'The spoilers from within: Allies and export controls' by Eliza Gheorghe in (2025) Journal of Strategic Studies comments
Do alliances help or hinder non-proliferation efforts? Existing theories of nuclear non-proliferation have looked at the direct effects of having allies on the spread of nuclear weapons, i.e., whether protégés are more or less likely to obtain atomic arsenals. However, there is value in examining the indirect impact of alliances on non-proliferation, namely how allies make it easier or harder for third parties to acquire nuclear weapons. In this article, I argue that transfers from suppliers allied with enforcers spoil the non-proliferation regime more than assistance from other suppliers, which underlines the difficulties enforcers face when combatting proliferation. ...
Alliances also play an indirect role in the spread of nuclear weapons, especially through the influence enforcers’ allies can have on the non-proliferation regime. ... The literature on sanctions highlights that allies pose a significant challenge for sanctioning states because they can ‘exploit the political cover provided by their alliances’ to engage in sanctions busting. Given the close relationship between sanctions and export controls, the question arises: do allies help or hinder the enforcement of export controls?
Allies can support non-proliferation efforts by aiding enforcers in cracking down on proliferants through unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral action. However, when states are both enforcers’ allies and suppliers of nuclear technology, they can undermine the non-proliferation regime by transferring nuclear technology to proliferants. Existing quantitative studies have shown that both civilian and sensitive nuclear assistance catalyze proliferation, but they have not examined whether, on average, nuclear technology transfers from spoilers are more damaging than those from other suppliers. This article offers the first comparison of these two types of nuclear assistance to highlight the challenge spoilers pose to enforcers’ non-proliferation efforts. I find that technology transfers from enforcers’ allies accelerate nuclear weapons programs, demonstrating how the non-proliferation regime can be undermined from within.
The following analysis is organized into five sections that aim to show how allies complicate export controls. The first section looks at the literature on the role of allies in creating and enforcing cartels, lays out a theory of non-proliferation spoiling, and specifies its key predictions. The second part discusses the methodology and the data I draw on. The third section presents the results of the quantitative analysis and shows that allied suppliers spoil the enforcers’ efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons more than other nuclear technology providers. I find that spoilers have contributed to the acceleration of nuclear weapons programs via nuclear trade after the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The fourth part provides a case study of Italy as a non-proliferation spoiler. The fifth and concluding section offers a summary of the findings, discusses implications for emerging technologies, and proposes avenues for future research.
'From nonproliferation to strategic competition: US export controls and China' by Mathilde Velliet in (2025) International Politics comments
Technological competition is at the heart of the renewed great-power competition that has characterized relations between the USA and China since the 2010s. The role of technological innovation in the evolution of power relations is already recognized in the literature of international relations. However, developments in US technology policy under the last two administrations raise the reverse question: how does the perception of changing power relations (in this case, Chinese technological catch-up perceived as a threat to US leadership) transform policies granting or denying access to technological innovation? This study sheds light on the transformation in the American conception of export controls: mainly conceived in the post-Cold War era as a law enforcement and nonproliferation tool, it has become a strategic instrument to restrict technology transfers to the People’s Republic of China. Using a Foreign Policy Analysis approach based on the analysis of legal texts, speeches, and interviews with the political actors involved, this article examines the policy process, leading to this fundamental change in US export control policy. As this study demonstrates, this change reflects a new interpretation of the link between economic and security interests, as well as the expansion of the perimeter of American national security.
'The trojan submarine: AUKUS, Pillar II, and the U.S. ITAR' by Paul Esau in (2024) 2 Journal of Strategic Trade Control comments
Since the announcement of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership in September 2021, critics have attacked the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as a key obstacle to its success. Echoing long-standing frustrations over the regulatory burden of the ITAR, these critics manufactured an “AUKUS-ITAR dilemma” which seemed to require a general ITAR exemption for military trade between the three partner countries. This dilemma minimized critical disparities between the Australian, U.K., and U.S. military export control regimes and exaggerated the impact of ITAR reform on the success of AUKUS, especially on the emerging technology collaboration envisioned in the second pillar of the partnership. Yet recent U.S. legislation and regulatory reform indicate that rather than eliminating U.S. military export controls, the AUKUS-ITAR dilemma has resulted in a more robust, ITAR-based plurilateral export control regime dominated by U.S. interests and primed for further expansion.
In September 2021, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom jointly announced a trilateral security partnership to address evolving threats in the Indo-Pacific region—AUKUS. Described as “the most significant security arrangement among the three countries in a generation,” this partnership was initially perceived as a vehicle for the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology to Australia for use in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines. External analysis, especially in the U.S., focused on the controversial export of nuclear technology and reactions from the impetus for the new partnership: China. While the second-last paragraph of the official joint statement also promised new collaboration in “cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities,” this second pillar of AUKUS seemed like an ambiguous afterthought. Submarines, not science fiction, were the core deliverable of the partnership.
Yet as the timeline for the submarine sales (Pillar I) lengthened, Pillar II emerged as not only central but also essential to the AUKUS partnership. In the words of one former U.S. official and industry analyst in March 2023, “If Pillar Two fails, AUKUS will be a failure. Plain and simple.” Industry representatives and several former U.S. ambassadors to Australia positioned U.S. military export controls, specifically the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as obsolete Cold War-era relics and impediments to collaboration among the three AUKUS partners, creating an “AUKUS-ITAR dilemma.” The ITAR was called a “unique threat” to U.S. national security, and the “most significant obstacle” to winning a strategic competition with China. These arguments echoed long-standing frustrations over the regulatory burden of the ITAR in all three countries, and inspired a series of radical proposals from hawkish members of Congress to implement a blanket ITAR exemption for AUKUS partners.
However, the passage of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in December 2023 revealed that these arguments had not been as persuasive as advocates had originally hoped. Instead, the U.S. Congress pursued a more moderate version of ITAR reform predicated on ensuring comparability between that the U.S., Australian and U.K. export control regimes, with implementation entrusted to conservative elements within the U.S. Department of State. In May 2024, the State Department released a proposed rule outlining a limited ITAR exemption that was finalized in August and implemented on September 1. Instead of receiving the crown jewels without caveat, Australia and the U.K. were forced to adopt ITAR-like regimes of their own.
Does this result mean Congress missed a “generational opportunity” to implement AUKUS and ensure a new era of allied collaboration and innovation? Not quite. This article argues that Congress has evaded an attempt to use the AUKUS/ITAR dilemma as a “trojan horse” for long- standing commercial frustrations with the ITAR. This attempt built on previous initiatives to exempt Australian and British entities from ITAR licensing requirements and minimized critical disparities between the Australian, U.K., and U.S. military export control regimes. It also misaligned the goals of Pillar II and the probable outcomes of blanket ITAR exemptions, exaggerating the impact of the ITAR on military trade between the three countries – especially exports of critical and emerging technologies. As shown by the existing Canadian ITAR exemption, licensing relief has limited potential to realize the sort of seamless military integration and research collaboration envisioned under Pillar II. Ultimately, rather than eliminating U.S. military export controls, the AUKUS/ITAR dilemma has created a more robust ITAR-based regime dominated by U.S. interests and primed for further expansion. This article begins by describing the re-emergence of export controls amidst increasing competition between the U.S. and China. After introducing the ITAR and contrasting it with the Australian and U.K. military export control regimes, it summarizes a series of recent attempts to reducing export licensing requirements among the three AUKUS partners and highlights the key obstacles to greater collaboration. Finally, it contextualizes three major arguments used to criticize the ITAR prior to the passage of the 2024 NDAA and explores the possibility that AUKUS constitutes not only a security partnership but also lays the groundwork for a new plurilateral military export control regime.
