22 June 2022

Rights and histories

A Powerless Companion: Human Rights in the Age of Neoliberalism' by Samuel Moyn in (2014) 77(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 147 comments 

 It is increasingly common to claim that international human rights law is a neoliberal phenomenon. And certainly the common timing is right: the human rights revolution and the victory of market fundamentalism have been simultaneous. In an important new essay, Marxist international lawyer Susan Marks compares Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine with my own recent history of international human rights, which emphasizes the 1970s as the moment of breakthrough for their ascent. Both histories, Marks observes, ascribe the newfound visibility of human rights to their promise to transcend formerly attractive political options east and west that seemed inadequate or even dangerous. "For her too," Marks acknowledges of Klein's treatment, "the human rights movement as we know it today took shape during the 1970s. And for her too, a defining characteristic of the new movement was its non-political creed." But for Marks, Klein succeeds by unveiling the neoliberal circumstances of human rights that have permanently defined their trajectory:

[S]he considers that a rather important aspect of the context for the movement's emergence is one Moyn omits to mention: the rise in that period of the neo-liberal version of 'private' capitalism, with its now familiar policy prescription of privatisation, deregulation and state retreat from social provision. To its influential enthusiasts then and now, that is the last utopia. .. . From Klein's perspective, then, the history of human rights cannot be told in isolation from developments in the history of capitalism."

(At this point Marks notes that Milton Friedman won the Nobel prize for economics in 1976, the year before Amnesty International was given the Nobel Peace Prize.) 

Friedrich Hayek, the guru of neoliberalism, was as impressed a witness of the human rights revolution of the 1970s as anyone else. But it is interesting that, although occasionally an advocate of the constitutionalization of basic liberties like freedom of speech and press, he was in fact an acerbic critic of that revolution. In an interview, he described the spike in talk around human rights associated with Jimmy Carter's election to the American presidency as a strange fad, which (like all fashions) risked excess:

I'm not sure whether it's an invention of the present administration or whether it's of an older date, but I suppose if you told an eighteen year old that human rights is a new discovery he wouldn't believe it. He would have thought the United States for 200 years has been committed to human rights, which of course would be absurd. The United States discovered human rights two years ago or five years ago. Suddenly it's the main object and leads to a degree of interference with the policy of other countries which, even if I sympathized with the general aim, I don't think it's in the least justified.... But it's a dominating belief in the United States now.

All the same, since that moment of modish popularity, the staying power of human rights has led to many more positive visions of the essential harmony-if not identity-of economic liberalism and international human rights. The Marxist left, indeed, is hardly the only source of claims concerning the synergetic relationship between the advancement of market freedoms and human rights. If anything, it is much more common to promote neoliberalism as an agent of the advancement of human rights rather than to link them as malign accomplices. 

Perhaps most notably, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that, although human rights law may exact some costs to efficiency, the general relationship between economic liberty and human rights is productive and strong, so much so that promoting the former and latter are not very different enterprises. He writes:

[E]njoyment of human rights require[s] the use of dispersed information and economic resources that can be supplied most efficiently, and most democratically, through the division of labour among free citizens and through liberal trade promoting economic welfare, the freedom of choice and the free flow of scarce goods, services, and information across frontiers in response to supply and demand by citizens.

There is, accordingly, little daylight between economic liberalization and the promotion of international human rights. And though Petersmann's optimism about near identity has certainly drawn their fire, mainstream international human rights lawyers generally envision a large zone of compatibility between their norms and standard market arrangements; they merely insist that the values of international human rights need to be kept separate so as to provide critical purchase on "globalization" if and when it goes wrong.' In the mainstream vision, international human rights can offer a toolbox of legal and other standards to guide, tame, and "civilize" an era of transnational market liberalization that has generally improved the human condition.

This article argues that it is far too soon - analytically in the one case and historically in the other - to sign on to either the Marxist or mainstream position about the relationship between human rights and neoliberalism. To the first position, much more analytical clarity is required to prove more than a simple case of conjuncture between the two phenomena that are sometimes too easily conflated. To the second, the record so far suggests that human rights seem fit to provide little, if any, help in remedying (let alone overturning) the development in the history of capitalism that its critics range under the heading "neoliberalism." In largest part that is because, although the record of capitalism in our time is highly mixed when it comes to the achievement and violation of basic human rights, its most serious victim is equality (of resources and opportunities alike) both in national and global settings-a value that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the international human rights movements following in its wake do not even set out to defend." Since globalizing neoliberalism and international human rights emerged at the same moment and developed in parallel, there are undoubtedly connections to be found. But the interactions between human rights and neoliberalism are more subtle than Marxists so far claim. Indeed, the crucial connection is a missed connection: precisely because the human rights revolution has at its most ambitious dedicated itself to establishing a normative and actual floor for protection, it has failed to respond to-or even allowed for recognizing- neoliberalism's obliteration of the ceiling on inequality. 

"Neoliberalism," especially in leftist discourse, often does massive work in diverse settings of argument, coming close through its overuse to functioning as a call for explanation rather than the real thing. And with its moral charge, it is sometimes deployed like holy water, sprinkled liberally for safety's sake to ward off evil. Although its rise as an item of discourse and apotropaic talisman reflects understandable anger, it is also symptomatic of explanatory confusion. Nonetheless, as David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy indicate in their introduction to this issue, citing an inadequate shorthand for the complex of individualist thought, market solutions, and state retrenchment both domestically and internationally is better than omitting these topics altogether, as American legal scholarship has so far done to its detriment. 

But looking beyond America, the prominence of neoliberalism as a category in scholarship about human rights means that the exact nature of the linkage of the two requires as much attention as the omission of the former from thinking about the latter. "Human rights, as with power and money, became a means to an end of globalizing neoliberal democracy," Stephen Hopgood remarks in his much noticed recent study, in a commonplace observation." And yet, so far, Marxists such as Wendy Brown, Susan Marks, and others have offered indeterminate and unsubstantiated claims that do not suffice to plausibly elevate the chronological coincidence of human rights and neoliberalism into a factually plausible syndrome. For there is a long way from historical "coincidence" or companionship - which there certainly has been between neoliberalism and the human rights phenomenon-to actual causality and complicity. "We would do well to take the measure of whether and how the centrality of human rights discourse might render ... other political possibilities more faint," Brown has argued in a classic indictment at the center of the recent commentary.  Even this displacement theory, about which Brown explicitly invites further reflection rather than offering a strong conclusion, is weak compared to the much stronger accusation of complicity that Brown and others simultaneously offer." 

Though it seems likely that some displacement of other schemes of justice has indeed occurred thanks to the rise of human rights, I do not think a much stronger claim is likely to work.  To say that human rights were coincident with or part of the context of neoliberal victory is not only not to say more-it is also not to say much. In particular, it is not to say that neoliberalism has required human rights to make its way in the world-or vice versa. Picayune an agenda as it might seem to specify how weakly related the ascent of human rights appears to the market fundamentalism of our time, I suggest that the finding of only a tenuous relationship between the two has substantial ramifications for judging human rights and their spectacular rise in the last few decades - and thus for assessing the mainstream position. 

Excusing human rights from causally abetting the free market victory of the neoliberal age is, after all, no defense of their prominence today. It is certainly worth considering the possibility that human rights provide some sort of moral leverage against neoliberal developments. However, even if the value of the normative guidance that human rights provide is undoubted, the trouble is that it amounts to little more than a set of mostly rhetorical admonitions. Worse, by focusing on a minimum floor of human protection, human rights norms prove inadequate in facing the reality that neoliberalism has damaged equality locally and globally much more than it has basic human rights outcomes (which, in some cases, it may indeed have advanced). It is hardly less distressing, but, so far, much more justifiable to conclude that human rights have not made enough of a difference in the short timeframe and global space they share with their neoliberal frere ennemi. They have been condemned to watch but have been powerless to deter. Added to the fact that human rights at least as canonically established have nothing to say about the principal value of equality that neoliberalism threatens, it seems hard to conclude that they are a useful resource in response. 

If my perspective in between Marxism and the mainstream is adequate, it also follows that there is not much critical or political value in opposing human rights out of understandable outrage at neoliberalism. Instead, the economic transformations of the current era force a heavy burden on those concerned to formulate or to find a more serious analytical account of economic transformations and to offer more robust political resistance than they have marshaled so far. And since human rights idioms, approaches, and movements are unlikely to offer either - and, indeed, do not strive to do so when it comes to inequality - they should stick to their minimalist tasks outside the socioeconomic domain, in part to avoid drawing fire for abetting the stronger companion of their historical epoch. 

This article is structured to reach these conclusions by examining a range of Marxist positions on the relationship between neoliberalism and human rights, beginning with Karl Marx's own theory of rights, both because of its intrinsic importance of and its frequent application to current debates. After concluding that this theory offers only initial starting points for analyzing international human rights and the neoliberal era of capitalism alike, the article's next part turns to the late-twentieth-century history of the companionship of the two, tracking their contemporaneous inceptions to examine their harmony and dissonance. The final part of the article stresses that human rights offer a minimum of protection where the real significance of neoliberalism has been to obliterate the previous limitation of inequality. Although human rights idioms, regimes, and movements have valuably formulated one approach to that floor, they have so far done little or nothing to build it, even as they have surged discursively across the same era as the ceiling on hierarchy has been simply blown away.

'Human Rights and History' by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann in (2016) 232(1) Past & Present 279–310 comments 

Historians are the embalmers of our political and moral convictions. As soon as historiography begins to take an interest in an issue, we can be certain that it no longer possesses a self-evident presence in our society. Some questions and problems only become objects of history after society has become historically conscious of them. The history of workers boomed in the 1970s, for example, when industrial labour was in the process of disappearing, just as memory and its sites became a mode of inquiry for historians in the 1980s precisely at the moment when lived memory of ‘the age of extremes’ (Eric Hobsbawm) was disappearing together with its last generation. 

The issue of human rights has by no means come so far, even if a certain historicizing sobriety has now set in among activists. On the contrary, as I have argued elsewhere, human rights are still something like the doxa of our times: those ideas and sentiments that are tacitly presumed to be self-evident truths and not in need of any justification.  Who is opposed to human rights today? And who of those born before the late twentieth century would like to be reminded that earlier he or she had had little use for the concept of human rights? At least in the Euro-Atlantic world today the resonance of human rights is so universal and unassailable that in principle the only thing still debated is how they can best be realized on a global scale. We feel distressed and melancholic about the continued violation of human rights in our time but do not wish to abandon the concept altogether. 

And yet it is remarkable that historians have begun to concern themselves with human rights only recently — essentially only since the late 1990s. Still, in the major historical syntheses of the past two decades, for instance in the interpretations of the twentieth century by Eric Hobsbawm and Tony Judt or of the nineteenth century by Jürgen Osterhammel and Chris Bayly, or of the rise and fall of empires by Jane Burbank and Fred Cooper, human rights have appeared only at the margins, if at all. Most historians of genocide, refugees, nationalism, slavery or humanitarianism (including Pamela Ballinger, since 2011 the first professor of the history of human rights in the United States)  do not consider themselves to be part of the new field of human rights history. This is about to change, so much can be said already. In recent years we have apparently arrived at a new present, an era of ‘global governance’, ‘cosmopolitan ethics’, ‘transnational law’ and ‘humanitarian interventions’, for which we seek anchoring points in history, but which begins at the same time to historicize itself. As times change, so does the past. 

The new historiography of human rights can be divided into these two tendencies: one that searches for stabilizing points for the present and finds them in the longue durée evolution of human rights (deep history) and one that seeks to demonstrate in revisionist fashion the instability of such universalist narratives and thereby the historicity, that is, the transience, of our political and moral convictions (recent history). Conveniently, these two tendencies are grouped around two path-breaking books: Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights and, as a counterpoint, Samuel Moyn’s Last Utopia. 

Put briefly, Lynn Hunt argues that in the eighteenth century human rights gained in currency because they were based on new experiences and cultural practices, a new emotional regime, the core of which was ‘imagined empathy’. From this new emotional regime, which is evident, for example, in sentimental, epistolary novels as well as in the moral campaign for the abolition of torture beginning in the 1760s, a new legal regime emerged during the French Revolution that in turn followed its own cascading logic: once human rights had acquired self-evidence, they could no longer be removed from the world, and unfolded their revolutionary potential during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Reading epistolary novels or accounts of torture had physical effects that translated into ‘brain changes’ and ‘came back out’ as new concepts of individual human rights. Hunt acknowledges the paradoxes of human rights as politics, that rights claims emerged in tandem with revolutionary violence, but insists that their self-evidence ultimately transcends these historical mutations: ‘You know the meaning of human rights because you feel distressed when they are violated’. 

Samuel Moyn, in contrast, objects in Last Utopia that we can speak of human rights in their current form, as individual rights granted to every person even beyond the nation state, only since the late 1970s — since Jimmy Carter and disco, as one unhappy reviewer summarized.   Prior to this, human rights were tied to the nation state and were thus essentially citizenship rights. As the title suggests, human rights became, according to Moyn, the last utopia, especially for activists in the recently established human rights non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, following the failure of other global emancipation ideologies such as socialism and anti-colonialism. With this brilliant polemic, Moyn provides an interpretative framework for a series of more recent studies and ongoing research projects of a new generation of historians investigating the ‘breakthrough’ of human rights to a global morality in the 1970s. 

This essay is intended as a historiographical intervention in this debate and develops three interconnected arguments that seek to determine the place of human rights in the crises and conflicts of the recent past. First of all, I shall push the historiographical revisionism of Moyn and others even further and argue that we can first speak of individual human rights as a basic concept ( Grundbegriff ), that is, a contested, irreplaceable and consequential concept of global politics, only in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War. In the 1970s and 1980s ‘human rights’ coexisted and overlapped with other moral and political idioms like ‘solidarity’ and included competing notions of rights, which were in many ways still indebted to the legacies of socialism and anti-colonialism, as in, for example, the transnational movement against apartheid. It was only after the end of the Cold War that ‘human rights’ emerged as an explanatory framework for understanding what had just happened. Human rights idealism, I shall argue, is not the cause but the consequence of the epochal ruptures of the late twentieth century. 

However, this does not mean, secondly, that ‘human rights’ have no deeper history; here I agree with Hunt and others. On the contrary, in many respects the human rights idealism of the 1990s appears as a strange return of the enlightened liberalism of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century and its critics (of Immanuel Kant and Carl Schmitt, the two sources of inspiration and antipodes of the political and moral discourse of the 1990s), as does the enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism, civil society, free trade, humanitarian interventions and moral justifications of war within the new world (dis)order. I shall suggest, therefore, that we should bring the long nineteenth century back into human rights history, especially the histories of social and economic rights, women’s rights, humanitarianism and international law, to assess more precisely what is new about the human rights idealism of the late twentieth century. Conversely, I shall discuss which previous notions of international human rights were replaced or bypassed in the 1990s, especially collective rights claims that were of particular importance for the so-called Third World UN from the 1950s to the early 1990s. The unrecognized irony is that human rights have become not less but more Eurocentric in recent years. 

Human rights are not a new (and certainly not the last) utopia. Rather, the question is whether the human rights idealism of the Euro-Atlantic world at the end of the twentieth century can be seen as utopian at all. It is other motifs that appear to be new: the self-evidence of individual human rights, which stand above the rights of states; the evocation of present and past suffering as a mobilizing source; and, finally, the global claims connected to human rights as well as the media presentism of their failed realization, that is, the ubiquity of crises and the state of emergency as a matter of course. The ‘endtimes of human rights’ (Steven Hopgood) are the global here and now, not a utopian ‘elsewhere’. From this follows, thirdly, my concluding suggestion that the rise of human rights as the crisis semantics of a new fin de siècle can be understood in part as a result of the fracturing of the modern time regime, that is, the ways in which past, present and future are reflected in our experience of time. Not the future (or an idealized past) serves as the vanishing point, but rather the present, which appropriates past and future to validate the immediate. The new historiography of human rights also belongs, I think, in this context. It invents for our times a history of human rights conceived as individual and pre-state rights which are read into the past and future as if without alternatives.

21 June 2022

SOCI

The ANAO report 'Administration of Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy: Department of Home Affairs' (Auditor-General Report No.38 2021–22) comments 

The department’s administration and regulation of critical infrastructure protection policy was partly effective. 

The department has partly effective governance arrangements to administer critical infrastructure protection policy. Implementation of critical infrastructure related risk assessments and reporting was not captured in risk documentation. The effectiveness of the department’s stakeholder coordination arrangements is reduced by not having an engagement strategy and providing limited support to other critical infrastructure regulators. The department’s performance framework as it related to critical infrastructure was not adequate, with performance statements, regulatory performance assessment, and use of internal measures to inform policy and regulation requiring improvement. 

The department’s administration of compliance activities consistent with critical infrastructure protection requirements is partly effective. The department’s compliance framework does not reflect existing responsibilities or compliance requirements. Compliance activities are not supported by approved procedures or systems controls. The department has not established a risk-based decision framework for achieving compliance outcomes or demonstrating its impact on asset security or resilience. The department does not have a process of effectively reviewing its use of regulation tools, impact on industry or to inform continuous improvement. 

Supporting findings 

Governance arrangements 

10. The department identified key critical infrastructure risks and had appropriate governance arrangements to assess and assign responsibility for these risks. The department’s critical infrastructure risk management does not represent an integrated approach to risk management between its enterprise and operational, legislative and policy functions. Implementation of critical infrastructure related risk assessments and reporting was not captured in risk documentation, which reduces its use to inform business planning, legislative reform, and policy decisions. (See paragraphs 2.3 to 2.23) 

11. While the department undertakes coordination activities with key stakeholders, including through some long-established forums, it does not have a documented stakeholder engagement strategy to identify the engagement purpose, means by which engagement occurs or scenarios are managed, or the basis for there being more established information-sharing arrangements with some key stakeholders than with others. (See paragraphs 2.26 to 2.35) 

12. The department’s performance framework requires improvement. Critical infrastructure related content in the department’s 2020–21 performance statements is not adequate. The department did not assess its critical infrastructure functions against the Regulator Performance Framework. The department has established internal performance reporting but could improve its use of measures in the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy to inform policy development and regulation. (See paragraphs 2.38 to 2.51) 

Compliance activities 

13. The department has established a compliance framework comprised of the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, Compliance Strategy and Administrative Guidelines. This framework would be enhanced by updating documents in the framework to align with and clarify the department’s existing responsibilities and regulatory posture. (See paragraphs 3.2 to 3.7) 

14. The majority of policy and procedural documents (15 of 22) to support possible critical infrastructure related compliance activities were drafted, but not finalised and approved, or included in the department’s policy and procedural repository. A lack of procedures, or procedures that remain in draft, increases the risk of inconsistency in administration and decision-making. The department does not have an established process to ensure that appropriately trained officials are engaged in investigations under critical infrastructure regulations. Classified network and critical infrastructure-related system security controls do not meet the requirements to mitigate the risk of unauthorised access. (See paragraphs 3.10 to 3.20) 

15. The department’s use of regulatory tools is not always consistent with legislative and procedural requirements, and approved procedures or decision records do not exist for all compliance activities and outcomes. Use of regulatory tools was consistent with the department’s documented regulatory posture. Decisions on whether to escalate to higher tiers of the regulatory compliance model were not supported by approved procedures, processes, or documented analysis of the administrative or financial burden associated with an escalation of compliance activity. (See paragraphs 3.23 to 3.29) 

16. The department does not have an established process to obtain assurance of regulatory compliance. This limited the department’s capacity to demonstrate that it has a proportionate and effective approach to resolving non-compliance, or has improved the security or resilience of critical infrastructure assets. (See paragraphs 3.30 to 3.44) 

17. The department has not established a process to effectively review regulatory tool use, impacts on industry, or lessons learned to inform continuous improvement. (See paragraphs 3.45 to 3.46)

The  Recommendations are

Recommendation no. 1 Paragraph 2.24 Recommendation no. 2 Paragraph 2.36 The Department of Home Affairs ensures that implementation of critical infrastructure related risk assessments and reporting is appropriate to inform policy and regulatory decisions. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs establish an engagement strategy to document how it will coordinate with stakeholders with shared responsibility for critical infrastructure security and resilience. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. Recommendation no. 3 Paragraph 2.52 

Recommendation no. 4 Paragraph 3.8 Recommendation no. 5 Paragraph 3.21 The Department of Home Affairs ensure performance measurement: 1. (a) in its corporate plan is adequate and measurable; 2. (b) aligns with the Regulator Performance Guide; and 3. (c) is used to inform policy and regulatory improvements. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs revise or replace the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy with documentation that reflects current policy, regulatory responsibilities and posture, and outlines its application by the department in relation to other critical infrastructure asset sector policy leads and regulators. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs support effective use of the full suite of available critical infrastructure related regulatory tools by having in place procedures that: 1. (a) are finalised, approved and lodged on the internal policy and procedural repository; 2. (b) ensure that trained officials are appropriately engaged in investigations; and 3. (c) align with the Protective Security Policy Framework and Information Security Manual requirements. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs approve, apply and monitor consistent use of policies, procedures and processes to: 1. (a) trigger, triage and manage escalated use of critical infrastructure compliance powers, including by making better use of its information gathering, and investigatory powers where national security concerns have been identified; and 2. (b) revise its risk approach and implement processes that enable effective assessment, prioritisation and management of non-compliance risks. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. 

Recommendation no. 6 Paragraph 3.39 Recommendation no. 7 Paragraph 3.47 The Department of Home Affairs evaluate, monitor, and report on: 1. (a) the extent to which regulatory tools are used to effectively improve security and resilience of critical infrastructure assets to risks; and 2. (b) implementation of actionable items in strategies, reviews and lessons learned for which it is responsible and how they contribute to intended outcomes. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed.

For some cyber security students the report's value will be in contextualisation paragraphs such as

1.1 Australian society and its economy are supported by a network of interconnected infrastructure assets across a broad range of industry sectors. The Australian Government defines critical infrastructure as:

those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia's ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. 

1.2 Threats such as natural disasters, pandemics, sabotage, and espionage have the potential to significantly disrupt critical infrastructure. Secure and resilient infrastructure ensures continuous access to services that are essential for everyday life, such as food, water, health, energy, communications, transport, and banking. A disruption to any of these critical infrastructure sectors could have serious implications for business, government, and the community. 

1.3 The Commonwealth, state and territory governments have different responsibilities for critical infrastructure depending on the sector or nature of the threats being mitigated. Responses to a threat can involve the asset owner and operator, technical and operational lead for that jurisdiction, and emergency services or law enforcement. Coordination among entities is therefore required to prepare and respond to critical infrastructure threats. 

1.4 The Department of Home Affairs (the department) is the lead Australian Government agency responsible for the administration of critical infrastructure policy and regulation. 

Critical infrastructure policy and regulation 

Regulatory options 

1.5 Governments may approach regulation through either legislative or non-legislative models. Non-legislative models involve achieving regulatory ends through non-legislative means, such as guidelines on market participants, and can include light touch or principles-based regulation4, self-regulation5 and quasi-regulation. Legislated approaches involve either  co-regulation or explicit government regulation, which is used where ‘there is a high perceived risk or public interest and achieving compliance is seen as critically important’. 

1.6 Australian Government regulators are empowered by, and subject to, a range of legal and other requirements including the following.

• Legislation that establishes the regulatory powers of an entity, and underpinning policies and relevant directions. 

• The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 along with delegated legislation such as the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014, the Commonwealth Procurement Rules, and the Commonwealth Risk Management Policy. 

• The Australian Government Regulator Performance Framework — introduced in October 2014 — to encourage regulators to achieve their objectives while minimising their impact on regulated entities. On 1 July 2021, the Regulator Performance Guide replaced the 2014 Framework and included a transition year for regulators to assess their approach to complying with its requirements. 

1.7 The Australian Government’s critical infrastructure regime is comprised of a combination of light touch, co-regulation and explicit government regulation. 

Overview of the Australian Government critical infrastructure regime 

1.8 Terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and Indonesia in 2002, were the catalyst for formal engagement between the Commonwealth, state and territory governments, and industry on how to prepare for and respond to threats against critical infrastructure assets. In 2003, the Australian Government established a Trusted Information Sharing Network as the primary engagement mechanism for business and government information sharing, and resilience building initiatives on critical infrastructure. 

1.9 Prior to the introduction of critical infrastructure focussed policy and legislation in 201810, national security threats to assets were primarily assessed under the Foreign Investment and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA). Under the FATA, certain proposed foreign investments, including those related to critical infrastructure assets require approval from the Treasurer. Conditions may be imposed, existing conditions may be varied, or a divestment from an approved investment may be required where a national security risk emerges. 

1.10 The Treasury remains the lead entity for assessments under the FATA. The department provides national security advice to support decisions made under the FATA, and may impose and enforce conditions on approved applications. In 2020–21, the department received 943 applications for review from the Treasury, an increase from the 640 received during 2019–20.

1.11 The Australian Government Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy was released in May 2015.11 The strategy comprises a policy statement and plan, and sets out the Australian Government’s policy position that:

• critical infrastructure is essential to Australia’s economic and social prosperity; • resilient critical infrastructure plays an essential role in supporting broader community and disaster resilience; • businesses and governments have a shared responsibility for the resilience of critical infrastructure, requiring strong partnerships; and • all states and territories have their own critical infrastructure programs that best fit the operating environments and arrangements in each jurisdiction. 

1.12 The policy statement sets out an approach based on non-regulatory business–government partnerships, mature risk management, and effective information sharing. The policy statement required the strategy to be reviewed in 2020. 

1.13 The Critical Infrastructure Centre was established in 2017 to coordinate the management of risks to Australia’s critical infrastructure and deliver more coordinated national security assessments to inform foreign investment decisions in significant and complex cases. In December 2017, critical infrastructure policy, regulatory and strategy functions were transferred to the department and the Critical Infrastructure Centre became a division within the department. 

Critical infrastructure legislation 

1.14 In 2018, legislative coverage of the security of critical infrastructure expanded from the FATA to include: 

• the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SoCI Act), which commenced on 11 July 2018; and 

• the amendments to Part 14 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, or Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR), which commenced on 18 September 2018. 

1.15 The legislation in paragraph 1.14 enables the government to obtain information to undertake risk assessments in relation to critical infrastructure, and gives government the power to issue directions to address national security risks if necessary. 

Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 

1.16 The SoCI Act was introduced to ‘strengthen the Government’s capacity to manage the national security risks of espionage, sabotage and coercion arising from foreign involvement in Australia’s critical infrastructure’.  The SoCI Act defines a critical infrastructure asset, and what assets can, and must not be prescribed as being ‘critical’.  The SoCI Act has three measures to manage national security risks related to critical infrastructure.

• The Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets (the Register), provides the government visibility of who owns and controls the assets. 

 • The information gathering power, provides the ability to obtain more detailed information from owners and operators of assets in certain circumstances. 

• The Ministerial directions powers, provide the ability to intervene and issue directions in cases where there are significant national security concerns that cannot be addressed through other means. 

1.17 In 2020, the Australian Government approved changes to the critical infrastructure regulatory regime on the basis that the SoCI Act did not enable it to impose requirements on entities to protect their assets, and an over-reliance on the FATA to manage risks arising from foreign ownership. In 2020, the department sought public contributions on the design of ‘an enhanced regulatory framework, building on existing requirements under the SoCI Act’. 

1.18 In December 2020, the Australian Government introduced a Bill that included amendments to the SoCI Act. These amendments would enact the regulatory framework that was the subject of public consultation. The Bill proposed mandatory incident reporting, an expanded application of the register of critical infrastructure sectors and assets, powers to obtain ownership, operational and risk management information, and powers to respond to serious cyber incidents. The amendments to the SoCI Act were described when they were introduced, as being ‘underpinned by enhancements to Government’s existing education, communication and engagement activities, under a refreshed Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy’. 

1.19 In December 2020, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) commenced an inquiry into the Bill that would amend the SoCI Act, as well as a statutory review into the Act.  In September 2021 the PJCIS published an Advisory Report on the concurrent reviews of the Bill and statutory review of the SoCI Act and made 14 recommendations. Among   the recommendations was that the Bill be split in two so that government assistance and an expanded definition of critical infrastructure sectors and assets could be legislated in the shortest time possible. 

1.20 An additional $42.4 million over two years from 2021–2221 was included in the 2021–22 Budget for ‘Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Systems of National Significance’.

• In September 2021, the Critical Infrastructure Centre was re-branded as the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre. 

• In December 2021, amendments to the SoCI Act expanded the asset classes covered from four to 22 across 11 sectors to include: communications, financial services and markets, data storage and processing, defence industry, higher education and research, energy, food and grocery, health care and medical, space technology, transport, and water and sewerage.  The department estimated that it would have ten times the number of assets on its Register under the SoCI Act as a result of this change. 

• Also in December 2021, the Australian Government commenced consultations on further amendments to the SoCI Act.   

• In March 2022, the PJCIS published an Advisory Report on the proposed further amendments to the SoCI Act and made 11 recommendations.

1.21 In March 2022, the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Act 2022 was passed by the Parliament. Details of changes to Australian Government critical infrastructure legislation are in Appendix 3. 

Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms 

1.22 The TSSR established a regulatory framework ‘to better manage the national security risks of espionage, sabotage and foreign interference to Australia’s telecommunications networks and facilities’.  The purpose of the TSSR is to:

• introduce a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework to better manage national security risks of espionage, sabotage and foreign interference to Australia’s telecommunications networks and facilities; and 

• better protect networks, and the confidential information stored on and carried across them, from unauthorised interference and access. 

1.23 The aim of the TSSR is to encourage early engagement on proposed changes to networks and services that could give rise to national security risks, and to facilitate collaboration on the management of those risks. Key elements of the TSSR include: 

• a security obligation that requires all carriers, carriage service providers and carriage service intermediaries to do their best to protect networks and facilities from unauthorised access or interference; 

• a notification obligation that requires carriers and nominated carriage service providers to notify the Australian Government of planned changes to their networks and services that are likely to have a material adverse effect on their capacity to comply with the security obligation; 

• that the Secretary of the department can obtain information and documents for the purpose of assessing carriers and carriage service providers compliance with their security obligations; and 

• that the Minister for Home Affairs can direct a carrier, carriage service provider or carriage service intermediary to:  − not use or supply carriage services if the Minister considers the use or supply prejudicial to national security; and  − do, or not do, a specified thing that is reasonably necessary to protect networks and facilities from national security risks. 

1.24 In September 2020, the PJCIS commenced a statutory review of the operation of the TSSR. The PJCIS published its report on the statutory review in February 2022 and made six recommendations.  ...

Critical infrastructure security and resilience roles 

1.26 The Commonwealth, state and territory governments, and industry, have a shared responsibility to ensure the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, and to prevent, prepare, respond to, and recover from all hazards. Each participant has different roles as shown in Table 1.1. 

1.27 The Department, as the lead agency for ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure, must coordinate, complement, and support the programs and activities of all these participants. When the Critical Infrastructure Centre and SoCI Act were established, it was recognised that the Australian Government would have limited powers to implement risk management strategies, and monitor and enforce compliance, and should first leverage existing state and territory regimes to conduct these activities.

20 June 2022

NZ Sovereign Citizen claims

Another New Zealand sovereign citizen judgment - Simon v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 222. 

The Court states 

 [1] Mr Simon is facing a number of sexual and violence charges. He is currently detained at Spring Hill Corrections Facility. In December 2021 Mr Simon applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Venning J dismissed the application. Mr Simon appeals. 

[2] On an application for habeas corpus by a person detained in prison the Department of Corrections has the onus of proving that the applicant is being detained lawfully. It can do so by producing a committal warrant or other authorisation to detain. It is then for the applicant to show that the document produced does not justify detention in the particular circumstances. 

[3] Mr Simon filed written submissions and addressed us orally. He explained that he had not received the respondent’s submissions prior to the hearing in the High Court. This was, apparently, the result of a delay within the prison in providing Mr Simon with the submissions. As a result, we invited Mr Simon to make the submissions he wished to make in the High Court as well as to identify any error in the Judge’s decision. 

[4] Mr Simon argued that there is a distinction between himself, as a “natural person” and the “legal person/corpus body” named in the warrant. From Mr Simon’s assertions that he could not be compelled to enter into any contract, we infer that he regards the authority of the court as a matter of consent by him and that since he does consent to be bound by the authority of the Court, the warrant is not a valid basis on which to detain him. 

[5] Arguments similar to this, based on the concept of the “ sovereign citizen ” are regularly made in New Zealand courts. However, they have no legal basis and cannot succeed. All persons in New Zealand are subject to the laws made by the New Zealand Parliament and to the authority of the courts in enforcing those laws.

In respect of para 5 the Court refers to 

See, for example, Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 105 at [10]–[11]; Warren v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 20; Rangitaawa v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2013] NZCA 2 at [5]; Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZHC 2811 at [20]; Wallace v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 1 at [4]–[5].

In Rangitaawa v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2013] NZCA 2 the Court states

 [5] The appellant does not challenge the existence of the warrants and the bail judgment mentioned above. However, he claims he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court. He is, rather, subject to the jurisdiction of his hapu. There have been a number of decisions of this Court in which it has been made clear that arguments based on an assertion that the New Zealand Parliament does not have power to make laws affecting some or all the persons living in New Zealand cannot succeed. All New Zealand Courts are bound to accept the validity of Acts of Parliament, including, in the present case, the Land Transport Act 1998 and the Crimes Act 1961. All persons living in New Zealand are subject to the jurisdiction of the New Zealand Courts. 

[6] The appellant also claimed that he is Rangatira Graham Rangitaawa and that the person having that name is a different person from Graham Colin Rangitaawa. However, as he acknowledged himself during the hearing before us, it was Rangatira Graham Rangitaawa who pleaded guilty to the offence for which the sentence of imprisonment for nine months was imposed. In his written submissions, he suggested that Graham Colin Rangitaawa was “a legal entity in ‘trust’ with the Registrar-General in office with Internal Affairs New Zealand”. We do not need to engage with that proposition. We are satisfied that, having pleaded guilty to the count for which the sentence of imprisonment was imposed, the appellant is the person who is required to serve that sentence.

Elites

'The social origins and schooling of a scientific elite: Fellows of the royal society born from 1900' by Erzsébet Bukodi, John H. Goldthorpe and Inga Steinberg in (2022) British Journal of Sociology comments 

We present an analysis of the social composition of the UK scientific elite, as represented by Fellows of the Royal Society, in terms of Fellows' social class origins and type of secondary schooling. From various sources, we have assembled data for 1691 Fellows, representing 80% of our target population of all Fellows born from 1900 onwards whose scientific careers were spent predominantly in the UK. We find that while these elite scientists come largely from more advantaged class backgrounds, it is professional rather than business or managerial families that are the main source of their recruitment—and, increasingly, such families where a parent is in a STEM occupation. Recruitment from working-class families has declined and for most recent birth cohorts almost ceased. The scientific elite is thus now more homogeneous as regards the social origins of its members than it was in the second half of the twentieth century. At the same time, little change is evident in the secondary schooling of Fellows. In all birth cohorts, between two-fifths and a half of all—and over two-thirds of those from more advantaged class backgrounds—were privately educated, although the proportion attending Clarendon schools would seem low compared with that in other elites. A further finding of interest is that some variation in Fellows' class origins and type of schooling exists across different research fields. 

 The authors state 

This paper is the first in a planned series on the sociology of the UK scientific elite, as represented by Fellows of the Royal Society. In this research, we aim to exemplify a new approach to elite studies that we have outlined elsewhere (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2021) and that, we believe, treats questions of the social composition, openness, and power or, more generally, effectiveness of elites in a more integrated way than hitherto. We plan to extend this approach to a range of other—including the UK political and economic—elites. But our initial focus on a scientific elite reflects our view that in the context of rising concerns over such issues as global warming, pandemics, and the threats as well as the potential of AI, greater research attention needs to center on scientific elites in view of the increasingly important sociopolitical role that they would seem destined to play. 

The study of scientific elites has in fact a long, though rather discontinuous, history, and has been driven by significantly differing interests. 

In the nineteenth century, a central concern was with the relative importance of heredity and environment in the creation of scientific genius. A notable controversy on this issue occurred between Francis Galton and the Swiss botanist, Alphonse de Candolle. Relying mainly on the analysis of pedigrees, including those of Fellows of the Royal Society, Galton (1869, 1874; Galton & Schuster, 1906) persisted in the view that heredity was the dominant factor in outstanding intellectual achievement in all fields, science included. Such achievement ‘ran in families’, and those few men from hitherto undistinguished families who rose to intellectual eminence—as, say, through being elected Fellows of the Royal Society—were to be regarded as ‘sports’, whose characteristics would in turn be ‘transmissible by heredity’, as animal and plant breeders well knew (Galton & Schuster, 1906, p. xlii). De Candolle, on the basis of a study (1885) of the social backgrounds of over 300 scientists who were foreign members of European scientific academies—that is, who had gained international recognition—challenged Galton's almost exclusive emphasis on heredity. While accepting that scientific excellence did have some tendency to run in families, he pointed to the part played by ‘family traditions’, and also stressed that the number of those attaining such excellence was strongly conditioned by national cultural and institutional environments that favored or disfavored the promotion of scientific ability. 

In this regard, Galton came to agree with de Candolle on at least one point1: the importance of the character and quality of national educational systems. Education in English ‘public schools’ and at Oxford and Cambridge, Galton maintained, was ‘conducted in the interests of the clergy’ and was strongly opposed to science. And although this ‘gigantic monopoly’ of the clergy was slowly yielding, a notable contrast remained with Scotland, where schools and universities were far more conducive to the development of ‘a taste for science’ (Galton, 1874, pp. 259–260). 

In the earlier twentieth century, interest in, and the study of, scientific elites became increasingly centered in the United States, and with a changing focus. Pioneering work of influence was that of the German-trained psychologist, James Cattell (see esp., 1915). Cattell thought that the issue of the relative importance of heredity and environment in scientific ability was misconceived: ‘it is like asking whether the extension of a spiral spring is due to the spring or the force applied to it. Some springs cannot be extended by a foot by any force; no spring can be extended without force’ (1915, p. 6). Cattell's main concern was with how far in the US scientific potential was being adequately exploited in the national interest. He established a list of 1154 ‘leading scientific men’ in the US, based on the rankings of others in their fields, and sent these men a questionnaire dealing with various aspects of their families of origin. Analyzing data from the 975 completed questionnaires that were returned to him, he found that the American scientific elite was predominantly recruited from ‘the professional classes’—from the sons (daughters did not figure) of physicians, lawyers, clergy and teachers. Far fewer came from business or farm families, fewer still from the families of skilled workers, and none at all from the families of domestic servants and unskilled labourers. Overall, the professional classes contributed, in proportion to their numbers in the American population, 14 times more leading scientists than did all other classes together. Cattell concluded (1915, p. 8) that while the number of individuals ‘capable of exhibiting genius is limited’, it was evident that ‘many of them are lost through lack of opportunity’, and he underlined the damaging consequences for national economic and social development and prestige. 

In what was essentially a follow-up study to Cattell's, Stephen Visher (1947), a social geographer, exploited the American Men of Science directory, which had taken over Cattell's method of identifying the leaders in a field. He focused on the 2607 scientists who were thus ‘starred’ in successive editions of the directory from 1903 to 1943, and as well as accumulating published biographical material on these individuals, sent a questionnaire, similar to Cattell's, to the 1443 who were still alive, obtaining responses from 905. Visher's analyses of this body of data led to results that he regarded as disappointing so far as the recruitment of the scientific elite was concerned. He found little change in the situation described by Cattell. The children of professionals, and especially of professionals living in larger urban areas, continued to be quite disproportionately represented among leading scientists, while there was little increase in the proportion coming from the broadly defined working class. 

In Britain, the interest in the scientific elite shown by Galton was not sustained. So far as we are aware, it was not until a study by Choobbasti (2007) that any research at all comparable to that of Cattell and Visher was undertaken.  In treating the scientific elite as being constituted by Fellows of the Royal Society, Choobasti's study could be regarded as a direct precursor of that on which we here report. It has, however, major limitations. Choobbasti invited all current Fellows whose email addresses were available on the Society's website as of 2005—525 in total—to complete a web-based questionnaire relating to their social backgrounds. Unfortunately, after two follow-ups, still only 102 Fellows had responded, and since at the time rather less than half of all Fellows provided an email address, it has to be reckoned that Choobbasti obtained information on less than 10% of his target population. Using the Registrar-General's Social Classes as a basis for analysis—despite this categorization being for some time outmoded—Choobbasti felt able to claim (2007, p. 142) that ‘a remarkable proportion of intergenerational mobility’ was revealed in that 65% of Fellows' fathers did not have professional occupations. 

In our own research, we do wish, eventually, to take up the issues raised in this earlier work of the extent to which social ‘skews’ in the composition of the scientific elite reflect inequalities of opportunity and thus a potential wastage of talent. However, as we have previously observed (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2021), in addressing such issues, in the case of any elite, simply comparing distributions of its members' social origins or of their type of education with distributions estimated for national populations at large, although a common practice, is unduly limited. Comparisons need also to be made with distributions in the ‘pool’ from which elite members are generally drawn. And how far skews result from the processes of selection or election from the pool and how far from the social character of the pool itself is a matter of evident importance. 

In the present paper, we take as being of interest, and as prior to other concerns, essentially descriptive questions relating to the social composition of the British scientific elite, as this is represented by Fellows of the Royal Society. In treating the scientific elite in this way, we follow the approach for which we have earlier argued (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2021) of defining elites by some kind of institutional or associational reference, so as to avoid making what might be regarded as our own, more or less arbitrary, judgments.  We here focus on the degree of social homogeneity of the scientific elite, thus understood, in terms of the social origins, specifically the social class origins, of Fellows of the Royal Society and of their type of schooling. We analyze the extent to which the composition of the elite in these respects has changed over time, and also on the extent to which variation in this composition may exist within the elite—that is, across different scientific fields. In a forthcoming companion paper, we will then extend these analyses to Fellows' university education, at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. 

The social composition of elites has of late attracted growing attention in that an undue degree of social homogeneity has been seen as a source of problems of stasis, ‘group think’ and ‘cultural disconnect’ in elite outlook and policy. In the British case, see, for example, on the governmental elite, King and Crewe (2013) and on elites more generally, Social Mobility Commission (2019). The Royal Society has in fact been itself subject to criticism in this regard (Røstvik & Fyfe, 2018). That is, over its difficulties in moving on from being a ‘gentlemanly space’—or more caustically ‘a musty old boys club’—in which an ethos of gentlemanly conduct proved, if only inadvertently, to be in various respects damaging to women scientists, both within and outside of the Society. 

Finally, it will also emerge that starting out from questions of composition serves to bring out issues in the study of elites that seem not always to have been appreciated in earlier work. In particular, the connection between the social homogeneity of elites and the openness of access to them can be more complex than has generally been recognised.

19 June 2022

Regulation and Interpretation

Lee J at [22] in LCM Funding Pty Ltd v Stanwell Corporation Limited [2022] FCAFC 103 comments 

The conclusion that these types of litigation funding arrangements are not managed investment schemes may be thought by some as meaning such arrangements are “unregulated” and hence dangerous. But the spectre of their operation in some sort of Bir Tawil zone where no laws apply can be dismissed. Overwhelmingly, litigation resulting from such funding arrangements adopts the form of a class action. At all stages during the currency of such litigation, the Court is required to adopt a close protective and supervisory role, be alive to the interests of group members and to take steps to ensure that any class action is conducted in a way which best facilitates the just resolution of the disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Relatedly, the Court is also obliged to protect group members and manage the class action recognising that conflicts of interest, or conflicts of duty and interest, between and among representatives, group members, funders and solicitors can arise. When this is understood and appreciated, any criticism that litigation funding arrangements are “unregulated” is put into proper context. 

 In Alexander v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 19 Edelman J states 

[180] There are four questions raised by this special case. First, is s 36B of the Australian Citizenship Act supported by a head of Commonwealth legislative power? Secondly and thirdly, is s 36B inconsistent with two asserted implied limitations upon the Commonwealth legislative power under s 51(xix) of the Constitution? Fourthly, does s 36B repose in the Minister "the exclusively judicial function of punishing criminal guilt"? 

[181] As to the first question, the only head of power relied upon by the defendants to support s 36B is the power over "naturalization and aliens" in s 51(xix) of the Constitution. This raises the question of how the meaning of "alien" – a foreigner to the political community – is to be applied. On the approach of the defendants, all dual citizens fall within the aliens power. Therefore, there is power to pass a law such as s 36B of the Australian Citizenship Act simply because all the people to whom it applies are dual citizens. That would mean that, subject to any separate implied limits, the Commonwealth Parliament would have the power to strip persons like Mr Alexander of their citizenship solely because they are dual citizens. The defendants also argued that s 36B is a valid law because the Commonwealth has power in circumstances described as "repudiation of allegiance" to make non‑aliens into aliens. 

182 The application of the essential meaning of "alien" that was urged by the defendants has the likely consequence that potentially half of the permanent population of Australia are aliens, being dual (or more) citizens, being born overseas, or having at least one parent who does not hold Australian citizenship. Almost by definition, something must have gone wrong in the application by this Court of the meaning of the Constitution for it to be concluded that the Commonwealth Parliament has power to legislate on the premise that potentially half of the people of the Commonwealth of Australia are foreigners to the political community of the Commonwealth of Australia. 

[183] Nevertheless, the defendants' approach was only an incremental extension of the present state of the law concerning the application of the aliens power. That approach is the result of the compounding effect of a series of decisions of this Court. Those decisions have seen an imperial march of the application of the aliens power, extending it far beyond any ordinary understanding, capturing more and more members of the permanent population of the Commonwealth of Australia. At some point it will become necessary to confront the correctness of those decisions rather than tip‑toeing around them, carefully confining them by tiny exceptions, or restricting their scope by recognising implied constitutional constraints such as those raised by the second and third questions in this special case. It is not necessary to do so in this case because none of the decisions was challenged. 

[184] The compounding effect of the decisions of this Court began in 1982, when this Court first held that persons who had been unconditionally absorbed into the Australian political community were still within the reach of the aliens power. From that premise, and case by case, the application of the essential meaning of "alien" – a foreigner to the Australian political community – was extended further and further to apply to persons who had less and less "foreign" connection. It might seem like only another small, incremental step to conclude that Mr Alexander is a foreigner to the Australian political community, despite his birth in Australia to two permanent members of the Australian body politic. But, with an appreciation that the decisions of this Court may have already stretched the application of alien beyond breaking point, that is a step that should not now be taken. 

[185] Although s 36B cannot validly apply to persons simply on the basis that they are dual citizens, and would not have applied to Mr Alexander at the time of his birth, the aliens power does permit the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate, as it did in s 36B of the Australian Citizenship Act, in relation to non‑aliens who act in a manner that has been described as a repudiation of their allegiance to Australia. The aliens power permits the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate in relation to some people who were not aliens in extreme cases where circumstances or conduct are capable of making them into aliens. One such circumstance is where a person's conduct is so wrongful and extreme that it can be judged to be inconsistent with continuing membership of the political community. That is the effect of s 36B, so, subject to any other constitutional limits, s 36B would therefore be valid. ... 

[187] It has been suggested that the aliens power resembles legislative powers conferred by the Constitution on the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to a legal status, such as bankruptcy, trade marks, and marriage, rather than resembling legislative powers conferred by the Constitution with respect to physical things, like lighthouses, lightships, beacons, and buoys. There are grave difficulties with the creation of separate constitutional principles within s 51 according to those classes concerned with physical things and those concerned with legal status on the basis that the former "are fixed by external nature" and "cannot well be extended". 

[188] All of the powers in s 51 are expressed by words which convey meaning, with the meaning anchored in its essence, at the appropriate level of generality, by the contemporary understanding at Federation. That meaning is ideational. It is not confined to categories of physical things or legal status. Indeed, numerous powers might even derive the essence of their meaning from both. For instance, fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits are concerned with both physical things and legal status. So are bills of exchange or promissory notes. The custody and guardianship of infants concerns both people and legal status, and so does "the influx of criminals". Further, just as the application of the essential meaning of words that describe a legal status can change, so too a power that appears limited to purely physical things, such as a lighthouse, lightship, beacon, or buoy, might arguably extend to things never contemplated in 1900 but which are within the same concept, fulfilling the same purpose, such as global positioning system software for seafarers. 

[189] Although there is no warrant for creating new and separate constitutional categories within s 51, the character of a s 51 power can still influence the interpretation of the power, particularly where the character reveals a purpose of the power. But one matter must be common in the interpretation of every power in s 51. It is an axiom of constitutional law in Australia that "[t]he validity of a law ... cannot be made to depend on the opinion of the law‑maker": "a stream cannot rise higher than its source". Hence, no power in s 51 of the Constitution, whether in relation to legal status or not, is with respect to a subject matter that is determined by the opinion of the Commonwealth Parliament. The Parliament is not empowered to make laws based solely on the criterion that, in its opinion, the law is with respect to a status of bankruptcy, trade marks, or marriage. 

[190] In the context of bankruptcy, the legislative power is ample but it extends only "to regulate all matters which fairly fall within that subject". The power is constrained by reference to the "essential feature ... that provision is made for the appropriation of the assets of the debtor and their equitable distribution amongst [their] creditors, and for the discharge of the debtor from future liability for [their] existing debts". 

[191] In the context of trade marks, it has been emphasised that "[i]f the thing is not of itself within the meaning, an Act of Parliament cannot make it so". If the Parliament were to enact legislation dealing with a matter which did not have the "essential qualities" or "common attributes" of a trade mark, it would not be "in essence a species within the language of the legislative powers" and would "amount to an attempt to amend the Constitution by a process not sanctioned by the Charter". 

[192] In relation to passing laws dealing with the personal relationships that are the consequences of the marriage power, it has been observed that, "[s]o far as they can be regulated by law without impairing the essence of marriage", laws about the consequences of marriage, such as cohabitation, would "properly be called laws with respect to marriage". The power "does not support a law which so regulates the incidents of marriage as to impair the essence of marriage". In other words, "[t]he term marriage bears its own limitations and Parliament cannot enlarge its meaning". An exercise of "constitutional interpretation of the marriage power would be an exercise in hopeless circularity if the Parliament could itself define the nature and incidents of marriage by laws enacted in purported pursuance of the power". ... 

Avoiding absurdity 

[196] In an apparently innocuous statement in the joint judgment in Chetcuti v The Commonwealth, four members of this Court said that it was a "settled understanding" that "the aliens power encompasses both power to determine who is and who is not to have the legal status of an alien and power to attach consequences to that status". If read literally, that statement would be a radical new theory of interpretation of constitutional heads of power. 

[197] If the statement in Chetcuti were read literally and without qualification, it might support an assumption that a constitutional alien is no more than the antonym of a statutory citizen. If that were true, then s 51(xix) would confer an unconstrained power on the Parliament to choose its own criteria for citizenship and thereby determine who is an alien and attach consequences to that alienage. Applied to other powers, this reasoning would mean that the Parliament could make laws to divest the assets of Croesus among his creditors on the basis that the Parliament determined for itself the meaning of bankruptcy, irrespective of the essential features inherent in the constitutional meaning of bankruptcy. The Parliament could "define 'trade mark' as including a will, and enact that no will shall be valid unless registered as a trade mark", contrary to "universal agreement in the laws of every part of the British Empire" at the time of Federation concerning "certain essentials founded in the origin and very nature of a trade mark". Or the Parliament could pass laws in relation to the merger of corporations, or forced, non‑consensual unions, on the basis of its own determination of what a marriage is, thus enlarging that meaning beyond its constitutional essence as "a consensual union formed between natural persons in accordance with legally prescribed requirements" and bearing certain characteristics. 

[198] The statement quoted above from the joint judgment in Chetcuti should not be read as rejecting a century of hornbook constitutional law. Rather, and consistently with the acknowledgement in the previous paragraph in Chetcuti that a law of the Parliament might need to be disapplied to the extent of "constitutional overreach" by treating "all non‑citizens as aliens", the statement in Chetcuti should be understood as saying no more than that the Commonwealth Parliament has power to set the criteria for who will, and who will not, be a statutory alien and the consequences of that, provided always that the exercise of that power is within the boundaries of the constitutional concept of "alien". In oral submissions, the defendants quite correctly accepted that position, conceding that the aliens power "cannot be used to treat, as an alien, someone who cannot answer that description on the ordinary understanding of the word". 

[199] The ordinary understanding of the word "alien" – its essential meaning – is simple and well‑established in this Court. At a reasonably high level of generality, which recognises the state of flux at lower levels of generality of the common law of alienage at the time of Federation[, an alien is a foreigner or outsider to the political community of the Australian body politic. The difficult question is how that ordinary understanding of "alien" is to be applied. 

[200] On the submission of the defendants, the application of alien extends to people who have any of the following characteristics, each of which involves some "foreign" element: (i) the person has dual citizenship; (ii) the person was not born in Australia; or (iii) at birth, the person had one or more parents who were not an Australian citizen. It is likely that these slight foreign connections describe more than half of the Australian population; the first criterion alone involves close to half of the Australian population and the second and third criteria together likely involve a similar proportion. On the defendants' submission, therefore, potentially half of the Australian population are aliens within the meaning of the Constitution and can therefore be treated in that way by legislation. 

[201] It is not to the point that it might be thought to be extremely unlikely that the Parliament would ever legislate to impose the consequences of alienage, potentially including deportation, upon half of Australia's population. The identification of the extreme reach of the power on the submissions of the defendants is not to propose an absurd or distorting possibility. Rather, the extreme reach of the power, over more than half of the population of Australia, and the infinite range of possible laws over those persons, or groups of them, which would be within the scope of the power illustrate the difficulties with the proposed interpretation. 

[202] The submission of the defendants was, nevertheless, a carefully devised formulation of the application of the essential meaning of "alien" which respected a line of authority in this Court since 1982. The extreme effect of the submission is only an incremental extension of a series of problematic decisions in this Court. Those decisions have developed the law to a point where the question that is asked of s 51(xix) is no longer which people are aliens. The question that is now asked is usually couched in the euphemism of "the Pochi limit to the aliens power". But that "limit" is not some outer extreme within which Parliament has free rein. Rather, it is an absolutely orthodox requirement that the aliens power be applied in accordance with its meaning. As the application of the aliens power has strayed further and further from its essential meaning, the question has become how to identify which categories or groups of people are not aliens. And as the groups of people who are not aliens have come to be treated as diminishingly smaller, the answer to that question has not been readily forthcoming. 

[203] This case is not the appropriate vehicle to consider the extent to which it is possible to unwind some, or all, of the arguable errors in the decisions of this Court. But, in order to address the submissions of the parties on the first issue in this special case, it is necessary to identify where potential missteps may have occurred in order to explain why the aliens power should not extend any further to dual citizens born in the same circumstances as Mr Alexander.

18 June 2022

TRIPS Waiver

'The COVID-19 TRIPS Waiver Process in Critical Review: An Appraisal of the WTO DG Text (IP/C/W/688) and Recommendations for Minimum Modifications' by Siva Thambisetty, Aisling McMahon, Luke McDonagh, Hyo Yoon Kang and Graham Dutfield comments

The original TRIPS waiver proposal made by India and South Africa in October 2020 was based on the need for affordable access to medical products for the prevention, containment of treatment of COVID-19 during the pandemic. That proposal sought to bring into force a waiver of WTO States’ TRIPS obligations with regard to patents, copyrights, industrial designs and undisclosed information as they relate to COVID-19 health technologies. In May 2021, we set out the legal and political case for this principles-based TRIPS waiver. Subsequent negotiations over the waiver have been difficult and protracted. Only in May 2022 did an apparent ‘compromise’ text emerge from the WTO Director General (DG), but without the explicit support of the waiver’s main proponents, India and South Africa, leading to concern over the scope and effectiveness of the DG text. In this paper we provide a short commentary that critiques the WTO DG text’s deficiencies and spells out the minimum modifications necessary for a meaningful workable text for use in the COVID-19 emergency context.

17 June 2022

Fictions

‘The Talented Mr. Mallory’: literary scammers, pain-for-profit, and selves made of others' by Alyson Miller in (2021) 18(2) New Writing: The International Journal for the Practice and Theory of Creative Writing 197-212 comments 

In 2019, Dan Mallory, book editor turned author of the enormously successful thriller, The Woman in the Window, was exposed as a pathological dissembler. Faking cancer, an Oxford PhD, a prestigious career, and tragic family deaths, Mallory constructed a distressing history in order to gain authority and influence. Examining the complexities of the fraud in relation to other contemporary fakes, this paper contends that impostors expose the value systems of power, especially those situated within gatekeeping institutions that enable grifters to thrive. It asserts that despite humiliating exposure, or the excoriation of outraged readers, the impostor invariably succeeds, perpetuating an exclusive monoculture in which the same voices, both real and imagined, are heard and received. The Mallory controversy emerges within a succession of impostures fixated on crossing boundaries from privilege to disadvantage and trauma, revealing an identity politics located within the commodification of the marketable ‘other’. The hunger for narratives of ‘authentic’ suffering comes to represent a form of literary virtue signalling which exploits ‘otherness’ to satisfy middle-class stereotypes and prejudices. Imbricated with issues of appropriation and theft, the fake treats suffering as an object to be possessed, yet also functions to uncover a sequence of literary and cultural fault-lines. 

 Miller states 

 Invariably described as charming, handsome, and clever, Dan Mallory, book editor turned novelist, is also a pathological dissembler (Parker 2019). With the release of The Woman in the Window (Finn 2018), a psychological thriller about an alcoholic agoraphobe, Mallory garnered extraordinary literary success: the manuscript sold in a two-million-dollar two-book deal, entered the Times bestseller list at number one, and has recently been adapted for film, starring Amy Adams and Gary Oldman (Parker 2019). A ‘hodgepodge’ (Crispin 2019) re-imagining of Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window (1954) and Jon Amiel’s Copycat (1995), The Woman in the Window nonetheless attracted enormous industry support, lauded by Stephen King as ‘unputdownable’, for example, whilst Gillian Flynn pronounced the novel an addictive and ‘mesmerising … noir for the new millennium’, with ‘stunning twists’ and ‘beautiful writing’. Yet it is in the extra-textual emplotments in which Mallory’s talent for fictivity evolved into ‘Nabokovian game-playing’ (Parker 2019). Via a contradictory series of bizarre autobiographical claims, Mallory constructed a complex alternate double-life, including significant traumas such as surviving a brain tumour and the death of a brother by suicide, alongside more aggrandising fabrications: modelling for Russian Vogue; working as an editor at prestigious publishing houses; and achieving a doctorate from Oxford. In line with the scandal surrounding James Frey, after a New Yorker exposé revealed the extensive, if not dichotomous, narrative of suffering and brilliance to be a sequence of cynical and calculated deceptions, Mallory was denounced as a Mr. Ripley performance artist, a charismatic impostor with a long history of ‘duping … with false stories about disease and death’ (Parker 2019). In a response statement, Mallory confessed to yet further suffering, claiming to be ‘afflicted with severe bipolar II disorder’, and experiencing ‘crushing depressions, delusional thoughts, morbid obsessions, and memory problems’: ‘It’s been horrific, not least because, in my distress, I did or said or believed things I would never ordinarily say or do – things of which, in many instances, I have absolutely no recollection’ (qu. ABC 2019). 

As Christopher L. Miller observes in Impostors, ‘deception is fundamental to literature’ (2018, 3), whilst the fraud – or the hoax, imposture, or forgery – is as old as writing itself. Surrounded by ‘screens, fakes, avatars, simulacra, and all manner of imitation’, contemporary audiences arguably attend less to the Platonic exhortation against the gap between mimesis and ‘true reality’, than to the Aristotelian enticement to revel in the fictional and the virtual, to embrace the pleasure of the unreal (3-4). The recognition of language as a form of creative play and of the mimetic as being ‘capable of so much more than truth-bearing’ (5) also frees the literary work, particularly in terms of its attachment to the figure of the author. Indeed, Roland Barthes argues that by removing an insistence on the role of the ‘Author-God’, and understanding text not ‘as a line of words releasing a single “theological” meaning … but as a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash’, both fixed meaning and signifying limits are rejected and refused (1977, 146–147). If the identity of the author is obsolete, and there is, Miller contends, ‘no origin to steal’, language itself reigns and hoaxing is not only ‘utterly inconsequential’ but also ‘entirely permissible’ (2018, 6). Certainly, it is rhetoric adopted by Mallory, who repeatedly, if not conveniently, insists on the irrelevance of the life of the writer: ‘I am not especially interested in author bios. I am buying their novel, not their memoir. I view it as a sign of respect not to want to know too much’ (qu. Benedictus 2019). Barthes thus asserts that the separation of a text and its author results in liberation from singular or ‘ultimate meaning’ which, as a ‘tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred’, is now constituted by the reader (1977, 147). Yet in the context of literary fakes, the clarity of such a borderline is radically unsettled, complicating not only ideas about the construction of self, but also the consequences of imposture. Whilst the manoeuvrings of a fraudulent author are often framed in terms of the enactment of a postmodern vision of identity, defined by a protean urge towards reinvention, the scandals surrounding fakery are also trapped within a ‘crossfire between play and truth’ (Miller 2018, 7). 

The effect, as this paper contends, is less concerned with arguments for the possibilities of an endlessly transforming selfhood; rather, it is about the revelation of a series of anxieties about privilege, representation, and power, in which the politics of identity are located within the marginalisation and commodification of the marketable ‘other’. Certainly, the fabrications created by Mallory seem fixed on obscuring ideas about stable subjectivities, suggesting a blurring of distinctions between real and unreal selves. Rooted in complex layers of literariness, and defined by gothic tropes of haunting, doubling, and liminality – augmented by admissions of mental illness – such a strategy alludes to notions of subjectivity as a series of narrative constructions that might be re-visioned in profound or shocking new formulations. It is an undoubtedly tempting proposition, yet in the context of fakes, also deeply problematic, imbricated with issues of appropriation and theft, of the plagiary of bodies as ‘raw material to be moulded, made up, made us of, and made off with’ (Young 2017, 434). As Kevin Young argues in Bunk, whilst the fraud or hoax ‘once meant to glorify’, the modern desire to ‘horrify’ denotes a radical shift through which suffering and trauma are regarded as objects to be possessed (98). Indeed, the rationale employed by impostors that suggests authenticity is little more than a façade or performance to be enacted is, as Cathy Park Hong contends, borrowing from James Baldwin, often a ‘delusion of whiteness’ that wilfully denies the systemic and material inequalities which inform the realities of ‘self’ and ‘other’:

The avant-garde's ‘delusion of whiteness’ is the specious belief that renouncing subject and voice is anti-authoritarian, when in fact such wholesale pronouncements are clueless that the disenfranchised need such bourgeois niceties like voice to alter conditions forged in history. The avant-garde's ‘delusion of whiteness’ is the luxurious opinion that anyone can be ‘post-identity’ and can casually slip in and out of identities like a video game avatar, when there are those who are consistently harassed, surveilled, profiled, or deported for whom they are. (2014)

Indeed, the Mallory imposture exposes the perverse capitalisation of marginality by fakes, who utilise discourses of ‘otherness’ as a vehicle through which to gain status and celebrity – representing a level of success traditionally denied to those who exist outside centres of power but made interesting and appealing by those whose performances neatly align with the expectations of majority culture