrument (and associated technical reports) for broader use across the tertiary education sector and as the basis for ongoing, longitudinal use in higher education 

• a comprehensive literature review 

• a report that includes Study findings and a series of recommendations for further work and/or action, for the Government and the university sector.

Conspiracism

'Conspiracy theory, anti-globalism, and the Freedom Convoy: The Great Reset and conspiracist delegitimation' byr Corey Robinson and Scott D. Watson in (2025) Review of International Studies comments

In this article, we analyse how anti-globalist conspiracy theories were mobilised online to delegitimise national authorities and policies designed to curb the Covid-19 pandemic in Canada. These conspiracy theories attacked the political authority underpinning public health measures and targeted purportedly ‘liberal’ policies and ‘globalist’ actors. Our case study examines the Freedom Convoy, a series of protests against Covid-19 vaccine mandates that began in Canada but inspired global demonstrations. The Freedom Convoy fostered and relied upon anti-globalist conspiracy theories, including the ‘Great Reset’ and ‘Great Replacement’, both of which posit a global conspiracy to erode national sovereignty and impose a ‘liberal’ international order. We investigate far-right social media commentary from 4chan’s Politically Incorrect imageboard /pol/, Infowars, and Rebel News, showing how conspiratorial claims were marshalled in alt-tech spaces. These narratives were used to delegitimise public health measures to combat Covid-19 and the Liberal Trudeau government by linking them to various ‘globalist’ forces. In exploring three mechanisms of delegitimation – externalisation, personification, and Othering – we argue that far-right movements like the Freedom Convoy, motivated by anti-globalist conspiracism, mobilise the international realm by leveraging the legitimacy gap of international organisations and agendas to undermine the political authority of actors at the national level. 

 

The Freedom Convoy (FC) began in January 2022 as a series of protests, blockades, and online campaigns opposing Covid-19 vaccine mandates for commercial truckers crossing the Canada–US border. The protests quickly evolved into a broader movement, both within Canada and internationally, against ‘globalism’ and various issues associated with liberal global governance. These issues ranged from vaccine mandates to intentional depopulation and world government. The FC, which united a loose coalition of far-right groups alongside vaccine sceptics, organised via social media and travelled across Canada to gather in Ottawa and at key border points. The movement mobilised far-right anti-globalist conspiracy theories to articulate its opposition to a range of measures associated with the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the ‘Great Reset’. 

 

Using semi-trailer trucks, protestors established an encampment and demanded the repeal of public health measures and the dissolution of the Trudeau government. Sustained by the deafening chorus of honking from 400 to 500 semi-trailer trucks and supported by approximately $24 million CAD in online donations – 56 per cent of which came from the United States – the protests grew to an estimated 10,000 people in Ottawa’s downtown core, paralysing city services for over three weeks. The Ottawa protest sparked demonstrations at provincial capitals and blockades at numerous Canada–US border crossings. It obstructed at least 19 ports of entry, resulting in $3.9 billion CAD in lost trade activity. At the Coutts Port of Entry, along the Alberta border, police uncovered a cache of guns, ammunition, a pipe bomb, and body armour. Four protestors, some with alleged ties to Diagolon – a far-right accelerationist group – were charged with conspiracy to murder RCMP officers. 

 

Driven by anti-globalist conspiracies and extremist rhetoric, the FC and the Canadian government’s invocation of the Emergencies Act to end the protest garnered significant international attention, leading to smaller but notable copycat demonstrations worldwide. Countries such as Austria, Bolivia, Israel, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand saw groups rally against what they perceived as the authoritarianism of public health orders, framing the situation as a populist battle for ‘freedom’ against alleged government overreach and a ‘globalist’ agenda. In Wellington and Helsinki, vehicles blocked roads around Parliament, while Paris and Brussels took steps to prohibit anti-vaccine protests inspired by the FC. French police arrested dozens of individuals and intercepted vehicles heading to Brussels. In the United States, former president Donald Trump criticised Prime Minister Trudeau as a ‘far-left lunatic’ who ‘destroyed Canada with insane COVID mandates’. Senator Ted Cruz visited the ‘People’s Convoy’ in Washington, DC, to show his support, while Florida Governor Ron DeSantis vowed to investigate GoFundMe after the crowdfunding platform suspended fundraising for the protestors. Pierre Poilievre, leader of the Conservative Party and the official opposition in Canada, enthusiastically supported the FC as a popular campaign against Trudeau and the ‘gatekeeping elite’.  In his campaign to become the next prime minister, Poilievre continues to engage with many of the groups that participated in the Convoy and to weaponise conspiracy theories that found a discursive vehicle in the protests, such as the Great Reset. 

 

Focusing on the conspiracy theories surrounding the FC that circulated online, this article explores the question: how does anti-globalist conspiracism function in the delegitimation of political authority? Contextualising these transnational protests within broader scholarly debates about the global far right and populist internationalism, this article examines how far-right populists and movements have increasingly mobilised conspiracy theories to undermine national governments and ‘elites’ associated with ‘globalist’ institutions and agendas. 

 

Our analysis illustrates that the anti-globalist conspiracism surrounding the FC functioned discursively to delegitimise the political authority of the Canadian government (and public health measures like vaccine mandates) by associating them with international institutions and ‘globalist’ agendas held responsible for the pandemic response. As we show in the following sections, conspiracist delegitimation employs three primary mechanisms: externalisation, personification, and Othering. 

 

First, externalisation involves projecting problems of national politics onto the international level and attributing their causes to foreign actors, institutions, and agendas, to the exclusion of internal/domestic processes, policies, and complex, multilevel governance structures. This process redirects concerns about domestic issues onto representative figures of the global elite, delegitimising national actors (such as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau), international institutions (like the WEF), and agendas (such as the Great Reset). Of course, this is not unique to anti-globalism; identifying foreign, international actors as the driving force in history is a fundamental feature of conspiracy theories. External figures such as Klaus Schwab, George Soros, and Bill Gates were prominent in the Convoy discourse, as was the general term ‘globalists’. Externalisation functioned discursively by linking public health measures and post-Covid recovery policies to international organisations such as the WEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations (UN). At the same time, externalisation obscured key factors that shaped the response, such as the division of federal and provincial powers, and the rejection of legitimate democratic processes and actors, which were discredited through their association with the legitimacy deficit of international institutions. Externalisation thus served to delegitimise democratic norms and procedures by mobilising the international and the legitimacy deficit of international institutions and agendas. 

 

Second, personification entails reducing various processes and structures to the actions of single individuals or groups – what Popper referred to as ‘psychologism’ in his early critique of conspiracism – a phenomenon also captured by terms such as ‘hyperagency’. Personification assumes that individuals hold near-total control over outcomes and that outcomes are always intended. Consequently, it attributes both unintentional effects and negative outcomes of impersonal and abstract structures to the intentional conspiratorial design of powerful individuals or groups, such as Schwab, Soros, or Gates. Domestically, Trudeau personified the Covid public health measures associated with ‘globalism’, while externally, Klaus Schwab of the WEF was considered responsible for the ‘Great Reset’. The focus on Trudeau, along with his association with Schwab, obscured the mistakes and unintended outcomes that contributed to the pandemic and simplified complex global processes into a narrative of intentional design by individuals. These processes, and the complex governance of public health, border controls, international trade, and supply chains in Canada, were reduced to the intentions of specific elites. By focusing on Trudeau and associating him with Schwab and the WEF’s Great Reset, anti-globalist conspiracism offered a simplistic diagnosis of the pandemic that challenged the legitimacy of the Canadian government and public health measures by discursively linking the prime minister to elitist, illegitimate, and undemocratic forces of ‘globalism’. 

 

Finally, Othering draws on racist, civilisational, and gendered discourses to identify those allegedly engaging in or facilitating conspiratorial behaviour intended to alter social norms and practices against the values and interests of the national community. Certain groups are consistently Othered in anti-globalist conspiracism, including Jews, homosexuals, and communists, either explicitly or through the use of coded language like ‘globalists’. As we explore in subsequent sections, the FC online narratives focused their discursive energy on these ‘Others’, with communists (Trudeau and Castro), women and homosexuals (globohomo), and Jews (George Soros) all featured in the discourse about the FC. 

 

Through an analysis of the anti-globalist conspiracy theories that discursively fuelled the FC, this article makes a twofold contribution to International Relations (IR). First, it adds to the emerging body of research situated at the intersection of IR, the global far right, and conspiracy theories by extending the study of anti-globalist conspiracism beyond the realms of populist foreign policy and far-right ideology to focus on alt-tech spaces, which are becoming increasingly influential in these movements. Second, this article advances the study of populist internationalism by highlighting the role of anti-globalist conspiracism in the FC’s resistance to the perceived forces of globalism, and by analysing the mechanisms of delegitimation directed towards national authorities, who were cast as front organisations for global elites. 

 

Before analysing the process of conspiracist delegitimation in the alt-tech space, the following section reviews the multidisciplinary literature on conspiracy theory. While existing scholarship identifies individual and cultural responses to globalisation, it has not sufficiently addressed the national and international political dynamics at the root of anti-globalist conspiracism. Subsequently, we examine the emerging scholarship on conspiracy theory in IR. We then turn quickly to the literature on the global far right, which has drawn attention to the internationalisation of the far right but has largely neglected anti-globalist conspiracism. Finally, before the empirical analysis, we outline our methodological approach.

AI Externalities

'The Unpaid Toll: Quantifying the Public Health Impact of AI' byYuelin Han, Zhifeng Wu, Pengfei Li, Adam Wierman and Shaolei Ren comments 

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has numerous potentials to play a transformative role in addressing grand societal challenges, including air quality and public health [1, 2]. For example, by integrating multimodal data from various sources, AI can provide effective tools and actionable insights for pandemic preparedness, disease prevention, healthcare optimization, and air quality management [1, 3]. However, the surging demand for AI — particularly generative AI, as exemplified by the recent popularity of large language models (LLMs) — has driven a rapid increase in computational needs, fueling the unprecedented expansion of energy-intensive AI data centers. According to McKinsey projections, under a medium-growth scenario [4], the U.S. data centers are anticipated to account for 11.7% of national electricity consumption in 2030, a substantial increase from their current share of less than 4% in 2023. 

The growing electricity demand of AI data centers has not only created significant stress on power grid stability [5,6], but also increasingly impacts the environment through escalating carbon emissions [7,8] and water consumption [9]. These environmental impacts are driven primarily by the “expansion of AI products and services,” as recently acknowledged by Google in its latest sustainability report [10]. To mitigate the challenges posed to both power grids and the environment, a range of strategies have been explored, including grid-integrated data centers [6, 11], energy-efficient hardware and software [12–14], and the adoption of carbon-aware and water-efficient computing practices [9,15–17], among others. 

The hidden toll of AI. While the environmental footprint of AI has garnered attention, the public health burden, a hidden toll of AI, has been largely overlooked. Across its entire lifecycle — from chip manufacturing to data center operation — AI contributes substantially to air quality degradation and public health costs through the emission of various criteria air pollutants. These include fine particulate matter (PM2.5, particles measuring 2.5 micrometers or smaller in diameter that can penetrate deep into lungs and cause serious health effects), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Concretely, the AI hardware manufacturing process [18], electricity generation from fossil fuels to power AI data centers, and the maintenance and usage of diesel backup generators to ensure continuous AI data center operation all produce significant amounts of criteria air pollutants. Moreover, the distinct spatial-temporal heterogeneities of emission sources suggest that focusing solely on reducing AI’s carbon footprints may not minimize its emissions of criteria air pollutants or the resulting public health impacts (Section 5). 

Exposure to criteria air pollutants is directly and causally linked to various adverse health outcomes, including premature mortality, lung cancer, asthma, heart attacks, cardiovascular diseases, strokes, and even cognitive decline, especially for the elderly and vulnerable individuals with pre-existing conditions [20–23]. Moreover, even short-term (hours to days) PM2.5 exposure is harmful and deadly, accounting for approximately 1 million premature deaths per year from 2000 to 2019 and representing 2% of total global deaths [24]. 

Globally, 4.2 million deaths were attributed to ambient (i.e., outdoor) air pollution in 2019 [25]. Air pollution has become the second highest risk factor for noncommunicable diseases [26]. Notably, according to the latest Global Burden of Disease report [27], along with high blood pressure and high blood sugar, ambient particulate matter is placed among the leading risk factors for disease burden globally in every socio-demographic group. 

While the U.S. has generally better air quality than many other countries, 4 in 10 people in the U.S. still live with unhealthy levels of air pollution, according to the “State of the Air 2024” report published by the American Lung Association [28]. In 2019 (the latest year of data provided by the World Health Organization, or WHO, as of November 2024), an estimate of 93,886 deaths in the U.S. were attributed to ambient air pollution [29]. In fact, even compliance with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air quality standards does not necessarily guarantee healthy air that meets the WHO guidelines. Concretely, the EPA’s recently tightened primary standard for PM2.5 sets an annual average limit of 9 µg/m3, considerably higher than the WHO’s recommended level of 5 µg/m3 [30,31]. In addition, the EPA projects that 53 U.S. counties, including 23 in the most populous state of California, would fail to meet the revised national annual PM2.5 standard in 2032 [32]. 

Further, criteria air pollutants are not confined to the immediate vicinity of their emission sources; they can travel hundreds of miles through a dispersion process (i.e., cross-state air pollution) [33,34], impacting public health across vast regions — pollutants from the 2024 Canadian wildfires significantly degraded air quality across much of the U.S. and reached as far as Mexico and Europe [35]. 

Importantly, along with transportation and industrial activities, electricity generation is a major contributor to ambient air pollution with substantial public health impacts [26, 36, 37]. For example, a recent study [38] shows that, between 1999 and 2020, a total of 460,000 excess deaths were attributed to PM2.5 generated by coal-fired power plants alone in the U.S. As highlighted by the U.S. EPA [36], despite years of progress, “fossil fuel-based power plants remain a leading source of air, water, and land pollution that affects communities nationwide.” Moreover, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projection [39], the coal consumption by the electricity sector in 2050 will still be about 30% of the 2024 level in the baseline reference case, and the number will exceed 50% in the high zero-carbon technology cost case. Indeed, the growing energy demands of AI are already delaying the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants and increasing fossil-fuel plants in the U.S. as well as around the world [6,40,41]. 

The public health outcomes of AI due to its emission of criteria air pollutants lead to various losses, such as hospitalizations, medication usage, emergency room visits, school loss days, and lost workdays. Moreover, these losses can be further quantified in economic costs based on epidemiology and economics research for the corresponding health endpoints [22,42]. In contrast, the environmental impacts of AI, e.g., carbon emission from fossil fuels and water consumption for data center cooling, often do not cause the same immediate health impacts. For instance, while anthropogenic carbon emissions could also pose risks to public health, such impacts are often second- or third-order effects through long-term climate change which can then threaten the human well-being by affecting the food people eat and facilitating the spreading of pests, among others [43]. Nonetheless, despite their immediate and tangible impacts on public health, the criteria air pollutants of AI have remained under the radar, entirely omitted from today’s AI risk assessments and sustainability reports [10,44,45]. 

Quantifying the public health costs of AI. In this paper, we uncover and quantify the hidden public health impacts of AI. We introduce a general methodology to model the emission of criteria air pollutants  associated with AI tasks across three distinct scopes: emissions from the maintenance and operation of backup generators (Scope 1), emissions from fossil fuel combustion for electricity generation (Scope 2), and emissions resulting from the manufacturing of server hardware (Scope 3). Then, we analyze the dispersion of criteria air pollutants and the resulting public health impacts across different regions.

Classroom FRT

'Cameras in the Classroom: Facial Recognition Technology in Schools' (2020) by Claire Galligan, Hannah Rosenfeld, Molly Kleinman and Shobita Parthasarathy 2020 comments 

 Facial recognition (FR) technology was long considered science fiction, but it is now part of everyday life for people all over the world. FR systems identify or verify an individual’s identity based on a digitized image alone, and are commonly used for identity verification, security, and surveillance in a variety of settings including law enforcement, commerce, and transportation. Schools have also begun to use it to track students and visitors for a range of uses, from automating attendance to school security. FR can be used to identify people in photos, videos, and in real time, and is usually framed as more efficient and accurate than other forms of identity verification. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that it will erode individual privacy and disproportionately burden people of color, women, people with disabilities, and trans and gender non-conforming people. In this report, we focus on the use of FR in schools because it is not yet widespread and because it will impact particularly vulnerable populations. We analyze FR’s implications using an analogical case comparison method. Through an iterative process, we developed historical case studies of similar technologies, and analyzed their social, economic, and political impacts, and the moral questions that they raised. This method enables us to anticipate the consequences of using FR in schools; our analysis reveals that FR will likely have five types of implications: exacerbating racism, normalizing surveillance and eroding privacy, narrowing the definition of the “acceptable” student, commodifying data, and institutionalizing inaccuracy. Because FR is automated, it will extend these effects to more students than any manual system could. On the basis of this analysis, we strongly recommend that use of FR be banned in schools. However, we have offered some recommendations for its development, deployment, and regulation if schools proceed to use the technology.