16 February 2025

the latest carnival of absurdity

More pseudolaw incidents in Western Australia, Victoria and Queensland

Cousins v WA Police [2025] WASC 39 notes

 On 18 May 2023 the appellant was convicted of three offences, namely speeding, failing to provide personal details, and obstructing a police officer. The convictions followed a hearing at which the magistrate had decided to hear and determine the charges in the appellant's absence under s 55(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). A charge of failing to comply with a direction to stop was dismissed at the request of the prosecutor. The conviction for the obstruction offence was set aside following an application made by the appellant under s 71 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 

The appellant represented herself before the magistrate and conducted her own appeal. The appeal notice contained 74 grounds. Many of the grounds did not raise valid legal arguments. Rather they invoked pseudo‑law concepts. That said, two appeal points could be distilled from the grounds. The first was that it was not open to the magistrate to convict the appellant in her absence and the second was that the prosecution notice was invalid. At the hearing of the application, I granted leave to appeal in relation to the first ground and refused leave in relation to the second. I allowed the appeal and made consequential orders and said reasons would be published later. These are those reasons.... 

The respondent applied for leave to rely on additional evidence on appeal. That evidence included an affidavit affirmed by the Senior Security Coordinator of the Department of Justice attaching two incident reports recorded in relation to the hearing in the Magistrates Court on 18 May 2023. The evidence provided an account of the events that took place at and following the hearing that was relevant to the magistrate's decision to proceed to hear the charges under s 55(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Pursuant to s 40(1)(e) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), I granted the respondent leave to rely upon the additional evidence. 

The appellant also applied for leave to rely on additional evidence on appeal and sought orders as follows:

(2) An Order that the Application in an appeal Dated : 6 September 2024 by the Respondent the Court strike out the Application on the grounds of it is an abuse of process, frivolous, vexatious, scandalous and improper and a witch hunt and has no merit at English Common Law under Chapter III Section: 71 to 80 Constitution Act 1900 UK and the Magna Carta 1215 and the Bill of Rights 1688 and all Imperial Laws and no evidence to the contrary can be fm1h coming by the Respondent, estoppel by acquiescence 

(3) An Order that CITATION: TEY -v- PLOTZ [2010] WASC 163 be enforced that the WA POLICE are not known at Law under the Supreme Court Jurisdiction as this Miscarriage of Justice has been Perverted by the State Solicitor and now committing 'Torture' on the Appellant by the Application in an Appeal of the Respondent. 

(4) An Order by the Supreme Court that Criminal Charges be brought against the State Solicitor Office for 'Torture' under the Crimes (Tortures Act 1988 (Cth) Section : 5. 6. 7. A Public Official or person acting in an official capacity, commits the offence of Torture if in Australia he/she intentionally inflicts suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of his official duties at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or of a person acting in an official capacity immaterial whether the pain or suffering is physical or mental and whether it is caused by an act or an omission 

In the light of the conclusion I reached as to the strength of the appellant's ground concerning the magistrate's decision to proceed to hear the application under s 55(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was unnecessary to deal with the appellant's application to adduce further evidence and for the other orders sought by her. ... 

Shortly after, the magistrate addressed the prosecutor and said, 'I'm going to have to set another trial date'. This remark prompted the following exchange:

[APPELLANT]: If you cannot hold this hearing here today - - - 

HIS HONOUR: Ms Cousins - - - 

[APPELLANT]: - - then this needs to be fully - - - 

HIS HONOUR: - - - I'm going to ask you to stop speaking and do not interrupt me. 

[APPELLANT]: Why are you shouting over me? This is my courtroom today. You've invited me here. Now you listen to what I have to say. 

HIS HONOUR: Okay. So, Ms Cousins, I'm going to have an adjournment. I'm going to walk out of this court in five minutes. 

[APPELLANT]: No. No, you cannot adjourn this. 

HIS HONOUR: I'm going to have an adjournment, Ms Cousins. 

[APPELLANT]: You cannot keep on dragging this on. 

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Can I speak? Am I - - - 

[APPELLANT]: You are speaking, but don't babble. 

HIS HONOUR: Am I allowed to - - - 

[APPELLANT]: Stick to the law. Stick to the facts and stick to the law. 

HIS HONOUR: Will you do me the courtesy of allowing me to speak, or not? Am I allowed to speak? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes, speak, but don't babble. 

HIS HONOUR: Sit down, please. Sit down, please. 

[APPELLANT]: I don't need to sit down. 

HIS HONOUR: Yes, you do, because I tell you you have to. 

[APPELLANT]: No, I don't. 

HIS HONOUR: Okay sit down 

[APPELLANT]: Where do you tell me I have to sit down? 

HIS HONOUR: Everyone out please. I'm having an adjournment and I'm coming back in. Clear the court. 

[APPELLANT]: You adjourned it last week because you could not - - - 

HIS HONOUR: We're adjourned. Thankyou

The court room was cleared. When the hearing resumed (and I infer from the transcript and the incident reports forming part of the respondent's additional evidence that this was only a matter of minutes later) the appellant was not present in the court room and when her name was called outside the court room she did not respond. I infer that the appellant was aware that she was required to re-enter the courtroom from ground 21 of the appellant's grounds of appeal which records 'the Court Clerk calling out the name of "Carol-Maria Cousins" after we were all removed from the Court Building'. 

Immediately after the adjournment and in the absence of the appellant the magistrate made the following observations:[

HIS HONOUR: ... The matters for Ms Cousins were called earlier. Ms Cousins herself was, in my view deliberately disruptive in her interactions with the court. When the matter was called earlier she had a large number of people who were, broadly speaking, supporters who were in the gallery of the court. They became disruptive and because of the combination of those factors, I adjourned the court. 

I've made a decision on security grounds and to ensure that the court can function as it ought to, that when the matter was recalled, that only the accused, Ms Cousins, would be entitled to enter and appear in the court, that is that the court would, otherwise, be closed. So that directive, I assume, has been communicated to, perhaps, Ms Cousins, perhaps, to others, but I'm now in a situation where Ms Cousins has, apparently, left the court and has not appeared when her names were called, or when her name was called, for the matter to be resumed. So that's for the transcript. That's what has occurred this morning.

In Song v M.T.V. Building & Construction Pty Ltd [2025] VSC 3, an appeal from the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act including attempted late filing of affidavit attaching extensive pseudo‑legal material and a challenge to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria, theCourt states ' Some of the grounds of review were difficult to decipher. I have done my best to make sense of them  ...'. 

 42 During his oral submissions in respect of the second application, Mr T. Mitevski also made submissions seeking to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that the Supreme Court of Victoria is unable to hear matters where a corporation is a party. This challenge was unsuccessful.  ... 

57 At 10:25am on 25 November 2024 (the day before the trial), Mr T. Mitevski filed a notice of appearance for MTV. At 2:20am on 26 November 2024 (the morning of the trial), Mr Mitevski attempted to file a 13‑page affidavit attaching 272 pages of exhibits. A copy of the unsealed affidavit was sent to my chambers’ email inbox at this time. 

58 The content of the affidavit and exhibits was wholly unhelpful. The substance of the material was, as is unfortunately too often the case in recent times,* replete with pseudo‑legalise catch phrases, nonsensical arguments, conspiratorial allegations, and Bible quotes and exhortations. The affidavit sought to invoke a ‘Doctrine of Impossibility’ to locate a public defender or solicitor who would ‘challenge their undisclosed oath’ to ‘Guilds’ and asked the Court to dispense with r 1.17 on the basis that ‘allegiance of solicitors may conflict with their duty to represent clients’ which may lead to unjust enrichment of Bar members. 

59 Attached to the affidavit were exhibits which were manifestly pseudo‑legal in nature. There were documents stamped with a seal of a fictitious court named ‘Themis Court of Natural Law – Terra Australis’, there were documents containing assertions that the Commonwealth Government is a ‘foreign privately owned American Company’. There were also out of context biblical references: ‘Thy Kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in the spiritual heavenly realm’. 

60 Needless to say, the material was nowhere near persuasive of why Mr T. Mitevski should be permitted to appear on the company’s behalf. This material alone could be relied on to reject the application to dispense with the r 1.17 requirement. However, Mr T. Mitevski attended the trial and made an oral application to dispense with the requirements of r 1.17. ... 

 64 In the course of making his oral application to dispense with the requirements of r 1.17, Mr T. Mitevski made separate submissions challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to hear this matter. 

65 He stated that he challenged the jurisdiction in ‘a very limited capacity’ and that there was a ‘question mark’ as to the fact that MTV is a ‘company with an ABN and an ACN’ and, as far as his research has indicated, that meant this case should be heard by the Federal Court of Australia, rather than the Supreme Court of Victoria.

66 When questioned about whether he had undertaken legal training, Mr T Mitevski told me ‘I’m a constant student of many facets including the law.’

The reference to the 'unhelpful' material as 'is unfortunately too often the case in recent times' is reflected in note 8:

Most recently the subject of comment in Nelson v Greenman & Anor [2024] VSC 704 at [68]–[73] per Gobbo AsJ. Her Honour describing the pseudo‑legal arguments in that case as ‘nothing more than [a] carnival of absurdity drawn from a mishmash of delusional arguments’, a description which can be adopted here as being apt.

Cartwright v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 178 Cartwright sought to overturn orders made by a District Court judge. The judgment states

 In June 2024, Mr Cartwright attempted to file in the registry of the Court of Appeal what purported to be originating process in the Court of Appeal. The documents included: (a) a notice of appeal; (b) an application to the Court of Appeal; (c) an affidavit of Mr Cartwright; and (d) two documents entitled “Statement of Truth”, which expressed inadmissible opinion evidence from a Mr Evans and a Mr James concerning what I assume must have been the conduct of the hearing before the District Court Judge. The documents which Mr Cartwright sought to file seem to be intended to advance an appeal from the orders made in the District Court on 2 April 2024. ...  The Acting Registrar’s letter also suggested to Mr Cartwright that he might consider seeking independent legal advice on how to proceed. ... 

Mr Cartwright’s second affidavit contains various irrelevant statements of pseudo law somehow founded on the notion that he: ““Nevin John” is the “lawful and rightful owner of the duty bearing entity Nevin John Cartwright sign and all it’s debentures, Bonds, CUSIP numbers, trusts and financial assets created, and we are entitled to a hearing in a chapter 3 court [Forge v ASIC] as equity will not allow a statute to be a cover for fraud.” (d) Other irrelevant material was annexed. (e) The notice of appeal might be the document which one would expect some clarity about the basis on which Mr Cartwright sought leave to appeal from the judgment below. Unfortunately, the notice of appeal did not state the grounds “briefly and specifically” as required by r 747(1)(b). But instead, the so-called “grounds” contained substantive, often unintelligible pseudo-legal argument. How that argument bore on showing error by Clarke DCJ was not apparent. ... 

I make the following observations:

(a) On 25 September 2024 Mr Cartwright filed a third affidavit of his, sworn 12 September 2024. 

(b) Like his second affidavit, it started with the same irrelevant proposition of pseudo law earlier quoted. It exhibited a number of documents which were inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts and opinions there asserted, and, in any event, not relevant to the issues before me. ( 

c) Exhibit A contained the same two statements from Mr Evans and Mr James which expressed inadmissible opinion evidence concerning what I assume must have been the conduct of the hearing before the District Court Judge. 

(d) Exhibit B contained a June 2023 media report concerning political steps taken in the United States of America concerning COVID vaccine, and also what appeared to be a copy of a petition filed in a Kansas District Court about the conduct of the drug manufacturer, Pfizer, in relation to a COVID vaccine. 

(e) Exhibit C contained irrelevant information containing Mr Cartwright’s birth certificate number and “social security” number. 

(f) Exhibit D contained extracts from the Magistrates Court annual report for 2020/2021 said by Mr Cartwright’s affidavit to show “that much of the hearings heard in a Magistrates Court is that of Quasi law”. They showed no such thing. 

(g) Exhibit E was said to be the “life event registration patent which demonstrate in it’s pictograph that life event registration creates a duty bearing insurance bond which the lawyer represents being the person or the ancients referred to as nomen and not the man or woman.” The proposition is unintelligible and the contents of the documents incapable of bearing any meaning in relation to the issue before me. 

(h) Exhibit F contained an extract from a government web writing and style guide manual, and also a partial extract from the case of Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) 34 NSWLR 506. Those documents, too, were incapable of bearing any meaning in relation to the issue before me. 

(i) Exhibit G was an extract from some form of report of a decision by the Lisbon Court of Appeal in Portugal which recorded some expression of opinions recording COVID tests and their significance. That document, too, was incapable of bearing any meaning in relation to the issue before me. 

(j) Having exhibited the documents to which I have referred, the affidavit then proceeded to express two paragraphs of legally incoherent argumentative statements concerning the process adopted by Clarke DCJ, and four paragraphs of legally incoherent argumentative statements addressing something to do with Mr Cartwright’s complaints about how the Government handled the COVID epidemic. 

(k) Exhibit H was a copy of what purported to be the dissenting report of Senator Babet to a Senate standing committee which had been established to understand “excess mortality in 2021, 2022 and 2023”. 

(l) The affidavit ended with the pseudo law assertion: “This is official notice that under a Admiralty Rules 1995 (Cth) we will be applying to the special magistrate of HMAS Creswell for an order for a fair trial to be enforced by the military which will be done this week. Declaring a court of law abolished is a crime against humanity and an international law USC, laws of belligerent occupation and Commonwealth law. If you oppose a fair trial, we suggest you retire like Magistrate Guttridge did.”

The Court was unpersuaded.  

In Cartwright v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 168 the Tribunal dismissed Cartwright's application for review of revocation of his firearms licence, noting  the 'applicant holds sovereign citizen beliefs.

 [7] The grounds of suspension were set out in the decision under review as follows:

Correspondence under your hand has been received indicating that you hold Sovereign Citizen beliefs relating to the laws in force in Queensland specific to their non-applicability to yourself. On the 28 December 2021 I note you attended the Rockhampton Police Station front counter asking for their [officer-in-charge] to be arrested. On the 30 January 2022 I note you attended the Rockhampton Police Station to demonstrate your anti- (sic) stance on COVID-19. 

[8] The QPS concluded that Mr Cartwright may not be a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence, such that his licence should be suspended. 

[9] Section 28(1)(b) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (‘the Weapons Act’) gives an authorised officer the power to suspend a firearms licence if he or she “considers, on reasonable grounds, that the licensee may no longer be a fit and proper person to hold a licence”. 

[10] Section 10B of the Weapons Act relevantly provides: (1) In deciding or considering, for the issue, renewal, suspension or revocation of a licence, whether a person is, or is no longer, a fit and proper person to hold a licence, an authorised officer must consider, among other things— (a) the mental and physical fitness of the person; and (b) whether a domestic violence order has been made, police protection notice issued or release conditions imposed against the person; and (c) whether the person has stated anything in or in connection with an application for a licence, or an application for the renewal of a licence, the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular; and (ca) whether there is any criminal intelligence or other information to which the authorised officer has access that indicates— (i) the person is a risk to public safety; or (ii) that authorising the person to possess a weapon would be contrary to the public interest; and (d) the public interest. 

[11] Mr Cartwright has filed voluminous material in these proceedings. It is sufficient for the purposes of these reasons to include a brief extract from a submission filed on 4 June 2022: 

The statement that I hold sovereign citizen beliefs is indeed an oxy moronic statement as I do not hold them as Queen Elizabeth the second is the sovereign and holder of all lands in The Commonwealth of Australia being that of we the people and I am just a mere share holder of the true Commonwealth of Australia. If you care to read international law it refers to a sovereign and a national never is the citizen-ship (Corpus Juris) of the trust territory under the Hague and UN charter treaties, being that of the Certificate of Birth Registration being a promissory note to fraudulently turn a child into property of the Reserve Bank and bringing that man or women (sic) into corpus juris.

[12] In Bradley v The Queen [2021] QCA 101 at [2], President Sofronoff described this style of submission as “a confused hodgepodge of confusion”. I am unable to engage with such submissions from Mr Cartwright on the basis that they are incomprehensible. 

[13] What I am more readily able to engage with is Mr Cartwright’s email to the Police Minister dated 21 January 2022, in which he stated:

I Nevin-John ask that you issue me with all classes of weapons ownership ... I also pray for an open and concealed carry permit as the last act with royal accent (sic) was the weapons act of 1973 requiring no licencing for men and women not persons. I Nevin-John ask that a permanent permit to buy be issued with my card that you re-issue as the acts and statutes apply only to legal fictions and as I have left the necromancy.

[14] Mr Cartwright has evinced a discernible view that the Weapons Act does not apply to him. I do not consider that it is in the public interest to issue a firearms licence to persons who do not consider themselves bound by the Weapons Act, and therefore consider that Mr Cartwright is not a fit and proper person for the purposes of section 10B(1)(d) to hold a firearms licence.